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Editors’ Note
Laurel Bard and Julia Matthews

“A Historic Result”: Populism, Political Culture, and Marine Le Pen in the 2017 French Presidential Election
Jasper Cattell

Conceptualizing the “Safety Tax” on Women: Examining safety products as a paradoxical form of empowerment
Brenna Cox

Blending in and Standing out: The Social Structure of Adolescent Victimization
Bernard Coles

One Size Does Not Fit All: Dual-Labor Market and Family Structure Among African Americans in the South, 1880-1920
Michael Chen

Notes on Contributors

Guide for Future Contributors

“The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.”
–Karl Marx, “XI” from “Theses on Feuerbach”
EDITORS' NOTE

It is with great excitement that we present the ninth volume of Eleven: The Undergraduate Journal of Sociology. This is the first volume to be directed by two editors-in-chief, and we hope that this collaboration, in conjunction with generous support from the University of California, Berkeley Department of Sociology, contributes to Eleven’s goal of showcasing important and unique undergraduate research in the social sciences. By making these works available to the public, we intend to inspire not only further academic research but also social and political action that bases itself in scientific facts.

This semester, our journal includes works regarding the global rise of far-right populism, the commodification of the fear of sexual assault, inter-adolescent violence and victimization, and the historical economic marginalization of black workers in the United States. All of these topics directly affect the lives of every person who lives in the United States as well as many who do not. In conjunction with Marx’s Eleventh Thesis, which implores academics to not only study the world but also to change it, we should let the knowledge we gain from these papers inspire us to think and act critically in our communities and beyond.

Our ninth volume opens with a piece by Jasper Cattel examining the cultural and political factors that led to the relative success of Marine Le Pen in the 2017 French elections. Though Le Pen ultimately lost the election, Cattel conducts a thorough analysis of political rhetoric and public opinion to explain the “historic” level of support given to her party by the French public, and how the factors that led to these events may apply in a broader, global context. Next, Brenna Cox qualitatively explores the institutional, organizational, and personal dimensions of the “Safety Tax,” a term she coins to refer to the unequal mental and financial burden placed on women as they are made responsible for their own personal safety. Cox’s paper highlights the paradoxical disempowerment inherent in selling empowerment to women in the form of safety products. Our third piece, written by Bernard Coles, studies the structural and interpersonal factors that contribute to adolescent victimization inside and out of the classroom. Coles innovatively weaves existing literature and survey data together to determine proximate causes of victimization while painting a compelling and heartbreaking picture of violence in certain communities. Finally, Michael Chen takes a historical approach to the sociological problem of understanding the relationship between economics and family structure by examining the experience of black families in America in the years between Reconstruction and World War I. He argues that black workers in this period faced a dual-labor market to which they creatively adapted, and that these adaptations have had a lasting impact on black family structures.

The pieces featured in this volume seek and reveal underlying causes of phenomena ranging from American social and historical trends to global current events. We invite you to consider these investigative works in the spirit of Marx’s Eleventh Thesis, with regard to the pursuit of a deeper understanding of our social world as key to changing it.

Laurel Bard and Julia Matthews
Eleven Editors-in-Chief
“A Historic Result”: Populism, Political Culture, and Marine Le Pen in the 2017 French Presidential Election*

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Abstract
Despite losing the 2017 French Presidential election, Marine Le Pen hailed her performance as a “historic result.” Even if she failed to take the Élysée Palace, she scored more votes in this election than any Front National candidate had before. In this paper, I take a sociological approach to examining the macro-level political, economic, and cultural factors that contributed to her relative success in this election. Specifically, I follow the developments of three key phenomena: (1) the development of an image of a corrupt elite in the French social imaginary; (2) the neoliberalization of the French economy; and (3) the shift towards republicanism in discourses surrounding French politics and identity. Each of these, I argue, helped create favorable conditions for Le Pen to articulate her far-right, populist political vision.

Keywords
populism, neoliberalization, ideology, ressentiment

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INTRODUCTION

“This is a historic result,” (Bloomberg Politics 2017) said Marine Le Pen to a crowd that seemed far too sombre for such words. It was May 7 and she was announcing her loss in the second round of the 2017 French Presidential election. Even if she and her supporters were less than jubilant, the election was an unprecedented success for Le Pen. Once seen as the heir of her father’s fringe, far-right populist party, she received 34 percent of the vote, coming in second in the election. Equally surprising, neither of the two major parties had made it into the second round. Not since 2002, when Le Pen’s father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, made it into the second round of the French presidential election, had a far-right populist been so close to succeeding in a national election in a Western European country. Even if there was virtually no chance of an FN victory in 2017’s second round, the party scored higher in that election than ever before, indicative of how the populist far-right had become more popular, even when losing.

Le Pen’s relative success in 2017 came on a wave of “historic results.” In 2016 and 2017, right-wing populist movements asserted themselves with a force that took many by surprise. Traditionally, these sorts of movements have been studied by political scientists, but our current historical movement gives us the opportunity to find new ways to approach the subject. Reflecting on the recent work on right-wing populism in political science, Cas Mudde observes that there has been far more theoretical innovation in understanding populist parties and leaders than the people who support them (2016:8). In light of this gap, it is my hope that sociological studies of populist political movements can compensate for the lack of research into the social, economic, and cultural contexts from which populist movements emerge. This paper draws specifically from C. Wright Mills’ directive to “study the social structures in which milieu is organized” (1959:226) in relation to specific events – in this case, the 2017 French election.

In this paper, I argue that Le Pen’s relative success in this election can be understood as contingent on a series of socio-political phenomena which preceded it. It is not a post-mortem of the election; rather, I argue that Le Pen’s populism was preceded by three phenomena: (1) the development of an image of a corrupt elite in the French social imaginary; (2) the neoliberalization of the French economy; and (3) the shift towards republicanism in discourses surrounding French politics and identity. Each of these are long-term factors but correspond to recent events, including corruption scandals, the Great Recession, terrorist attacks, the Syrian refugee crisis, and the migrant crisis.
CONCEPTUALIZING POPULISM

Recent studies of populism have reopened the long-running debate on its definition. Is it an ideology, a discourse, a “political style” or something else entirely (Mudde 2004; Aslanidis 2015; Moffitt and Tormey 2014)? For this reason, I will make my own approach clear, but this line of theoretical questioning is not my focus. Rather, I am interested in determining which elements of the socio-political and socio-economic context fostered support for a populist actor.

Ernesto Laclau argues that “populism consists in the presentation of popular-democratic interpellations as a synthetic-antagonistic complex with respect to the dominant ideology” (Laclau 1977:172-173). Using ideology in the Marxist sense, Laclau argues that populism interpellates individuals as members of “the people” who oppose some elements of the dominant ideology, but not necessarily all of them. The dominant ideology is signified by the “corrupt elite,” as well as other potential enemies of “the people” who are usually assumed to be aided by the elite. To Laclau, populism’s “people’/power bloc contradiction” (1977:166) is a discursive construct, so its exact content is malleable.

Laclau, however, takes a top-down view, which paints populism’s followers as masses, ready to be mobilized (or interpellated) by a populist actor. But do pre-existing social factors influence how this interpellation occurs? As Laclau elaborates in his work with Chantal Mouffe, a political discourse is deeply intertwined with sociological phenomena, insōfar as it attempts to politically articulate pre-existing aspects of the social (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Similarly, in their discussions of fascist and totalitarian populisms, both Hannah Arendt (1968) and Deleuze and Guattari (1987) highlight the role of pre-existing social groups which, due to historical circumstances, tend towards extremist populism. According to Deleuze these political phenomena are “inseparable from a proliferation of molecular focuses in interaction, which skip from point to point, before beginning to resonate together” in the populist movement (1987:214).

Jon Beasley-Murray (2010), drawing from Deleuze, argues that political power rests on the transformation of affect into “subjective [and politically charged] emotion” (p. 63). A populist leader accomplishes this through a

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1“Affect,” according to Beasley-Murray (2010), “is a way of redescribing the constant interactions between bodies and the resultant impacts of such interactions” (p. 126). In essence, affect describes the unnarrated reactions and responses we have to others, which are subsequently narrated as emotions (Robinson et al. 2006; Deleuze and Guattari 1987). For all of the authors cited here, social movements form around groups of people who share affects. For Beasley-Murray in particular, learning how to transform affect into emotion is the process by which we become subjects and is therefore at the core of interpellation. And, as Laclau (1977) argues, the interpellation of individuals into members of “the people” is key to forming a populist movement.
“systematic set of substitutions” (Beasley-Murray 2010:60), in which threats to “the people” take the place of what another actor might call policy failures or crises. According to affect control theory, all social situations are based on socially-inscribed affectations; political movements according to Deleuze and Guattari (1987), aggregate these “micropercepts” and “unconscious affects” (Robinson et al. 2006:213). But some emotions will be more useful than others, depending on the character of the movement in question. For far-right populism, these might include anger at elites, love for the homeland or frustration over a lack of responsiveness to one’s concerns. One particularly important emotion is *ressentiment* (Pappas 2012; Ure 2015:71): “the repeated experiencing and reliving” of a hostile “emotional response” until it “sinks […] into the center of the personality” (Scheler 1994:21). While not all affect that populists exploit can be considered *ressentiment*, many populist leaders draw heavily upon pent-up anger over perceived injustices, until it becomes a *ressentiment* directed against the entire establishment (Ure 2015).

So when looking at pre-existing socio-political factors, we need to find ones that have generated negative affects, including *ressentiment*, towards elites or others which a populist actor can later describe as “enemies of the people.”

Because the definition of *populism* is contested, some scholars argue we should abandon it altogether, while others have become increasingly wary about how we use it. Jacques Rancière argues that the term is often misused to dismiss legitimate democratic movements, reinforcing oligarchic power in the process (2005:80; 2016). We should, however, be careful to differentiate between *populism* as a term used in careful political analysis and the popular image which Rancière disputes. The theoretical approach offered here is not intended to delegitimize populism but to foreground certain elements of the phenomenon, particularly its affective element. Not all definitions of populism delegitimize it by default; that depends on the approach of the author employing it. Rancière’s critique is better directed at those using the term than at the term itself.

**THE IMAGE OF THE CORRUPT ELITE**

The following examines factors such as globalization, France’s relationship with the European Union, and religion and secularism, that have transformed the Fifth Republic’s political culture. Since the 1970s these factors have altered the ideological stances of the main parties, influencing the social context of the 2017 election.\(^2\) Michael C. Behrent calls this situation “the ideological disarray of French politics” to encapsulate how

\(^2\)With the exception of direct references to Laclau and Mouffe, I use ideology and ideological in their contemporary senses, to describe the collection of normative stances held by a political actor.
several decades of political changes created “a rightward-leaning left, a centre right stretched between liberalism and nationalism, and a far right actively reclaiming the economic positions abandoned by the left” (2017:75-79). At the time of Behrent’s writing, the “rightward-leaning left” referred to the Parti Socialiste (PS), but by the time of the 2017 election, there were two more radical candidates: Jean-Luc Mélenchon, a long-time left-wing icon and Benoît Hamon, the PS’s most left-leaning candidate in years. The FN – the greatest anachronism – pursues far-right policies on immigration, religion, and certain cultural issues but supports left-style social welfare policies.

These macro-political changes are deeply related to a social change, specifically, a change in how many French people imagine themselves in relation to their country’s political elite. In his “theory of loyalty,” Albert O. Hirschman says that voters in two-party systems tend to have higher loyalty to political parties, even if they are not active members (1970). This is because unhappy voters lack other viable options within the mainstream political system; therefore, they will likely remain loyal and vocalize their discontent with the party, if they vocalize it at all (Hirschman 1970:83–85). This analysis fits with French politics of past decades. Although there were multiple parties on the left and right, their use of alliances resulted in a de facto balance of power between dichotomous ideological blocs, which the majority of voters roughly identified with, despite having personal preferences for specific parties (Perrineau 2015).

Beginning in the 1980s, this binary began unravelling as issues alien to the traditional left-right divides, such as institutional legitimacy, the role of religion in public life, and climate change, receded as the French state became more neoliberal (Perrineau 2015). Communism, socialism, and Gaullism, which formed the ideological bedrock of the left-right divide, declined in popularity in the 1970s and 1980s. This led to a re-orienting of the major parties around republican rhetoric, reducing the sharp discursive differences between left and right (Chabal 2015). So, while the left-right divide of past decades resembled a two-party system, its declining salience today has led to a more pluralistic party system.

Despite this pluralism, policies of the PS and Les Républicains’ precursor – Union pour un Movement Populaire (UMP) – fostered a proto-populist imagination of France as divided between elites and non-elites. As ideological disarray developed, the PS and the UMP began taking similar, but not identical, stances on many issues, including globalization and European integration. These similarities in policy, especially economic policy, boosted the concept of a party-transcending political elite. The perception of such an elite is not novel in itself, but it has taken on a new affective element since
the 1980s.

Similarities in policy had effects on social perceptions of politicians. In Hirschman’s theory, people become discontented when parties become too similar to each other (Hirschman 1970); they feel that they have lost meaningful alternatives. This translated into negative affects and, eventually, resentment when people are materially disadvantaged by similar political and economic policies of successive governments, both PS and UMP, over several decades (Hewlett 2017). As one Le Pen voter told The Guardian in May 2017, “We have tried the left. We have tried the right. Nothing has worked” (Willsher 2016). Le Pen explicitly targeted these feelings in her election rhetoric, which dismissed the old left-right divides for a new one: “the divide is not between the left and right anymore, but between patriots and globalists” (Farand 2017), the latter of which she equated with elites.

The idea of an elite consensus developed alongside a “dramatic rise in popular awareness of corrupt practices” (Birch et al. 2017:897) as concern about corruption became more common. It was further aided by pre-existing perceptions of elites, such as their identification in the popular imagination with Paris (Barthes 1957) and the strong presences of École Nationale d’Administration and Sciences Po Paris alumni across parties and bureaucracies. In short, those angered by government policies and corruption found themselves opposed to the consensus of the entire, vaguely-defined Parisian political establishment. This is a consensus in Rancière’s understanding of the term: elites participate in the dominant political norms “as if [they] were true” and despite the problems that they might create (Rancière 2016a:137).

Not only does this anti-establishment resentment predate Le Pen, but it is held by more than just her supporters. In the pan-European “Living in Hard Times” (LIVEWHAT) survey, conducted from 2013 to 2016, a minority of French participants trusted parliament (only 20.6 percent), politicians (12.5 percent), political parties (13.13 percent), the EU (22.47 percent), and the national government as a whole (19.35 percent) (LIVEWHAT 2014:54). Similarly, half of the French respondents agreed that “public officials don’t care much about what people like me think,” (LIVEWHAT 2014:55) and 73 percent agreed that “the particular interests of the political class negatively affect the welfare of the people” (LIVEWHAT 2014:59).

As Birch et al. (2017) note, people have affective reactions to politicians repeatedly featured in the media, including outrage and anger. Since the

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3The identification of elites and Paris is a repeating trope in French right-wing populism; it was key to the Poujadist movement of the 1950s, as Roland Barthes observed in his essay on the subject.
1980s, the idea of a corrupt elite has been a common theme in the French media, thus laying the groundwork for broad anti-establishment *ressentiment* (Birch et al. 2017). This was reinforced in the lead-up to the election, particularly in reference to Fillon, the candidate for Les Républicains, and the financial scandals of various PS politicians, epitomized in the infamous Cahuzac affair. Not only did the scandal de-popularize Fillon, but it also played into ideological disarray on the right. During Nicolas Sarkozy’s presidency, the UMP/Les Républicains moved farther right, especially on key FN issues like immigration and religion (Hewlett 2015). Sarkozy articulated these policies in a way that was conscious of the feelings of working class voters, who themselves felt abandoned by the PS (Hewlett 2015). Like Sarkozy, Fillon’s popular appeal was rooted in FN style policies, yet the scandals that rocked his campaign de-legitimized him for many of the right-leaning lower-class workers that Le Pen courted; he too was identified with the corrupt elite.

In light of this apparent consensus, a politics which rejects consensus – “dissensus” – became a more promising option for many disaffected voters, particularly those materially disadvantaged by neoliberalization and those living outside of Paris. For many, Le Pen seemed to offer this, since she opposes long-standing ideas about how the country should be run and how politics should work. Rancière, however, disputes this, arguing that she is “a satellite that profits from the strategies of the state and the distinguished intellectual campaigns.” In other words, she is an actor of consensus (Rancière 2016b:104). But even if her politics are only a false dissensus, she offers the disaffected a chance to express their *ressentiment* by feeling like they are usurping the dominant political class.

Thus, it seems that the relative electoral success of Le Pen’s populism was preceded by ideological re-orientations which helped promulgate populist attitudes. Ideological disarray, combined with policy failures and concerns over corruption, generated negative affects and, eventually, *ressentiment* towards an elite consensus. The pre-existence of such populist sentiments can help us explain her popularity, but these populist sentiments can only be partially explained by ideological disarray. Deeply related to

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4 See next section.

Dissensus directly confronts consensus, rather than the elites who uphold it. Actors who practice dissensus aim beyond their political opponents in an attempt to change what is considered normal or sensible in politics. For Le Pen, this manifested in an attack on the corrupt elite because, more profoundly, she appeared to be arguing against their entire way of doing politics. Rancière’s objections to applying dissensus to Le Pen will be discussed later (Ranciere 2001:24).
ideological disarray was the mutual embrace of neoliberal economics by the pre-Hamon PS and Les Républicains. In one sense, the French shift to neoliberalism forms one part of the ideological disarray and is an area in which an elite consensus seems obvious. In another, it is its own structural factor in the development of populist attitudes in France.

**THE GREAT RECESSION AND NEOLIBERALISM**

The Great Recession has been favoured by pundits as an explanation for the success of Le Pen, Trump, and Brexit because economic crises are often assumed to be the causes of populism. However, their effects are far less predictable than we might think, particularly on radical right-wing parties. There is no real consensus on the economic crisis–right-wing extremism theorem which posits that crises cause far-right movements (Stockemer 2017). According to a 2015 collected volume on the Great Recession and European populism, there is only a “fuzzy relationship” between the two (Pappas and Kriesi 2015). While there has been an increase in support for right-wing populism in Europe in the wake of the recession, its effects vary across contexts (Pappas and Kriesi 2015). This is not to say that current populist movements are unaffected by the economic situation; rather, we need to trace more specific histories for each case to understand the role economic factors have played.

The Great Recession’s effects on French politics can only be understood in reference to the neoliberalization of the country. As in much of the world, the French economy has undergone significant changes since the 1980s (Harvey 2007). In policy measures, both the PS and the mainstream right have been generally committed to globalization, neoliberalization and Europeanization, contributing to ideological disarray (Goyer and Glatzer 2017). But globalization is viewed with suspicion by much of the French population, as it places key decision-making capabilities out of the reach of the state (Goyer and Glatzer 2017). In the French media, neoliberal economics are often associated with terms like Anglo-Saxon, le modèle anglo-saxon or Anglo-Saxonisation, which are used to paint neoliberalism as a product of an Anglophone Other, and therefore contrary to French identity (Chabal 2015). More immediately, neoliberalism entails what David Harvey (2007:23) calls “creative destruction”: it disrupts “divisions of labor, social relations, welfare provisions, technological mixes, ways of life, attachments to the land, habits of the heart, ways of thought, and the like.” French politicians, for their part, have often publicly discussed globalization with ambivalence, but have then implemented liberalizing reforms anyway
(Goyer and Glatzer 2017). They argue that these changes are unfortunate but necessary parts of Europeanization and the neoliberal world order; Goyer and Glatzer call this “liberalization by stealth” (2017:161).

François Hollande’s government was an archetypal example of this. As a PS candidate in the 2012 election, Hollande spoke violently against austerity in general, promising to renegotiate EU polities and calling the global financial sector his “real enemy” (McDaniel 2017:42). However, his policies as President only intensified liberalization by stealth and creative destruction. Promises to reverse unemployment rates by 2013 failed, plans to dramatically increase taxes on millionaires were cut, and corporate regulation and taxation were both decreased in his 2016 economic plan, the Responsibility and Solidarity Pact (RSP) (Kuhn 2014; Moulène 2016). Furthermore, his attempts at decreasing corruption and fraud failed when the minister in charge of the project, Jérôme Cahuzac, was implicated in fiscal fraud in 2012 (Kuhn 2014).

Liberalization by stealth comes with an elitist political assumption that Rancière outlines: states and elites, because of their technocratic authority, assume they know the right way to regulate global capitalism, even if implementing it means intentionally breaking promises or subverting democratic norms (Rancière 2005). To Hollande, neoliberal deregulation was a “historical necessity” (Rancière 2005:82), which he attempted to justify by comparing the states of the French and German economies (Moulène 2016). If his neoliberal turn had brought results, this argument might have been well-received, but it did not. Policy at the EU-level level could not address the EU’s short-term economic problems, especially as the Syrian refugee crisis and the Greek economic crisis added strain. Domestically, France was confronted with increasing debt, stagnating productivity and declining foreign investment and trade. Hollande had claimed that the RSP would address these issues, but Emmanuel Macron declared it a failure during his first year as Economy Minister in 2014 (Betz 2015; Moulène 2016). If this was not enough, the gap between French and German economic performance widened during the Hollande presidency, backfiring on the comparativist rhetoric he had used to justify the RSP (Moulène 2016).

Unsurprisingly, the ways in which Sarkozy and Hollande – the two least popular presidents of the Fifth Republic – consistently prioritized neoliberal reforms did not sit well with the pre-existing ambivalence towards globalization. This was heightened by a general sense of economic malaise brought on by the Great Recession and creative destruction (Betz 2015). In the wake of these failures, there was a backlash against elite sensibilities on economic matters. Such social sentiments constitute what
Erving Goffman calls an “injustice frame” (Gamson 1985:616); in a sense, they foster a common understanding that authorities are failing to live up to their obligations to their constituents. While approximately 23 percent of respondents in the LIVEWHAT survey blamed the government for the economic crisis, 39 percent blamed it for rising unemployment and 45 percent for economic difficulties (LIVEWHAT 2014). No other actor in the survey received a higher percentage of blame, and combined with the blame assigned to the EU and migrants – two of Le Pen’s other favourite targets – the three account for well over half of respondents (LIVEWHAT 2014).

Similar sentiments were expressed towards international economic institutions. In 2013, a survey found that 60 percent of respondents viewed globalization as a threat to France (Betz 2013). May 2017 Eurobarometer data showed that while the majority of French respondents had neutral or positive images of the EU, 41 percent were pessimistic about its future and 49 percent “tend[ed] not to trust” it (European Commission 2017:T4-T7). These sentiments, combined with the Great Recession and its accompanying crises in Europe, led to a decrease in loyalty towards the two main parties and a furthering of the notion of a “corrupt elite.” If the Hollande government wanted to combat these perceptions, it failed. Instead, it lost its legitimacy through reversed promises, scandals, and policies that were unsuccessful in alleviating economic stress.

The backlash was particularly pronounced among people in rural communities and those working factory jobs, many of whom were already disillusioned with the PS for other reasons (Behrent 2017). There are different opinions on when and how the rupture between the PS and the working class occurred, although the break emerges, unsurprisingly, with ideological disarray and neoliberalization. Behrent argues that the French working class started moving rightwards when the left began appealing to more middle-class, educated and young voters in the wake of the events of May 1968 (2017). This reorientation was mainly complete by the end of the 1980s (Hewlett 2015). Regardless of whether or not the PS intentionally lost working-class voters, its shift from neo-Keynesianism in the 1970s to neoliberalism in the 1980s was accompanied by neoliberal assumptions, principally that French society was composed mainly of a “middle class” (Hewlett 2015). This lost the PS’s reputation as an agent of reform, let alone one that would appeal to the re-sentiment or desire for dissensus of those opposed to globalization based on material losses, rather than political ideology.

In light of neoliberalization and Hollande’s policy failures, it is not surprising that the second round of the 2017 election featured two outsider
candidates with radically different approaches to the economy: Macron, whose genuine pro-EU, pro-globalization convictions were seen as almost refreshing, and Le Pen, with her vision of “economic patriotism” as a catch-all solution. Nor is it surprising that Mélenchon did nearly as well as Le Pen and Fillon in the first round, with his leftist policies and anti-PS reputation. Post-election analysis showed that Le Pen scored more votes in departments with higher unemployment rates, lower median incomes and lower life expectancy among women (Burn-Murdoch et al. 2017; Thomas 2017). On average, FN voters had lower opinions on the EU and globalization and, as one IPSOS poll showed, higher levels of pessimism about the country’s overall trajectory (Burn-Murdoch et al. 2017; Wike 2017).

This is not to say that Macron voters were not negatively affected by globalization or that some did not share the same ambivalence towards it. While regions with lower income typically cast more votes for Le Pen, this figure on its own might lead to the misleading view that all or the vast majority of low-income voters supported her. Significant numbers of low-income people voted for each, but since members of Macron’s base had more diverse socioeconomic backgrounds, low-income voters made up a smaller proportion of his base than of Le Pen’s. Similarly for the IPSOS pessimism statistic: just under 60 percent of Macron’s voters responded pessimistically, while 20 percent of Le Pen’s responded optimistically.

What these statistics do not show is the reactions people had to Hollande’s broken promises or to declining conditions for low-income voters. Their responses were influenced by both neoliberalism’s creative destruction and Le Pen’s discourse. The Great Recession, its accompanying economic crises and the Hollande government’s responses provided a backdrop for Le Pen to do what Benjamin Moffitt calls “performing crisis” (2014:197). While Moffitt argues that the populist leader is the main actor in this process, a variety of others were at play in France. Hollande and the status quo he represented already faced harsh criticism when the election campaigns began. In addition, Le Pen was hardly the only radical in town; denouncements of the EU, globalization and neoliberalism were being made within France, most notably by Mélenchon. Similar messages from other right-wing populists, including Donald Trump, Nigel Farage, and Geert Wilders, reverberated through the international media. And while we do not yet have data on the role of social media in the election, it is a key area for amplifying populist messages, without requiring interventions from the populist leader or the traditional media (Krämer 2017). In the wake of the Global Recession of 2008, the sense of crisis was present in the media, in politics and throughout the world.
For the economy, as with ideological disarray, Le Pen’s populist performances were politicizations of pre-existing social and material dissatisfactions. Her rhetoric focused on globalized economic elites and Brussels bureaucrats, denouncing both as having profited while those she called “forgotten France” (Betz 2015) suffered during the Global Recession. Such rhetoric does not appeal to everyone; it would be safe to say that those who already felt “forgotten” found it more compelling. In line with Moffitt and Beasley-Murray’s theories, this language simplifies a pre-existing social issue into a dichotomous antagonism, for which one can identify with one side or the other, and due to ideological disarray, it was relatively easy to link one of these sides with the “elite.”

Recall that part of the purpose of a populist performance is to transform affect into emotional reactions, not simply anger at elites, but resentment. Key to this is jealousy and spite that lead people to question why the establishment gets to make the decisions, seemingly benefitting from them while others suffer (Pappas 2012; Ure 2015). In Le Pen’s rhetoric, the divide between globalists and the forgotten plays into the dynamics of resentment by questioning the legitimacy of the French political elite to make decisions. This is not simply a one-way process; populist parties and discontent feed into each other (Rooduijn et al. 2016). This assumes that resentment at least partially pre-exists the populist but is then mobilized through performance to multiply itself. So, when Le Pen deployed her populist language about globalists and patriots or about forgotten France, she was multiplying resentment, not creating it.

We cannot draw a straight line from economic crisis to support for Le Pen. Rather, crisis and populism have a “fuzzy relationship” (Pappas and Kriesi 2015). As with ideological disarray, there were a long-term policy changes that increased general social dissatisfaction, which, in some cases, translated into votes for Le Pen. This was combined in the short-term with the Great Recession and Hollande’s failures to respond to it. Together, these provided an opportunity for Le Pen to “perform” populism (Moffitt and Tormey 2014). The interaction of these long-term and short-term factors hit the PS particularly hard: the broken promises and corruption scandals of the Hollande government added to the already decades-long decline in loyalty to the PS by those who felt forgotten. Even with a more left-leaning candidate, the party received only 6.2 percent of the vote in the first round, moving from the President’s party to fifth place in the presidential election.

Of course, specific increases in support for Le Pen required individuals to buy into the affective narrative that she performed: that Paris and Brussels elites were forgetting the French in favour of big business and immigrants.
In short, the Great Recession created space in which loyalty was low, and Le Pen could lower it even further. The recession, along with ideological disarray, was not the cause of the rise in support for Le Pen, per se, but it created socio-political conditions in which her populist performance could be more effective.

CONSTITUTING “THE PEOPLE” IN POPULISM

As ideological disarray and neoliberalism became more dominant in French politics, the old language of the left and right became less useful for the major parties. This is especially true for the PS; as we saw with Hollande’s economic promises, pushing his rhetoric too far to the left set voters up for disappointment. A new rhetoric was needed for political actors to express themselves in a way that energized voters. The answer was a return to an old discourse – republicanism – which has become key to French political culture and played a major role in the 2017 election.

This discourse became key to the views that Le Pen and the FN hold on social and cultural issues, principally immigration and religion. Scholars have paid attention to how exactly Le Pen and other European populists have politicized immigration, refugees, and Islam. Potentially the most important part of the FN’s policy of dédiabolisation (‘de-demonization’) has been distancing Le Pen’s rhetoric from that of her father without undermining the nativist and identitarian assumptions at the core of both eras of the FN (Ivaldi and Lanzone 2016). This move was facilitated by a switch to more mainstream political rhetoric, co-opting commonly used concepts from the discourse of French republicanism to equate fighting threats to the Republic with fighting the recognition of religious and ethnic minorities (Almeida 2017b; Chabal 2017). This, however, depended on a particular interpretation of republicanism which will be discussed in the coming sections, but, first, I highlight the importance of discourse in populism.

To some, looking at discourse is a fool’s errand; Eric Kaufman, for example, argues that “cultural change is what principally animates anti-immigration voters. The issue therefore cannot be defused with economic or political palliatives” (Kaufmann 2014:267). He continues to argue that demographic change, rather than media or politician-induced panic, is the cause of nativist politics (Kaufmann 2014). Such a perspective fails to address two interrelated aspects of the issue: the way in which demographic changes are constructed as crises and the ways in which political debates on immigration and demographics can manifest deeply rooted political, cultural, and social questions.
As Heiko Henkel and Thijl Sunier both argue, discussions about Islam’s place in Europe are based on a rarely articulated debate over the nature of Europe’s secular public sphere (Henkel 2009; Sunier 2009). Talal Asad (2003:161) argues that discourse involving the place of Islam in Europe reflects “anxieties about non-Europeans” and what they imply for European identities. In this sense, the exclusion of Islam is deeply related to insecurities about one’s own collective identity. As Kwame Anthony Appiah argues, many “identities are founded in antagonism” (Appiah 2005:106).

So when Le Pen engages in Islamophobic or anti-immigrant discourse, there is always a reflexive element which questions whether or not Muslims or immigrants can be part of populism’s core concept: “the people.” Rancière argues that “the people does not exist:” only “diverse or antagonistic figures of the people” do (2016:102). While Kaufmann may contend that socially constructed definitions of “the people” are of little relevance, they are, in fact, impossible to avoid. As Judith Butler suggests, when political actors invoke the notion of “the people” they open up a whole debate about who “the people” actually are (2016). Saying “we, the people,” explicitly or implicitly “gather[s] the people in the very saying” (Butler 2016). Although, not everyone may agree on who actually constitutes it (Butler 2016:54).

Therefore, Le Pen’s discourse of exclusion is better understood in its inverse form: rather than mobilize a pre-existing people upset by demographic change, she expresses a certain view of who should be included, thereby constituting a vision of “the people” and interpellating its members and non-members in the process. This is central to a populist movement; as Thierry Chopin argues, “the populist criticism of the elites goes together with the supposition that the former holds the monopoly in terms of representing the will of the “true” people” (2016:5). In order, however, for Le Pen’s vision of “the people” to gain traction, it must appeal to pre-existing social sentiments regarding French identity; this is tied in to a popular, but not universal, interpretation of republicanism.

THE ROLE OF REPUBLICANISM IN FRENCH POLITICS

Before Le Pen took over the FN from her father, it was not principally associated with republicanism. By the 2017 election, the party’s platforms hinged on it. Yves Mény describes republicanism as “a tool for everything and for all seasons” (2017:21) for French politicians. We can think of it as

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6Interpellation can occur regardless of whether or not the subject is present, aware or willing to be identified. In these cases, “one is still constituted by discourse, but at a distance from oneself” (Butler 1997:33).
an *ideological discourse* in Laclau and Mouffe’s sense of the term: although political in origin, it ascribes to France and the French a certain set of social characteristics associated with the spirit of the Republic.\(^7\) This means that certain ideas, words, or expressions are used by political actors to give meaning to politics and to evoke responses at an emotional and affective level. This is why the “easiest way to discredit a novel idea […] is to declare it contrary to the *idéal républicain* or to the *tradition républicaine*” (Mény 2017:21–22). The discourse of republicanism is made up of “sacred words,” which are employed in wildly different ways, in virtually “every debate or policy affecting the order of things inherited from the Revolution” (Mény 2017:15–16).

Republicanism’s influence has come and gone over the decades, but recently it has been at the centre of French politics. As ideological disarray set in and traditional left-right rhetoric became outmoded, actors began framing policies as republican rather than socialist or Gaullist (Chabal 2017). This allowed political actors on both the left and right to put forward their policies without sounding hopelessly stuck in the past (Chabal 2017). After years of speaking of France and the French nation as inherently republican, this discourse found its way to the centre of political debates, becoming a “tool for everything” (Mény 2017:21; Chabal 2017).

Part of the reason why the French left shifted towards republican discourse was the notion of *laïcité* – France’s version of secularism. During François Mitterrand’s presidency in the 1980s, *laïcité* was often used to resist attempts by conservatives to inject Catholicism into politics (Almeida 2017b). However, the concept is loaded with meanings beyond the separation of church and state, which other political actors latched onto. Since the 2000s it has been employed by actors, including the FN, in a particular way (Almeida 2017b). Dimitri Almeida breaks the FN’s version of the concept into three key points: “the non-recognition of sub-national communities,” “further legal restrictions to the funding of religions and ‘communitarian’ associations,” and “limitations to the freedom to express religious beliefs in public space” (2017b:7). This interpretation of *laïcité* is far removed from the separation of church and state. It gained traction as part of a popular version of republicanism which tied *laïcité* to the survival of society. Emile Chabal, in his studies of French nationalist politics, describes it as follows:

*Republicanism, as contested as it is, has become “a benchmark” that one can use to judge someone’s “French-ness” (Chabal 2017:73). A*

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\(^7\) I assume, along with Laclau, that the interpellation of subjects is at the core of an ideological discourse. Without subjects, “the isolated elements of the discourse have no meaning” (Laclau 1977:101–2).
successfully French-enough outsider undergoes intégration (integration), a word that implies something similar to assimilation and solidarity with the nation. A failed outsider is subject to intégration’s opposite: disintégration (Chabal 2015). This refers to both the individual’s failure to integrate and the disintegration of the Republic which could follow (Chabal 2015). A certain logic is then used by a wide variety of political actors, including Le Pen and those far less extreme: disintégration is seen as leading to a weakening of the “social bond” (lien social), eventually leading to a fracture sociale – a term that “implies a breakdown, dissolution or disintegration of the body politic” (Chabal 2015:83).

A variety of everyday religious acts are abstracted to the level of intégration, disintégration and fracture sociale by invoking laïcité. The headscarf first entered public political consciousness in 1989 with “l’affaire du foulard,” when three female Muslim students at a school in Creil were suspended by their headmaster for refusing to remove their headscarves (Chabal 2015). Public intellectuals and politicians linked the affair to laïcité, claiming that the students were being anti-republican and were in favour of their own oppression. To overturn the headmaster’s anti-headscarf policy would be a double sin to the Republic; not only was it seen as disintégration, but it was also a turn towards multiculturalism and communitarianism, giving into the so-called modèle anglo-saxon of organizing society. Because these arguments stem from the logic of republicanism, championed at the time by the PS, they resonated with actors and citizens from across the political spectrum. A prominent group of leftist intellectuals famously declared l’affaire du foulard the “Munich of the republican school” (Chabal 2015:63), implying that Nazism and schoolchildren’s headscarves were equal threats to the Republic.

We can draw a relatively straight line from leftist rhetoric in 1989 to the governments of Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy and, eventually, to Le Pen. This style of politics is a hallmark of Sarkozy’s tenures as Minister of the Interior and as President. He re-invoked l’affaire du foulard in 2003 when he mandated that veils could not be worn in identity photographs (Chabal 2015). Soon after, he intensified the process of marginalizing Muslims, banning headscarves from schools in 2004 and niqabs from public places in 2011. Once again, this was justified with an attempt to link laïcité with gender politics (Roggeband and Lettinga 2016). In a 2003 senate speech in support of Sarkozy’s anti-headscarf policies, President Chirac said that “our combat for Republican values must go hand in hand with the struggle for women’s rights and their equality to men” (Roggeband and Lettinga 2016:246). Some, but not all, prominent feminist organizations took similar stances, while political and media actors invoked pre-existing stereotypes of violence in the
low-income migrant-majority suburbs of Paris as evidence of gender-based oppression (Roggeband and Lettinga 2016). The arguments were no longer just against multiculturalism and special treatment for minorities, but relied on an old, Revolution-inspired republican trope: the Republic as a vehicle for emancipation (Roggeband and Lettinga 2016; Chabal 2015).

Suffice to say, throughout the 2000s and 2010s, republicanism became increasingly defined as the emancipatory opposite of Islam, while tolerance of Islam became a symbol of multiculturalism, disintégration and Anglo-Saxonisation. This discourse is used across the political spectrum; in 2016, PS Prime Minister Manuel Valls attempted to justify a proposed ban on headscarves in universities by telling Libération that, counter to popular opinion, Islam is “fundamentally compatible with the Republic, democracy, our values and equality between men and women” (Chrisafis 2016). While he attempted to frame it in a positive way, his rhetoric implied that Islam could only be compatible if Muslims followed policies that encourage complete intégration, such as not wearing headscarves in secular institutions.

Republicanism provides the arguments, ideas, and words for a discourse that reflects the arguments made by Asad, Henkel, and Sunier. Its entrance into mainstream political thought preceded Le Pen’s dédiabolisation and was, for many years, considered contrary to Jean-Marie Le Pen’s FN because of his anti-universalist rhetoric (Chabal 2015). However, republicanism opened a space in which Marine Le Pen could put forth anti-immigrant and anti-Islam policies in politically legitimate language that appealed to relevant emotions and identities. This is because it created an exclusionary notion of “the people” which she could draw upon in her rhetoric. Indeed, Le Pen’s dédiabolisation would have needed to be far more substantial, and may have been impossible, if it was not for the legitimation of identitarian politics using the sacred words of the Republic.

REPUBLICANISM AND AFFECT

The Sarkozy interpretation of republicanism provided more for Le Pen than just politically legitimate language. As an ideological discourse, it has emotional and affective elements that she could utilize as well. Recall that Beasley-Murray argues that transforming affect into habitually followed emotions is key to politics and is therefore pursued by the state (Beasley-Murray 2010). State control of affect involves excluding, categorizing, and otherizing people who, following Foucault, may be reformed through exclusionary exercise of biopower (Beasley-Murray 2010). However, affect can escape via “lines of flight” (Beasley-Murray 2010:136), making the task...
of the state to suppress or co-opt it. In this context, republicanism functions as a co-opting agent, transforming affect into emotion, while intégration is the rehabilitation of the Other in French society. As a result, the suppression of disintégration becomes a key part of maintaining social order. Populism, to Beasley-Murray, emerges when affect escapes the state’s control. Le Pen’s populism provides a line of flight for Islamophobic affect to emancipate itself; while it was originally a tool for state control of republican identity, it becomes a political force. Emotions associated with republicanism, such as national pride, become highly affected and are replaced by ressentiment towards the non-integrated Others and for the elites that allow their continued existence in the country.

Of course, anti-Islamic sentiments are not new. As Edward Said (1994) demonstrates, negative perceptions about Islam, the “West” and their relationship to each other long predate French republicanism. In part, we can attribute Islamophobia’s increased influence to its linguistic legitimation by Sarkozy and others. For the FN in particular, Islamophobia provided an opportunity to move away from past anti-Semitic and sexist policies, with the argument that they were protecting Jews and women from Islamic anti-Semitism and sexism (Hafez 2014). Sarkozy’s republicanism brought Islamophobic ideas to the forefront of French politics, so politicized events involving Islam were likely to generate negative affects.

The fear of Islamic conquest – one of the old ideas that Said identifies – has recently moved into the foreground in Europe’s radical right (Betz 2013; Hafez 2014; Said 1994). Often called “Islamization,” “Islamic colonization” or, in Le Pen’s terms, “Islamist globalisation,” this is a cornerstone of many European populist far-right movements (Betz 2013; Farand 2017). The reinvention of this old idea began in the early 2000s, with many grassroots far-right groups identifying public manifestations of Islam as representing a hostile takeover of society (Ivaldia and Lanzone 2016; Benveniste 2016). What distinguishes this notion from Mitterrand’s republicanism is that disintégration became a pre-mediated way of subverting and conquering France, rather than a structural problem that needed to be addressed.

“Islamist globalization” is not just employed by political elites in exemplary cases like l’affaire du foulard; for many people, it becomes an affect associated with everyday manifestations of Islam. Sunier (2009) observes that, paradoxically, the more integrated and visible Muslims are in European societies, the more they are seen as subverting it. “As long as the veiled lady […] keeps a certain occupational and social distance to the rest of society, there is no need to get disturbed and to raise the religious question” (Sunier
2009:475). But once Muslims become more visible, the question is raised and the apparent threat of *disintégration* becomes more immediate. As people began taking the apparent threat of *disintégration* seriously, the state's control of affect unravelled. But ironically, this so-called threat became so important precisely because of the state logic that was used to capture affect; without the logic of republicanism, mundane religious acts, such as wearing a headscarf or refraining from eating pork, would not be seen as threatening a *fracture sociale* via *disintégration*.

With this affective framework in place, each new public manifestation of Islam built up more affect, which Le Pen could co-opt. Once again, Moffitt’s notion of “performing crisis” is important. Le Pen drew from events that were far less abstract than “Islamist globalisation” to perform the crisis of *disintégration*. These include the Syrian refugee crisis, increases in the number of North African economic migrants, and sensationalized media reports of France becoming less French and more Muslim, particularly in the suburbs of Paris. Even as the Hollande government tried to skirt its EU commitments, Muslim refugee and migrant influxes made both the French state and the EU look complicit in “Islamist globalisation,” at least to those who believed in its existence.

This narrative was reinforced in the media, particularly in the coverage of the Syrian refugee crisis, the migrant crisis and the “Calais jungle” – the latest name for the decades-old refugee camps in the Calais area. After years of attention on television and in newspapers, Calais was a focal point in the discussion on refugees and *intégration*, even to those nowhere near the area (Robcis 2017). Furthermore, attempts to remove the camp were made nominally on humanitarian grounds but were intended to appease the residents of Calais rather than deal with the underlying humanitarian issues (Lequesne 2016). These policies were half-measures, so the Calais refugees inevitably reappeared, creating a sense among many in the area that only the FN’s exclusionary policies could solve the issue (Jones 2017; Lequesne 2016; Postelnicescu 2016).

The 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris were also major generators of affect, but within a pre-existing framework. Beasley-Murray argues that “low-level fear” pervades societies in the wake of terror: “like terror, low-level fear has neither subject nor object; it is ubiquitous and collective” (Beasley-Murray 2010:168). In what Ulrich Beck calls the “world risk society,” political actors from across the globe interact with each other around the “theme of risk” (Saito 2015:444). This makes threats constant and people in one part of the world may feel threatened by events in another. This does not need to stem out of attacks, but out of a perceived threat of attack. Through this,
a network of risks emerge, in which each risk-inspiring event “acts as a mediator” (Latour 2003:36) of a global sense of threat, thus advancing low-level fear across societies.

Terrorist attacks create “lines of flight” for low-level affects, allowing them to be expressed or expanded (Beasley-Murray 2010). The most profound of the recent attacks may have been those in 2015, at the Charlie Hebdo offices in January and across Paris, including the Bataclan theatre in November. Each attack elicited strong responses internationally for their senseless killing of ordinary people. For many French, particularly Parisians, the attacks were a source of psychological distress, contributing to people’s sense of risk (Goodwin et al. 2017). This distress was higher after the more extensive November attacks and was amplified through social media (Goodwin et al. 2017). At first, this was a major affect, but it became a low-level one with time. In Beasley-Murray’s words, “after its initial shock, even terror becomes routine;” this “is in part why terror maintains its power to shock, because it is both expected and unexpected” (2010:175).

The militarization of the country after the attacks helped transform the shocks of terror into longer-term, low-level affect. After the attacks the Hollande government’s discourse emphasized that they were territorial attacks and responded as if France was engaged in a war against terrorism (Lequesne 2016). This expanded into an official state of emergency, in which the military and Gendarmerie were deployed across the country. This was not repealed until November 2017, months after the election. While many elements of everyday life returned to normal, the presence of soldiers and extra security protocols served as reminders of the attacks.

By using the discourse of republicanism, Le Pen could utilize this build-up of low-level affect to boost her campaign. Her performance of crisis explicitly painted the political elite, foreigners, and refugees as complacent to the violence that occurred. This translated low-level affect into ressentiment. Recall her claim that “Islamist globalisation” and “economic globalisation […] want to bring France to its knees” (Farand 2017). As fear and risk become habit, so does anger towards those who might be causing it. By directing this anger many times over, Le Pen generated ressentiment. As I noted earlier, she did this by deploying the republican logic of disintégration to build a narrative of “Islamist globalisation.” This framework was then applied to the Syrian refugee crisis, the migrant crisis, and the terrorist attacks, so she argued that these events are simultaneously a reason to exclude Muslims and a reason to usurp the political consensus for its inability to see them as the extreme threats she sees.

While the attacks contributed to low-level affect, they did not
universally increase racism or Islamophobia. Goodwin et al. (2017) found that post-attack racism was more prevalent among older and rural respondents, while younger people and Parisians were more willing to engage socially with Muslims after the attacks. Cohu et al. (2016) found that participants were more willing to express Islamophobic prejudices after the January attacks than before. They hypothesize that these prejudices were pre-existing and respondents only felt comfortable voicing them in the post-attack “normative context” (Cohu et al. 2016:54). This shows us how the different facets of Le Pen’s populism tie together; resentment and affect were generated over a long period of time, using Le Pen’s interpretation of republicanism as their basis. The attacks provided opportunities for this affect to expand and strengthen.

Earlier, I brought up the concept of “the people.” Republicanism, as articulated by Le Pen, Sarkozy and others, is an ideological discourse which creates one version of “the people.” It does this by capturing affect, which the events above released as a political force. However, Sarkozy and Le Pen did not convince the entire population of their particular definitions of “the people.” This may be because these discourses were aimed at different demographics, particularly those that later supported Le Pen (Hewlett 2015). Maybe it appealed to people’s psychological backgrounds, which Rooduijn et al. (2016) argue influence populist voters. Unfortunately, I do not have the data to answer these questions. Rather, we can say that Le Pen’s relative success but failure to win in the second round is at least partially related to the fact that republicanism was not universally internalized as a generator of Islamophobic affect and resentiment. Sarkozy, Chirac and others helped develop a discourse that Le Pen could latch onto, but this meant that Le Pen’s success was dependent on how deeply republican discourse pervaded political culture and its varied influence over individual voters.

CONCLUSION

I cannot claim to have uncovered all of the reasons for the FN’s relative success in 2017. Rather, I have shown how it fits into three interrelated socio-political and socio-economic phenomena: ideological changes in the French political system, the neoliberalization of the French economy and the dissemination of an Islamophobic version of republican discourse in the French media and political culture. Each of these long-term changes played a role in how recent and dramatic events were interpreted by the French public, including the Fillon scandal, the Cahuzac affair, the Great Recession, Hollande’s economic policies, the Syrian refugee crisis, the migrant crisis,
and the 2015 terrorist attacks. In each of these cases, Le Pen multiplied existing resentment, rather than creating it from scratch.

A myriad of actors are implicated in these macro-level changes. Most obvious are political elites, like Sarkozy, Hollande, Fillon, Valls, Mitterrand and Chirac. Each of these figures played a role in failed economic planning, liberalization by stealth, encouraging problematic interpretations of republicanism and consolidating ideological disarray as the policy platforms of PS and UMP/Les Républicains drew closer. However, we can also look to the media, which created panics around issues like immigration, religion and terrorism, thereby contributing to increasing Islamophobia. As posited in my brief discussion of world risk society theory, panics and crises abroad influenced the responses to crises in France.

Others might be implicated as well, which could be the subject of future research. There was the potential influence of French public intellectuals, many of which Rancière argues foster a contempt for mass democracy that provokes reactions from populist and far-right movements (2005; 2016). There was also the non-traditional media; resentment, populist performance and the interpellation of a populist movement were likely boosted by online interactions.

Of course, the FN received a minority of the vote in each round – the election was only a relative success for Le Pen’s party. We cannot necessarily exempt those who voted for Macron, Mélenchon, Fillon or Hamon from being influenced by ideological disarray, economic failure, or republican affect when choosing how to cast their votes. As one Macron voter told CNN, many people voted for him because they were “picking the least worst option” (Jones 2017) rather than one they believed in. Indeed, a large number of voters were discouraged by both Macron and Le Pen. Voter turnout for the second round was the lowest since 1981, and neither secured more than five percent more than Fillon or Mélenchon in the first round (BBC News 2017).

I wish that I could point to a single factor and say that it caused Le Pen’s success, but even the three complicated, macro-level changes I have detailed here might not encompass all the historical contingencies that boosted the FN in this election. These are not preconditions for populism, so we cannot create a generalizable theory from this single case. We also cannot conclusively say that Le Pen would have been more or less successful

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8See Van Kessel and Castelein’s “Shifting the Blame: Populist Politicians’ Use of Twitter as a Tool for Opposition” and Krämer’s “Populist Online Practices: The Function of the Internet in Right-Wing Populism” for frameworks on how to think about and study the role of social media for a right-wing populist movement.
with a different set of structural factors. However, this type of study is important: as an ideology, style of politics, or discourse, populism reduces all political conflicts into those between “the people” and their enemies. Similarly, populist resentment takes affect from a variety of issues and congeals it into an all-encompassing emotional response. Using a sociological approach allows us to unpack those simplified versions and once again look at the complicated reality; engaging our sociological imaginations to understand the social factors behind the political dissatisfaction expressed in the polls. This is particularly important for those interested in politically disputing right-wing populism, since it shows which structural issues need to be addressed and discussed.

The future is uncertain; the socio-political factors that contextualize Le Pen’s relative success have not disappeared. The prominent role that right-wing populism plays in French politics will likely continue until the underlying social problems created by neoliberalism, the confusion of ideological disarray, and the hegemony of right-wing republican discourse are either addressed through policy or discursively framed by another political actor. Whatever happens, these socio-political and socio-economic developments have had profound effects on French political culture and identity; it seems that Le Pen was right to say that the 2017 election was a truly “historic result” (Bloomberg Politics 2017).

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Conceptualizing the “Safety Tax” on Women: Examining safety products as a paradoxical form of empowerment

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Abstract
This paper seeks to understand the nascent concept of a safety product market and the rhetoric it uses to create paradoxical forms of female empowerment. The safety product market can be thought of as a collection of news groups, companies, organizations, and bloggers supporting and selling self-defense classes and safety products like stun guns and tasers specifically to women. This market helps illuminate the extent to which women pay a safety tax to live in a culture that normalizes violence. While companies and organizations promoting the use of safety products may have intentions to make women safer, they fail to address the root of the problem: systemic violence, which tolerates male aggression towards women. In this paper, I argue that by marketing to a gendered type of woman consumer who is ‘domestic’, ‘passive’, and ‘vulnerable’, the safety product market responsibilizes women and perpetuates gender norms, essentially disempowering women. This research examines the safety product market for the role it plays in perpetuating gender norms and encouraging the narrative of woman as ‘consumer’, ‘domestic’, ‘passive’, and ‘vulnerable’.

Keywords
safety tax, gendered safety products, women as consumers, responsibilization
INTRODUCTION

Safety is a concern for all people navigating social spaces on a daily basis. Like many social constructs that shape daily life, the issue of safety is deeply connected with gender roles and gender stereotypes. Women are disproportionately affected by violence and overburdened with media messages warning them to be on guard (Women’s Policy Research 2015). Women carry pepper sprays and keychain alarms in their purses. Women are encouraged to take self-defense classes (Cunningham 2016). Women are told to avoid the bus, live on the second floor, or carry lights at night when they go to a parked car. As a female college student, I am constantly drawn into conversations about the best self-defense tactics and reminded of glaring statistics about women and violence, including the fact that one in five college women are sexually assaulted (Institute for Women’s Policy Research 2015). The extra responsibilities women take on to inform and make themselves safer through self-defense products are mentally, emotionally and economically taxing. While some may insist that taking self-defense classes empowers women (McCaughey 1998), the simple fact that women must spend extra time considering these self-defense options demonstrates a clear gender imbalance when it comes to issues of personal safety. The notion that women must be prepared to defend themselves is not empowering, as it implicitly suggests that women are responsible for their own safety. Women become trapped in a false sense of empowerment when making self-defense accommodations (Cunniff Gilson 2016).

The disproportionate violence against women (Institute for Women’s Policy Research 2015; Keeton 2007; Pain 1997) influences women’s perceptions of personal safety and their social position, leading them to fall victim to paradoxical messages of empowerment espoused by self-defense products. For instance, a Gallup poll conducted in 2014 reported that 45 percent of women, as compared to 27% of men, felt unsafe walking alone at night (Dugan 2014). This statistic, which highlights the 18-percentage point difference between men and women’s perceptions of safety, is referred to as the gender “safety gap” (Dugan 2014:2). The “safety gap” is further supported by a report from the Women’s Policy Research Institute (2015) on how safety threats disproportionately affect women academically and personally. Self-defense product advertisers use these statistics to exploit both the real and perceived differences between women and men’s experiences in order to sell false messages of empowerment.

Women are socialized to expect violence in their lives, whether it is in the form of street harassment, domestic violence, or sexual or physical assault (Wesely and Gaarder 2004; Stanko 1990). Women are socialized to
pay extra attention to their surroundings and take responsibility for their own safety in some the following ways: knowing the resources for domestic abuse, taking self-defense courses, and installing security systems in their home. In this society where violence is expected and normalized, women pay a tax on their own safety. Like the “safety gap,” I conceptualize this toll on women as a Safety Tax (Dugan 2014). The Safety Tax includes the extra mental effort associated with worrying about one’s physical safety and the monetary costs\(^1\) associated with safety products like pepper spray, home security systems, or self-defense classes. The Safety Tax also involves the detrimental perpetuation of gender norms, especially targeting the stereotype of female vulnerability, which insinuates a position of inherent weakness and inferiority (Sandlin and Mauldlin 2012). As vulnerability suggests inherent physical and mental susceptibility to harm and an inferior state of being, it is naturally incompatible with empowerment (Cunniff Gilson 2016); thus, self-defense products do little to close the “safety gap,” rather, they add to the Safety Tax on women (Dugan 2014). This paper specifically employs a sociological lens through content and narrative analysis to analyze the perpetuation of gender norms created by the Safety Tax, while leaving the mental burden and economic costs to be analyzed more quantitatively by scholars in the fields of psychology and economics, respectively.

Self-defense products are distributed through, what I refer to as, the safety product market, which consists of a collection of newsgroups, companies, organizations, and bloggers that promote and sell self-defense classes and safety products like stun guns and tasers to a specific female audience. Examining this larger market of self-defense products helps illuminate the extent to which women pay a Safety Tax in terms of the perpetuation of gender norms in our society. While companies and organizations that promote the use of self-defense products may have been established with good intentions to make women safer, their missions fail to address other issues, including the socialized acceptance of violence (Keeton 2007). The market exploits women’s socialized fear of violence by peddling false empowerment through their marketing of safety-products to women, who are depicted as vulnerable. It is essential to examine the safety product market for the role it plays in perpetuating gender norms that encourage the representation of women in \textit{domestic, consumer, passive and vulnerable} roles.

Feminist scholars have dealt with representations of women and power inequalities, especially in regards to sexual harassment, victim blaming, and rape culture. However, one aspect of violence against women that is absent

\(^1\)Following this analysis I suggest future research to capture the quantitative effects of the Safety Tax on women.
from the literature is the concept of the Safety Tax, which is illuminated in this paper through the analysis of the safety product market. This paper applies feminist and representational theories through a content and narrative analysis of the safety product market. The analysis provides a new examination of the gender disparities between men and women in terms of the costs of responsibilization of personal safety. The market’s lack of attention to systemic violence, and the overtly gendered marketing tactics it employs, disempower women and perpetuate a culture that normalizes violence against women. Through this analysis, I hope to mobilize support for alternative solutions to ending systemic gender violence by changing the social narratives created in the safety product market that disempower women and perpetuate safety inequalities. Before delving into the content and narrative analysis, it is necessary to examine the feminist theories and theories of representation and power that shape the discussion of the Safety Tax.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Jennifer A. Sandlin and Julie G. Maudlin provide an important historical analysis of how controlling images in the media construct rigid gendered representations of female consumers within a cultural system they call “patriarchal consumer capitalism” (2012:176). Sandlin and Maudlin explain how women have become tied to consumerism in Westernized societies as a result of these societies’ capitalist nature and tendency to create social hierarchies through gendered representations (2012:176). They discuss how, through social and political domination, men create master narratives that reinforce the gender stereotype of women in primarily domestic roles and, therefore, the primary consumer in a household unit. Sandlin and Maudlin employ Stuart Hall’s theories on discourse to reiterate how representations of women as consumers can influence social relations practices (2012:177). Sandlin and Maudlin acknowledge the predicament for women consumers who, through their purchasing behavior, reinforce domestic representations (2012:178). Their interpretation of how gendered portrayals of consumerism in the media affect the larger cultural narrative sheds light on how advertisements for safety products perpetuate controlling images of women as weak consumers in primarily passive roles.

As Sandlin and Maudlin (2012) demonstrate, Stuart Hall’s (1997) theory on systems of representation is helpful in discerning how women are represented in consumer spheres such as the safety product market. According to Hall, representation is a cultural construction that provides people with a conceptual map for understanding other people, objects, events,
and abstract ideas (1997:6). He elaborates on how cultural constructions are created and perpetuated through cultural accommodations made by the dominating social group to more vulnerable populations (Stasi N.d:2). Hall’s explanation of cultural constructions can be employed to think about how the safety product market reinforces the narrative of women as domestic, weak consumers. Furthermore, safety products can be analyzed as a form of cultural accommodation, provided by the dominant male class, to appease women in a world where their personal safety is perpetually threatened.

Judith Butler’s critical feminist theory also provides an important lens for examining the safety product market’s gendered nature and paradoxical messages of empowerment. Butler’s position on feminism is demonstrated in her theory on body politics and representation. Butler (1990) discusses the feminist movement’s struggle to create political visibility for feminists without allowing patriarchal systems to dominate changes in legislation in support of women. Butler acknowledges that other issues arise when women stand up for their rights because of the patriarchal institutional system. For example, when using legislation as a means of social change, women are placing power back into the patriarchal system. This is similar to Hall’s concept of cultural accommodation, which occurs in state institutions predominantly controlled by male figures. Cultural accommodation is used to provide protection to vulnerable groups while glossing over larger issues of power imbalances (Stasi:N.d:2). Butler (1990:28) explains how, in the process of “protecting” people with regulations and control, the patriarchal state produces a vulnerable subject with a false sense of autonomy. This can be applied to the safety product market’s messaging of empowerment, which, in reality, is a quick-fix solution to gender inequality and violence against women. Corporations selling safety products benefit from the representation of women as weak, domestic consumers.

Along with these understandings of political and institutional power, Butler acknowledges the self-defeating language of certain feminist rhetoric. Butler (1990) suggests that creating one concept of “women” in feminism perpetuates differentiation between genders, which is contrary to feminist goals. As the analysis will show, the safety product market targets one representation of a woman consumer that is assumed to be white, domestic, passive, and vulnerable. Even though the safety product market adopts feminist language to sell the idea of empowerment to women in the form of safety products, their narrow marketing to one type of woman does little to advance the feminist agenda. Selling empowerment and making overtly gendered products fails to address systemic gender violence. Butler’s understanding of how feminism is jeopardized when used incorrectly by
patriarchal institutions is central to understanding the contradiction in the safety product market, which sells a paradoxical form of empowerment to women and reifies gendered representations.

The influence of color, specifically the color pink, in social semiotics is critical to the discussion of representations of women in the safety product market. Koller (2008:402) recognizes pink as a marker of feminine identity in popular culture. Furthermore, Koller (2008:410) analyzes two functions of pink: one function is to attract the attention of female consumers, and the other is to manipulate a post-feminist image of femininity through color. Koller (2008:410) noticed that when pink is used to signal female consumers’ attention, the color is used more aggressively in marketing for products that would be considered less feminine. In regards to the color’s function in creating post-feminist meanings, Koller (20018:416) suggests that pink has been reclaimed to promote female empowerment. Koller (2008:418) remains skeptical as to whether or not reclaiming the color pink to embrace feminist messages of empowerment will help advance social change and dismantle deeply embedded gender stereotypes. The usage of the color pink is exceptionally predominant in the safety product market. The nuanced impact of color on social constructions of femininity and power will be important to the following analysis.

Additionally, there are intersectional considerations to be made in regards to the type of representations created in the safety product market. Sandlin and Maudlin (2012:182) explain how American advertising largely considers white, middle-class women as the targeted consumer audience. They employ the ideas of controlling images and gendered representations to analyze why black women have been largely ignored by advertising in order to keep them in a socially inferior position (Sandlin and Maudlin 2012:183). Patricia Collins (1978:919) provides insight into how ideas about race inform social concepts of women and safety in the United States. Collins explains how images have been controlled to portray black women as sexually deviant, which has complicated the rape-victim narrative and, essentially, erased black women from the discussion of safety. This experience of exclusion is important in understanding who the current safety market targets and how this complicates feminist images and representations from an intersectional perspective. Understanding how the intersections of race and class affect safety product marketing is essential to interpreting the paradoxical messages of empowerment.

These theoretical works help situate the concept of the safety product market within a larger consumer culture that uses representations and cultural accommodation to continue to oppress women. Sandlin and
Maudlin (2014) and Hall’s (1997) theories explain how representations of women as passive, vulnerable domestic consumers can be detrimental by influencing actual social practices. Butler’s (1990) analysis of how institutions embedded in the patriarchy misappropriate feminism to provide pseudo-protection is helpful in understanding how the safety product market’s rhetoric of empowerment is actually disempowering women. Koller (2008) explains how color can be another important representational element in perpetuating gender norms. Finally, Collins (1998) helps shed light on some of the important racial considerations that influence how consumerism and gendered representations uniquely impact women of color. A content and narrative analysis of the safety product market will help to illuminate how this paradoxical relationship is socially constructed and how it contributes to the Safety Tax.

METHODOLOGY

For the purposes of framing my analysis, I will use Donileen R. Loseke’s (2007) sociological evaluation of how to study identity from four levels of narratives: cultural, institutional, organizational, and personal. Loseke (2007:663) describes the cultural narrative as a social generalization of different categorizations of people. In this analysis, the media will be analyzed for the cultural narrative it creates by categorizing women as consumers with a domestic, and therefore, a more inherently weak role. Next, Loseke (2007:667) describes the institutional narrative as public policy and laws that ground cultural narratives. For the safety product market, it will be important to evaluate historical interpretations of self-defense cases involving women and law enforcements’ interaction with the safety product market. Loseke (2007:670) also examines organizational narratives, which are created by organizations, groups, or programs that help people who are identified as “having troubled identities” or are “in need of repair”. This paper will look at the organizational narratives created by self-defense groups and companies whose mission is to empower women, and promote the use of safety products, to address the issue of violence against women. Lastly, Loseke examines how personal narratives tell a story about how individuals construct their identities in relation to society. Op-ed pieces, blogs, and personal reviews from women telling their stories about using safety products or facing violence will provide the personal narratives for this analysis. Together these four narratives illuminate the extent that the safety product market contributes to the Safety Tax on women.

While Loseke (2007:680) makes distinctions between the different
levels of narratives, she recognizes that, in all practicality, it is quite difficult to analyze them independently. Loseke’s (2007:680) model is unique because it compartmentalizes narratives into different levels of social and cultural experience that can be analyzed separately and at their points of intersection. The layers of cultural, institutional, organizational, and personal messages and agendas create an overarching social narrative that impacts the lived experiences and perceptions of individual women. These intersections are examined throughout this paper’s analysis of the safety product market. This analysis will first examine each level of narrative independently, while periodically making connections between them. This paper argues that the overarching narrative created about women reproduces gender norms representing women as domestic, passive, and vulnerable consumers, thus, contributing to the Safety Tax and the disempowering representations and narratives of women in society.

FINDINGS AND THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

Cultural Analysis

The cultural narrative surrounding the safety product market is driven by popular books and media stories, which use fear to sensationalize stories about women being attacked. The fearful rhetoric emphasized by these cultural platforms implies that women take responsibility for protecting themselves. The self-help book, The Gift of Fear, is a prime example of a source that uses fear to emphasize the representation of women as vulnerable and asserts that women should be responsible for imminent attacks (Gavin De Becker 1999). The Amazon description of this book states, “The threat of violence surrounds us every day. But we can protect ourselves, by learning to trust—and act on—our gut instincts,” and “it might just save your life,” urging women to buy this book as a resource to protect themselves against violence (Amazon n.d. -a). The Amazon description of the book uses important cultural figures to further sensationalize this social problem and promote itself with a message of empowerment: “In this empowering book, Gavin de Becker, the man Oprah Winfrey calls the nation’s leading expert on violent behavior, shows you how to spot even subtle signs of danger—before it's too late” (Amazon n.d. -a). Although this book asserts that it is empowering, its responsibilization of women accomplishes the opposite and places blame and responsibility on women for their own safety.

Another example through which the cultural narrative about women and safety is told is in Allure Magazine’s article on self-defense. This article
likewise plays on women's collective fear of violence. “We’ve all had that moment while walking down the street when we've felt less than safe. Whether it's catcalls or a character who is trailing a little too close, at some point you have to wonder if feeling afraid on the street is normal” (Margolina 2017). The title of the article itself, “Self-Defense: Why Every Women's Magazine Should Write About It,” places responsibility on female-oriented magazines to inform women about self-defense (Margolina 2017). Furthermore, the use of the color pink in this article is both a signal to female audiences and a reclamation of the color in an attempt to empower women (Koller 2008). However, by emphasizing the fear women have about being attacked and responsibilizing other women to speak up about the issue, they are re-establishing the connection between vulnerability, women, and the color pink.

This article also demonstrates the overlap between cultural and organizational narratives. *Allure*, a cultural resource, uses its influence to highlight Women’s Initiative for Self-Defense (WISE). WISE is an organization that teaches self-defense to women and provides a Self Defense Starter Kit. This kit has been widely publicized on multiple cultural platforms including *Teen Vogue*, *Fusion*, *Muslim Girl*, *Mashable*, *Newsy*, and *Colorlines* (International Muslim Women's Initiative 2017). *Allure* also interacts with the Stop Street Harassment organization, using their statistics to emphasize the targeted violence and harassment women face by way of men on the streets (Margolina 2017).

As a cultural platform, news media also interacts with safety product organizations by sensationalizing violent encounters. 8 News Las Vegas and KOB (a local Albuquerque news station) both did special reports on Damsel in Defense, an organization that sells safety products. The 8 News female moderator introduced the segment: “Of course in the news we hear a lot about attacks, robberies, home invasions. Here in Nevada we’re one of the top-ranking states where women are attacked and killed by men. One company [is] making its priority to arm women with the tools that can help us fend off an attacker” (Krshul 2017). The rest of the segment highlights the safety features of the Damsel in Defense products, emphasizing how easy they are to operate. The news report on KOB also begins by sensationalizing violence, calling it an epidemic (Aguilar 2017). When sensationalizing violence against women, these news channels attempt to lighten perceptions of the safety product market. They highlight products’ more feminine features including attractiveness, usability for weaker individuals, and their ability to bring women together to train in a fun and engaging environment. In addition to this passive presentation of the safety products, the moderators
are wearing pink clothing in both segments. Like the presentation of the Allure article, the color pink subliminally demeans women by perpetuating the association of vulnerable female gender roles (Koller 2008).

Additionally, the cultural narrative interacts with the institutional narrative. Safety products provide cultural accommodation through institutions by encouraging women's passivity in self-defense cases in order to avoid legal trouble (Hall 1997). Safety products are marketed as “safe” and “easy” to use and are often utilized as a quick decoy to get women out of a dangerous situation. For example, in the 8 News’ interview of Damsel and Defense, the founder emphasizes one of their safety products, a keychain that won’t break the skin, so the woman using it will not “have to worry about blood and guts” (Krshul 2017). As Koller (2008) discussed, the color pink is more pronounced in the marketing of these weapon-like products in order to make them appear more feminine. While potentially trying to reclaim the color, the products’ gendered presentation and description demean the notion of self-defense to a more feminine and passive act. To keep women within the legal boundaries and not cross the line into violence, the safety market sells overtly gendered products.

It is clear that the media plays on women’s socialization to fear violence in the process of recreating representations of women as domestic, passive, and vulnerable consumers. In many ways, the paradoxical presentation of empowerment in the cultural narrative becomes evident in the messages media send to women. First, the fear rhetoric used in the above examples disempowers women by sending messages that reinforce the gender stereotype of women as vulnerable and weak. Second, media uses fear to encourage women to take responsibility for their own safety, thus, victimizing women. Third, the gendered presentation and emphasis on safety products being pink, attractive, easy-to-use, and fun add to the representation of women as passive, domestic consumers. The fear tactics, responsibilization of women, and overtly gendered marketing all contribute to this cultural narrative that perpetuates gender norms and disempowers women. These three burdens all significantly contribute to the Safety Tax placed on women.

**Institutional Analysis**

The institutional narrative constructed around women and violence also demonstrates the paradoxical message of empowerment within the safety product market. Public institutions such as our legal system and law enforcement agencies place a burden on women when it comes to safety. For example, traditional views of women are reflected in legal rulings on self-defense cases which restrict women’s empowerment by suggesting women
should not actually be violent when confronting an attacker (Phelps 1989). Historically, women who have hurt or killed an abusive partner have been encouraged by their lawyers to plead guilty or plead insanity (Phelps 1989). Additionally, women carry the burden of potentially increased aggression from their attacker if they do attempt self-defense measures (Saunders 1986). These gendered ideas about how women should engage in self-defense have been institutionalized through the legal system and projected into the cultural and organizational narratives surrounding safety products.

The institutional narrative surrounding women and safety is also influenced by the endorsement of safety products by law enforcement. For example, the founder of Damsel in Defense talks about how the inspiration for her company came from her husband who was a police officer (Damsel in Defense 2017). Similarly, the Women’s Personal Safety Network (WSPN), a free online community that provides women with articles, resources, and safety tools, promotes their website by mentioning that they have helped train law enforcement officers and elite military personnel (Elite Personal Safety Systems 2013). Safety products also use endorsements by the police to back their products. SABRE pepper spray, as advertised on their Amazon webpage, states, “SABRE is the #1 recommended brand used by police departments worldwide” (Amazon n.d. -b). Establishing connections with law enforcement companies and organizations legitimizes companies’ safety products.

Additionally, within the institutional narrative, laws existing in regard to safety products restrict the empowerment of women’s self-defense, as they imply that real violence is not a socially accepted defense for women. Many safety product companies ensure that women know the laws about using safety products. The Pepper Spray Store, for example, has an entire webpage dedicated to explaining the state-by-state laws on pepper spray, mace, and tear gas (Pepper Spray Store 2018).

The institutional narrative created by historical court cases, law enforcement, and legislation, represents women as passive and encourages the responsibilization of women in making themselves safer. The safety product market plays into this narrative by selling products that are easy-to-operate, attractive, and primarily non-lethal diversions, while also ensuring that women know the laws surrounding the use of these products. Safety products provide a more socially acceptable form of self-defense that falls within legal boundaries. Making women responsible for properly using these institutionally acceptable self-defense safety products adds to the Safety Tax placed on women. Next, the organizational narrative, which has already been linked to the cultural and institutional narratives, furthers the analysis of the
safety product market and its gendered, disempowering representations.

**Organizational Analysis**

Many self-defense organizations are founded on the principle of empowering women against attackers. Many of the self-defense groups and organizations analyzed encourage the use of safety products in addition to self-defense training. The Women’s Safety Academy (WSA), for example, has its own eStore that sells safety products such as pink stun guns, rainbow knives, and Hello Kitty key chains. Second, WSA’s mission is to provide the skills necessary to help women “attain empowerment” and “thwart attacks,” thus, responsibilizing women in the problem of systemic violence (Kawelmacher 2014). Finally, WSA offers a course dedicated to teaching women how to use pepper spray, suggesting that “defensive sprays are probably one of the best non-lethal, simple, reliable, and inexpensive choices available today” (Kawelmacher 2014).

Other organizations including the Women’s Personal Safety Network (WPSN), Damsel in Defense, and TigerLady contribute to the same problematic narrative about women and safety. As previously mentioned, Damsel in Defense has some of the most overtly gendered products of all of the companies analyzed (Damsel in Defense 2017). For example, one of their products is a keychain alarm with two versions, a pink called Holla Hers and a blue called Holla His (Damsel in Defense 2017). Moreover, many of their products are marketed as being child safe, such as the Holla Hers/His alarm, reinforcing the representation of women as domestic (Damsel in Defense 2017). TigerLady also genders its products by claiming, “TigerLady is a small and effective women’s self-defense tool. At less than two ounces, TigerLady is easy to carry and will fit in your back pocket, bag, or even your favorite clutch” (TigerLady 2018). The mission of the organization Damsel in Defense is to “equip, empower, and educate” (Damsel in Defense 2017). TigerLady’s mission is to “shift the balance of power” (TigerLady 2018). Lastly, WPSN’s mission is to “end violence against women by teaching” (Elite Personal Safety Systems 2013). Finally, WPSN and TigerLady play into the institutional narrative by suggesting that safety products should play a passive, less violent role in self-defense. WSPN introduces its number one safety product saying “The Defender Safety Keychain and accompanying instructional DVDs [are] a safe and effective way for you to protect yourself in a non-lethal manner” (Elite Personal Safety Systems 2013). Similarly, it is stated that TigerLady was made “to be simple to use, convenient to carry, and powerful when needed” (TigerLady 2018). They also emphasize that the
tool is primarily a diversion tactic as it “enhances your ability to scratch an assailant and quickly get to safety” (TigerLady 2018).

Not all organizations support the use of safety products in their mission. Model Mugging focuses on the self-defense aspect of preparing women against violence, while suggesting that safety products are a quick fix to violent encounters (Model Mugging 2018). This organization claims that “gismo[s] or gadget[s]” provide a “quick fix” myth (Model Mugging 2018). They believe that self-defense is the only real source of “internal self-confidence” (Model Mugging 2018). However, their discussion about safety still uses gendered rhetoric. For example, some of the empowering experiences they list for women taking their courses include: improving assertiveness while maintaining femininity, feeling safer to explore and enjoy physical existence, reducing fears of being attacked, interviewing for jobs more confidently, and learning to effectively protect yourself as a woman (Model Mugging 2018).

Not only do these organizations that sell safety products reinforce the institutional narratives about women, but they also reinforce the cultural narrative that responsibilizes women by sensationalizing the fear of an attack and suggesting that women can prevent them. In reference to safety in college, an article on WPSN’s website states that college is a dangerous time if a person is not careful, claiming that predators are looking for innocent women on campus (Elite Personal Safety Systems 2013). WSA reminds its shoppers that “The White House reports that 1 in 5 women will be assaulted during their time in college, and this figure does not even begin to describe the abuse that occurs to women outside of college campuses and around the world” (Kawelmacher 2014). This fear rhetoric demonstrates the extent to which women have been socialized to fear violent encounters with men and how often they are told to take preventative measures against these attacks. This contributes to the representation of women as vulnerable as well as the responsibilization of women in regard to their own safety.

While organizations and companies may have different opinions on safety products, they all play on socialized fears of violence and use stereotypically gendered marketing to attract female consumers. In doing so, they corroborate the representations of women as passive, domestic consumers. While these groups may have honest intentions to empower women, the gendered presentation of their products reinforces gender norms and is, therefore, disempowering (Cunnif Gilson 2016). This disempowerment adds to the burden and Safety Tax placed on women by the messages elicited by safety products. The cultural, institutional, and organizational narratives all reinforce a demeaning representation of women.
and have also permeated women’s personal narratives about safety.

**Personal Analysis**

The personal narratives of women on safety are greatly influenced by the cultural and organizational narratives, which sensationalize violent attacks as inevitable and responsibilize women by suggesting that they take preventive measures to thwart off attacks. A plethora of stories told by women online about their experiences with attacks and advice for other women on safety precautions exist. Huffington Post Women features some of these narratives, the majority of which are presented by white women. For example, Allison Leotta provides a personal narrative on women and safety from her perspective as a sex-crimes prosecutor in Washington D.C. Leotta’s (2013) article, “Avoiding Every Woman’s Worst Nightmare,” the title of which plays on women’s socialized fear of violence, provides a list of safety tips for women. The webpage’s video also restates those top tips, which include getting a dog, walking with confidence, and keeping an eye on your drink (Leotta 2013). Other Huffington Post bloggers relate to the lurking fear women have of attacks. For example, Jenny Dreizin states, “There is no doubt that gender is a key factor associated with fear in public spaces” (2013). Furthermore, they responsibilize women by implying that they should take action to ensure their own safety. Brenna Cammeron’s (2011) article, for instance, advises that women trust their gut before getting into a cab; Marybeth Bond (2013) suggests that women are easy targets when they do not pay attention to their surroundings.

Personal narratives can also be found in blogs posted to the websites of many of the organizations that sell safety products, which have already been analyzed in this paper. For example, the founder of Women’s Safety Academy, Vicki Kawelmacher (2017) posts blogs on her safety product company website to share personal stories and experiences of when her safety has been jeopardized. The author describes how her personal experiences with attacks called her to her current profession where she markets safety products to women. Similarly, on the Women’s Personal Safety Network, one woman gives a personal endorsement of a specific safety product on the website:

I was walking in a parking lot late at night when I was grabbed from behind. Instinctively I was able to use the Defender that was attached to my key ring to strike my attacker in the face and was able to run into a store for
help. The Defender keychain saved my life! I later found out that my attacker had left his car running and was likely trying to kidnap me. I highly recommend the Defender and Elite Personal Safety Systems to everyone (Gardner 2013).

Lastly, the customer reviews of safety products provide insight into the personal narratives constructed by women who have actually participated in the safety product market through direct consumption. One customer reviewing a pink SABRE pepper spray product commented, “I feel safer with it and the pink bottle is so cute...I would recommend this to anyone, we live in a scary world where anything could happen and it’s great if you feel nervous in certain situations” (Anonymous Reviewer -a). In another review of a pink taser the customer also comments on the color and mentions its safety features, “I love the color on this one... With this cool safety feature, I can keep the wristband separate while it charges and my daughter can’t accidentally tase herself or someone else either” (Anonymous Reviewer -b).

Finally, it is important to discuss the lack of diversity among who is telling the personal narrative in regard to women, safety, and the endorsement of safety products. Many of the pictures of the Huffington Post Women bloggers’ profiles indicate that most of the women discussing safety are white (or appear to be in their profiles). The majority of pictures used to market products also feature white women. Similarly, the founders of many of the companies are white women. One exception to this is the Women’s Personal Safety Network, whose instructors include both men and women of color. Apart from this exception, the trend provides evidence of Sandlin and Maudlin (2012), and Collins’s (1987) theories that black women are often left out of consumer markets and discussions of safety. This is especially problematic given that women of color are disproportionately affected by violence (Institute for Women’s Policy Research 2015). In addition to race, there is a lack of consideration for women of less privileged socio-economic backgrounds. The implicit suggestion by many bloggers that women must purchase expensive safety products and security measures disregards the fact that many women cannot afford this. This financial burden is a key part of the Safety Tax that could be further explored to expand this analysis.

Like the cultural narratives, these personal accounts of attacks sensationalize violent experiences and use them to responsibilize women by encouraging them to take precautionary measures, which, in these instances, means buying safety products. The personal, cultural, institutional, and organizational narratives paint a single representation of women as
consumers—domestic, feminine, passive, and vulnerable. This singular
gendered representation created in the safety product market disempowers
women despite the stated intent of many safety products and organizations
to provide empowerment.

CONCLUSION

It is clear that the safety product market capitalizes on the
representation of women as consumers (Sandlin and Maudlin 2012). Within
this specialized consumer market, companies like Damsel in Defense and
the Pepper Spray Store perpetuate gender roles and stereotypes through
specific marketing tactics aimed at women. The products marketing as pink,
attractive, compatible with purses, non-lethal, and safe in the presence of
children contributes to the overarching narrative created about women that
suggests their role as domestic consumers as being feminine, passive, and
vulnerable. Personal narratives promoting safety products also demonstrate
how certain groups of women, specifically women of color, are left out of
this consumer market, a problem acknowledged by Sandlin and Maudlin
(2012), and Patricia Collins (1987). Black women are underrepresented
among safety product bloggers and pictures used in the advertisements for
safety products. By focusing on the representation of their consumer target
as white, feminine, and vulnerable, the safety product market reinforces a
negatively gendered representation of women. These assumptions and
labels interfere with a feminist agenda of promoting gender equality and
eliminating systemic violence against women.

Essentially, the safety product market undercuts feminist progress,
as explained by Butler’s (1990) critique of the feminist narrative. By
creating a gendered representation of women, the safety product market
perpetuates the gender norm that suggests women are vulnerable and weak.
Furthermore, by responsibilizing women to take precautionary measures
to protect their bodies, the safety product market contributes to a culture
of responsibilization, which is inherently disempowering to women. Rather
than marketing safety products to vulnerable, feminine white women,
society needs to address why violence exists and aim to eliminate the
problem at the source rather than responsibilize the victims of this larger
social problem. As Stop Street Harassment explained, the current focus on
safety products is equally problematic for men, who also get labeled with an
either-or representation as protector or aggressor (Hagherty N.d.). These
labels perpetuate gender norms and contribute to the normalization of
violence, in which women are seen as the victim and men are seen as violent
in either a masculine or aggressive role (Hagherty N.d.). It is important to understand how male-dominated institutions in politics, law enforcement, and business play a role in constructing the safety product market, which reinforces traditional gender roles and contributes to the Safety Tax placed on women (Soergel 2016). Sandlin and Maudlin’s (2012) understanding of changing the media narrative, as well as Collins’s (1987) explanation of transversal politics, provide some solutions for addressing how to change the gendered narrative about women in the safety product market.

Moving Forward

Sandlin and Maudlin (2012:189) suggest rearticulating the representations of women as consumers by simply acknowledging controlling images in popular culture as they currently exist and understanding how they shape our perceptions and actions as individuals and as a society. This paper hopes to do this by shedding some light on the role that safety products play in creating representations of women as domestic consumers—passive and vulnerable—thus creating a Safety Tax on women. The term Safety Tax should highlight the extra burden women face in the responsibilization of their own safety. The Safety Tax concept should inform men and women about the social implications of buying into the safety product market and its disempowering narrative. Sandlin and Maudlin (2012) acknowledge the influence that the cultural narrative has on society and suggest that media outlets should strive to change the narrative about women as consumers by acknowledging the diverse positionalities of women beyond stereotypical gendered representations. For example, rather than highlighting companies like Damsel in Defense, news stations could run a story on an organization like Stop Street Harassment, which draws attention to the systemic problem of male aggression and challenges gendered representations of both men and women. In addition, instead of spreading sensationalized stories about women’s encounters with violence, like the sex crimes prosecutor Allison Leotta who was featured on many news sources, media sources could highlight bloggers like Sofia DiPasquale from Stop Street Harassment who encourages building community support. For instance, DiPasquale wrote, “We’re trying to get as many people trained up on bystander intervention as possible so we can begin to create communities where people affirm and protect each other in public space, and no one has to feel uncomfortable or unsafe” (2017). Emphasizing positive sentiments in the media, such as the one we see from DiPasquale, can help change the focus of violence from that which responsibilizes women to that which seeks to create a
more holistic approach to social change and decrease the number of violent attacks towards women.

In addition to the media readjusting their messages, Collins provides insight into how coalition building in a community can empower women and break down disempowering gendered representations. Collins’s (1998) view of transversal politics is a form of coalition building that encourages an intersectional understanding of violence against women. Transversal politics refers to the building of coalitions grounded in cultural competence and empathy for people’s different lived experiences, with social issues in relationship to their historically different social experiences based on unique identities (Collins 1998:934). Whereas the safety product market currently constructs a singular representation of female consumers as domestic, passive and vulnerable, they should be constructing a conversation that focuses on systemic violence and the range of negative effects it has on individual women. While the safety product market attempts to protect women, the gendered presentation of products and the responsibilization of women creates a paradox in the market’s message of empowerment. This leaves women more disempowered than before and contributes to the rising Safety Tax that women pay for systemic violence. To alleviate the burden this Safety Tax places on women, all four narratives in society must change their representation of women with regards to violence to be more inclusive of all women’s experiences and turn a lens upon systemic male violence.

Suggestions for Future Research

While it was not within the scope of this study, it is important to recognize the potential quantitative economic impacts that the Safety Tax has on women. Future studies should attempt to gather consumer data on the safety product market to examine whether or not men and women have statistically significant differences in their spending patterns on safety products and self-defense classes. Providing quantitative data on the Safety Tax women pay for being socialized to fear male violence would make a great contribution to the concepts explored in this paper and provide further incentive for social change.
REFERENCES


Blending in and Standing out: The Social Structure of Adolescent Victimization

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Abstract
This paper relies heavily on Sutherland and Cressey’s (1974) theory of delinquency, crime, and differential association as a framework for understanding victimization. Haynie (2001) also served as a methodological model for this project, as she applied a similar analysis, with the same dataset to delinquent outcomes. Logistic regression models show that the causal mechanisms of network form operate differently for victimization than for delinquency. I used three common network variables—popularity, centrality and density—to measure the structural influence of an individual’s position within their network. These variables imply two distinct ways of belonging to social networks. I refer to these aspects of belonging colloquially as “standing out,” measured by centrality and popularity, and “blending in,” which is measured by density. It is here, with these network form variables, that victimization functions differently than delinquency. I tested interaction terms for standing out and blending into delinquent networks and found that individuals who stand out in delinquent networks are at a higher risk for victimization than those who blend in to similar networks; this suggests that special attention should be paid to how network content and form interact when applying a social network analysis.

Keywords
victimization, network content, network form
INTRODUCTION

The formative years in the lives of many American teenagers take place within the context of public or private school systems. In these contexts, teens are consistently exposed to many opportunities to practice forming and maintaining social relationships. One potential outcome of adolescent social relations is the risk of engaging with delinquency and violence, especially when teens are unsupervised (Haynie and Osgood 2005). Adolescents remain at increased risk for victimization when compared to other age groups. In 1997, a total of 1.1 million students were classified as being victimized in school (Van Dorn 2004). In fact, in the United States, youth are more than 2.3 times more likely than the general population to be victims (Hanish and Guerra 2000). Important for this study are instances of serious nonfatal forms of victimization, their relationship to the content or behavioral norms of the network, and the structural characteristics of the respondent’s position within the network.

Starting with the National Institute of Education’s Safe School Study of 1977, school-based risk factors for victimization have been studied extensively. (Van Dorn 2004). The prevalence, severity, and impacts of this problem have prompted increasing attention in recent years by domestic and international researchers who are committed to providing youth with safer schools (Hanish and Guerra 2000). However, Van Dorn (2004) found that school-based safety precautions did not significantly reduce violent victimization and instead showed a trend toward significance of nonviolent victimization, suggesting that our high schools have much to improve regarding policies geared towards preventing teens from engaging in violence on campus.

Sociological research on adolescent crime and delinquency suggests that the social characteristics of an adolescent’s community heavily influences the likelihood of that adolescent’s involvement in delinquent behavior, and perhaps, the likelihood of their victimization (Hanish and Guerra 2000; Schreck, Fisher, and Miller 2004; Mouttapa, Valente, Gallaher, Rohrbach and Unger 2004; Sampson 1984; Moody 2001; Berg, Brunson, and Stewart 2012; Sampson and Groves 1989; Evans and Smokoski 2016; Hirschi 1969; Sutherland and Cresssey 1974). Schreck et al. (2004) speculate that research on victimization could benefit from studies emphasizing the peer influences generated by delinquent groups because delinquency and victimization share many empirical connections. Their study identified peer delinquency as a significant risk factor for violent victimization. Additionally, Hirschi’s (1969) theory of social control and Sutherland’s (1974) theory of differential
association have both empirically verified a connection between social networks and delinquency and have been adapted and replicated by modern sociologists such as Haynie (2001), Matsueda (1982), and Mangino (2009). For example, Haynie (2001) shows that any structural network location that puts one in a position of greater influence within the group, amplifies an individual’s delinquency above the delinquent content of the peer network. Just as there is a relationship between network position and delinquency, it follows that there is a likely connection between the social network occupied by an adolescent and his/her chances of becoming a victim. However, the likelihood of victimization compared to the propensity towards delinquency may function differently in terms of causal mechanisms, particularly the mediating effects of the network’s structure. I posit that network structure influences how an individual may learn appropriate behavior, and that the specific behaviors they adopt will either enhance or limit their exposure to violence.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Sutherland & Cressey (1974) hypothesized that high crime rates are rooted in normative conflict, defined as a condition in which society is segmented into groups that conflict over the definition of appropriate behavior. Based on a conception of modern society as heterogenous and segmented into conflicting groups, the theory of differential association asserts that crime is rooted in normative conflict. Therefore, when normative conflict is absent in a society, crime rates will be low; when normative conflict is high, societal crime rates will be high. The process of differential association provides a social psychological explanation of how normative conflict in society translates into individual criminal acts and, thus, an elevated risk of engaging with violence (Matsueda 2006).

Sutherland & Cressey (1974) develop several postulates of differential association, the first of which claims that criminal behavior is learned through communication with intimate groups. The process of differential association, with definitions favorable and unfavorable to crime, is arranged by the broader social organization in which individuals are embedded, such as family units, schools, neighborhoods, etc. The organization of these environmental contexts is captured by the concept of differential social organization because they are the sources that provide the network its content (Matsueda 2006). Sutherland & Cressey (1974) proposed in their differential association theory that structural conditions such as class, age, sex, ethnicity, and family status influence individual criminality by affecting the probability
of learning behavior patterns either favorable or unfavorable to violating the law (Matsueda 1982). Moreover, both favorable and unfavorable definitions and behavioral patterns are enhanced by their frequency, duration, priority, and intensity (Matsueda 1982).

Even in high crime communities, it is possible for residents to be exposed to the few anti-criminal norms present in the community (Matsueda 2006). For this reason, differential association lends itself well to the social network perspective because people in different positions within a social network may be exposed to different definitions depending on their position. The social network perspective allows us to examine the extent to which the values within a network will affect the individual—or “ego”—by providing a means to account for the influence of the values present. Using this social network perspective, Haynie (2001) hypothesized that adolescents will engage in behavior, not only because their friends are participating, but because of their location and influence within their own friendship network.

Structural characteristics of adolescent networks determine whether the network has control over its member’s behavior. In other words, behavioral influences from a respondent’s friendship network depend on the behavioral norms already present within the network—i.e., content—and are modified by structural components of the ego network such as the density, centrality and popularity—i.e., form. Haynie (2001) tested the effects of a network’s structure and the average delinquency of the network on the respondent’s propensity to engage in delinquent behavior. However, this study looks away from committing delinquent acts and instead gauges how likely the respondent is to become a victim of violence given the contexts and structural position within their friendship networks.

According to differential association theory, two conditions must be met before an individual will engage in criminal acts. First is learning the requisite skills and techniques for committing crime. Second is belonging to a network in which the ratio of definitions is favorable to crime. These definitions are not merely ex-post facto rationalizations of crime but operate to cause exposure to criminal behavior, thus, increasing the risk of victimization (Matsueda 2006: 5). Sutherland’s differential association addresses the relationship between the structural influences of network form and the values present within the network or its content. The theory is concerned with exposure to language and rationalizations that justify and teach criminal behavior and, thus, may cause an increased exposure to violence. For this study, I focus on the contextual and environmental risk factors associated with violent victimization during adolescence through the theoretical framework of differential association.
The Social Network Perspective on Victimization

To understand the behavioral and social impacts on victimization and adolescent behavior, some sociologists and criminologists have utilized a social network perspective when looking at high school instances of violence (Schreck et al. 2004; Mouttapa et al. 2004). The social network approach is particularly relevant in this study of adolescent victimization because friendship circles, or peer networks, are repeatedly referred to as the most important part of school life for American teens due to the structural changes that happen during transitions between elementary, middle, and high school (Coleman 1961; Eckert 1989). These changes often result in exposure to more heterogeneous populations and the adolescent’s new social status will be based on which peers know them (Haynie 2001; Coleman 1961; Suitor, Powers, and Brown 2004). Depending on their chosen peer group, an adolescent’s chances for victimization may increase or decrease based on the group’s behavioral norms. In addition to the behaviors and value consensus of the network, that is, the network’s content, the adolescent’s structural positioning within the network will either amplify or diminish the risk factors involved with the norms of their group (Haynie 2001). These risk factors refer specifically to the exposure of definitions favorable to crime or delinquency that may predispose teens to violence.

Although delinquency has long been positively associated with multiple forms of victimization, it is unclear whether central and popular members of delinquent peer networks have a greater level of violent victimization than do similarly situated members of conventional peer groups (Schreck et al. 2004). Mouttapa et al. (2004) hypothesized that bullies would occupy more central network positions, i.e. stand out, relative to their victimized counterparts. The study found that the number of friendship nominations (common operationalization for popularity) received was negatively associated with being a victim (Mouttapa et al. 2004). While an important find, the study did not account for the network content or the behavioral norms these friendship nominations brought into the respondent’s network. In this paper I seek to answer this question using Durkheimian notions of social structure in conjunction with Blau’s theory of heterogeneity which, together, lend themselves to the concepts of “blending in” and “standing out” and their relations to victimization.

The conceptual framework established by Sutherland’s differential association theory can be organized into two hypotheses: (1) Adolescents who occupy central or popular positions within highly delinquent networks will stand out as suitable targets, predisposing them to violent victimization. (2) Adolescents who occupy non-central positions in highly dense and
delinquent networks blend into their environment and are seen from the outside as “one of many.” Therefore, attacking an individual is much the same as attacking the group, which discourages the potential initiation of violence for fear of retaliation.

**NETWORK CONTENT AND FORM: BLENDING IN AND STANDING OUT**

The three variables used by several scholars in analyzing delinquency (Haynie 2001; Haynie and Payne 2006; Mangino 2009), *popularity, centrality and density*, imply two distinct aspects of an individual’s position within a social network, what I call blending in and standing out. In terms of measuring one’s exposure to violence, “blending into” a densely connected and highly delinquent network should provide safety from victimization, while “standing out” in similarly delinquent networks is expected to increase one’s risk of victimization. Network content in this discussion refers to the self-reported delinquency of peers present in an adolescent’s network, whereas network form refers specifically to the characteristics of the adolescent’s objective position within their network. A study that illustrates the importance of both network content (definitions of appropriate behavior) and form (position inside the network) was conducted by Evans and Smokowski (2016), who found that victims’ friendships likely do not improve their access to valuable social information; for example, which streets to walk on the way home, and that victims also do not befriend peers whose friendship may offer protection.

To further illustrate the concepts, imagine attacking a member of a gang; what are the consequences of such an action? Attacking one member is analogous to attacking the integrity of the entire gang. It follows then, that a part of highly dense organization of highly delinquent peers constitutes a protective shell around its members, reducing their likelihood of victimization for fear of retaliation on the part of the assailant. Conceptually, the likelihood of criminal victimization is composed of three elements: (1) motivated offenders; (2) suitable targets i.e., those who stand out; and (3) the presence of capable guardians (Miethe et al. 1987). In the gang example, the fear of retaliation can be understood as a lack of suitable or visible targets working in conjunction with the presence of capable guardians.

Closed structures tend to form dense networks of like-minded actors. For example, gangs tend to have strong ties and homogeneity of ideas which not only encourages conformity, but also leads to the circulation and recirculation of similar definitions regarding appropriate behavior.
Furthermore, the circulation of definitions favorable to committing violent acts in the name of preserving a hyper-masculine identity, the integrity of the group, or perhaps both, is seen as the standard for each member of the group. Therefore, a protective shell exists within dense delinquent networks as an altruistic duty to protect one another and their ideals, allowing individuals to blend into the group identity.

Social structure can also influence victimization based on the prominence of the position an individual occupies in a social group. Popularity and centrality are characterized by occupying an unequal structural position—some members are more influential than others i.e., team captains, head cheerleaders, etc.—within the network. When adolescents occupy one of these prominent positions in a highly delinquent network he/she will be at greater risk for violent victimization. The higher visibility of some members exposes them as suitable targets and prevents the formation of the “protective shell” around less exposed members of delinquent networks.

**ADOLESCENT VICTIMIZATION**

**Race & Victimization**

Research suggests that race is a robust determinant of victimization. Van Dorn (2004) states that there are a substantial number of high school students who reported seeing or hearing about racially or religiously motivated confrontations. In fact, 75 percent of all high school students reported seeing these incidents on a regular basis. What’s more, a study by the National School Boards Association (1993) reported that almost 30% of all school violence was related to race and ethnicity (Van Dorn 2004). Gottfredson, Hindelang, and Garofalo (1978) suggest that demographic characteristics (age, gender, income, etc.) are associated with various role expectations which, in turn, lead to difference in lifestyles, exposure to risk, and subsequently to difference in the likelihood of victimization (Miethe, Stafford, and Long 1987; Haggerty, Skinner, McGlynn-Wright, Catalano, and Crutchfield 2013). Gottfredson et al. (1978) report that higher victimization rates for males, the young, low-income persons, and racial/ethnic minorities are consistent with the lifestyle theory because these groups have higher exposure to the risks factors of victimization (Miethe et al. 1987). Studies of violent victimization among youth have consistently shown that individuals of color, particularly African Americans, are at elevated risk (Hanish and Guerra 2000; Haggerty et al. 2013).

Data from a National Youth Survey, analyzed by Finkelhor and Asdigian (1996), found that factors related to specific characteristics of
individuals that arouse anger in the aggressor, such as ethnicity, would be a likely source of hostility for members of different ethnic groups (Hanish and Guerra 2000). However, we also know that ethnic differences in rates of victimization of youth are mediated by the school context. For example, Hanish & Guerra (2000) found that the proportion of children in the school who belong to the same racial group and socioeconomic status as one another influences the likelihood of victimization in high school. The tendency to prefer members of one’s own group to other groups is also magnified when people interact primarily with members of their own (Hanish and Guerra 2000). In other words, the more potential for interracial contact, i.e. higher levels of racial heterogeneity, the stronger race is as an organizing principle for forming social relationships. When there is a larger group of individuals of one ethnic group than another in a school, it is more likely that members of the smaller groups will be at greater risk of victimization (Hanish and Guerra 2000). Therefore, race mediates the ability of a student to blend in or stand out in their school.

Interestingly, a body of research suggests that victimization is an ingroup phenomenon that occurs between persons of similar age and race backgrounds—in other words, victimization is likely to occur between members of the same community (Sampson 1984). Conflict between different communities implies that the structural constraints, characteristic of heterogeneous areas, counteract the ingroup tendencies that appear to underlie the victim-offender relationship by fostering animosity between groups (Sampson 1984). Ethnic minority students in schools with only a small proportion of ethnic minority classmates may have difficulty fitting in, and as a result, be more at risk of victimization than ethnic minorities in schools with higher proportions of students with minority backgrounds where protective communities can be formed (Vervoort, Scholte, and Overbeek 2010). This study operates under the assumption that racial heterogeneity within one’s school mediates the ingroup tendency for victimization as the ethnic composition of the classroom has been related to classroom levels of aggression, aggression among ethnic majorities, and victimization among ethnic minorities, and therefore, is employed as a network content control (Mouttapa et al. 2004; Orpinas and Frankowski 2001).

Social Structure & Victimization

In addition to network content this study seeks to understand network form, or the social structure in which individuals are embedded. Durkheim defines social structure as the intersection of two independent parameters:
integration and regulation (Bearman 1991). Integration can be understood as the extent of social relations binding a person or group to others such that they are exposed to regulations or the moral demands of the group placed on the individual that comes with membership (Bearman 1991). In other words, integration refers to the number and strength of social ties, whereas regulation is a set of behavioral norms or expectations attached to the group identity. To further illustrate social structure, Blau’s (1977) theory of heterogeneity suggests that the integration of social structure depends on face-to-face contact and interaction, not on functional interdependence or value consensus. For Blau, social structure refers to the specific distribution of a population among differentiated social positions (Sampson 1984). Blau’s conception of social structure implies that there are several distinct groups that exist within a single society with their own norms and values, in other words Blau’s theory of heterogeneity implies the distinction between content and form in social networks is particularly relevant to the high school context.

DATA AND VARIABLES

Add Health

To test a friendship network’s influence on violent victimization, this study employs the public use data from the first wave of the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health (Add Health). The data consists of a nationally representative sample of teens grades 7 – 12, nested in randomly selected public and private schools throughout the United States from 1994-95. Information on the sample was collected from the respondents, their peers, school administrators, parents, siblings, and romantic partners through an initial in-school survey followed by four in-home interviews.

In-School Surveys

Add Health’s In-School Questionnaire was distributed to more than 90,000 students in grades 7 through 12 in an hour-long class period between fall 1994 and spring 1995. The questionnaire consisted of many topics, from

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1The public use data set from Add Health is a merged file containing the Wave I In-Home Interview data, the Parent Questionnaire data (when available), the In-School Questionnaire data (when available), and the Add Health Picture Vocabulary data (when available), collected in 1994–1995. There are 6,504 Wave I public-use respondents.

2For a complete description of Add Health’s methodology, see “Study Design” page at http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/addhealth/design
education and parental occupation to self-esteem and risk behaviors, but most important to this study was the information collected on student’s behaviors and friendships. Respondents were asked to name their five closest female friends and their five closest male friends. In instances where the friendship nominations were members of the same school as the respondent, as more than 80% of nominations were, they too were respondents, meaning that data was also available on them. Because Add Health project staff assigned an identification number to each student and recorded these nominations by each student’s registered ID it is possible to reconstruct the social networks for most students. This network information makes it possible to calculate behavioral attributes present in each respondent’s own friendship (ego) network, such as delinquency, as well as test the structural influences the network may have on behavior or propensity to victimization.

In-Home Interviews

Data from the more in-depth in-home interviews contains sensitive information on the adolescents, such as experience with drugs and alcohol and various other risky behaviors, such as carrying a weapon. One of the most advantageous components of this in-home method was the use of laptop computers which played prerecorded questions about experiences with victimization. This method of data collection helped to maintain confidentiality on numerous sensitive subjects. These self-reported experiences from the first wave of in-home interviews was used to construct the dependent variable—victim violence—for this study. Therefore, the research sample for this project comes from the in-home wave 1 respondents with the network data from the in-school survey data as an addition to the sample. The final research sample for the study consisted of 4172 observations.

The Dependent Variable: Violent Victimization

The variable *victim violence* is a composite indicator of victimization experienced in the twelve months prior to the first wave of in-home interviews. It takes on the value of 0, if the respondent experienced none of the forms of physical victimization (listed in Table 2), or 1 if they have experienced at least one of the forms. The variable was designed to measure purely physical manifestations of victimization i.e. being shot, stabbed or jumped. Table 1 shows that the victimization variable has a mean of .19 and a standard deviation of .39 for the research sample.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Research Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victimization</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4172</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>15.75</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4172</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female (Male Reference)</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>White (Reference)</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4172</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Family Income</td>
<td>45.81</td>
<td>47.63</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>999</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aggressiveness</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>-0.8783</td>
<td>3.9555</td>
<td>4172</td>
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</table>

<table>
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<th>Network Content Variables</th>
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<tr>
<td>Network Delinquency</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>1.2489</td>
<td>4.1119</td>
<td>4172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Heterogeneity</td>
<td>25.75</td>
<td>21.87</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>76.3888</td>
<td>4172</td>
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</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Friend Involvement</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4172</td>
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<tr>
<td>Popularity</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4172</td>
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<tr>
<td>Centrality</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.2882</td>
<td>4172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density</td>
<td>29.72</td>
<td>14.01</td>
<td>7.6023</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4172</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 2. Frequency Distribution of Victimization Items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incident</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>During the past 12 months, how often did each of the following things happen?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Someone pulled a knife on you</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>3684</td>
<td>86.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One or more times</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Someone shot you</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>4122</td>
<td>98.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One or more times</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Someone cut or stabbed you</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>4012</td>
<td>96.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One or more times</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You were jumped</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>3766</td>
<td>89.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One or more times</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Control Variables

In addition to the usual socioeconomic indicators—age, race, sex, and income—this study incorporates the adolescent’s self-reported level of aggressiveness. Displaying aggressive behavior, having poor self-esteem and being rejected by peers, have all been identified as risk factors for victimization (Hanish and Guerra 2000; Orpinas and Frankowski 2001). This study employs these findings to construct an aggression index as an important individual level control variable when predicting victimization among high school students. As the aggressiveness variable was created using a standardized Cronbach’s alpha ($\alpha = .71$) its units are in standard deviations. The aggression index was created from the item taken from Add Health’s wave 1 in-home interviews shown in Table 3. The mean aggressiveness from the research sample is -.005 with a standard deviation of .5 and the variable ranges from -.8785 to 3.9555 as seen in Table 1. Much of the literature on delinquency and victimization focuses on the structural characteristics of adolescent networks that increases the risk of exposure to violence. This study considers the teens own aggressiveness to control for the individual’s own dispositions that might predispose them to victimization.

Additionally, friend involvement from the Add Health data set is a control of the strength of ties within the ego’s friendship network. The stronger the bonds present in the network, the more likely the network’s content is to heavily influence the ego. The variable was created from responses to the question: “during the past week, how many times did you just hang out with friends.” The variable ranges from 0, signifying the respondent did not hang out with friends at all in the last week and weaker ties, to 3, indicating that the respondent hung out with friends in the past week 5 or more times and stronger bonds. The mean for the variable is 2.01 and a standard deviation of 1 as indicated in Table 1.

Network Delinquency

The first contextual network variable deals with delinquency within the respondent’s peer group. The variable network delinquency is a measure of minor delinquent acts committed by the respondent’s ten closest friends in the year prior to taking the in-school surveys. It is a standardized index ranging from -1.25 to 4.11 with an average score of .01 and a standard deviation of .66 as seen in Table 1. Because the index was created using a standardized Cronbach’s alpha ($\alpha = .78$) interpreting the odds ratios from the regression equation uses one standard deviation as the unit of measure.
Table 3. Items used to Create Aggression Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Delinquency Scale Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In the past 12 months,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. How often did you deliberately damage property that didn't belong to you?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. How often did you get into a serious physical fight?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. How often did you hurt someone badly enough to need bandages or care from a doctor or nurse?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. How often did you drive a car without its owners permission?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. How often did you use or threaten to use a weapon to get something from someone?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. How often did you take part in a fight where a group of your friends was against another group?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. How often were you loud, rowdy, or unruly in a public place?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personality and Family Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. You never argue with anyone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Difficult problems make you very upset.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fighting and Violence Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In the past 12 months how often did you,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Pull a knife or gun on someone?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Health Item</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Please indicate how often you have had each of the following conditions,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Fearfulness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academics (School Environment) Item</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Since school started this year how often have you,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Had trouble getting along with other students?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Add Health Items used to Create Network Delinquency Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In-School Questionnaire Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>During the past 12 months, how often have you?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Smoked cigarettes?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Drink beer, wine or liquor?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Got drunk?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Race on a bike, on a skateboard or roller blades, or in a boat or car?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Do something dangerous because you were dared to?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Lie to your parents or guardians?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Skip school without an excuse?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Racial Heterogeneity of the Network

The second key contextual variable for this study is the racial heterogeneity of the ego network. Racial heterogeneity is defined in the Add Health codebooks as: (1) the proportion of all self-identified races present in the school which are also represented in the ego network (2) A measure of the racial diversity of the ego network, with respect to the number of races present in the respondent’s school. So, if the child’s school demography contains 10 racial identities and the child has one friend of each self-identified race then their racial heterogeneity score will be 100% (3) If all members of the ego network share the same race then the ego’s racial heterogeneity score will equal zero. The variable is represented as a percentage with a mean of 25.71% and a standard deviation of 21.89 as seen in Table 1.

Popularity, Centrality, and Standing out

Being a highly visible member, that is standing out, in a delinquent network is likely to increase one’s chances of becoming a victim, as theorized above. Two variables have been chosen to operationalize this concept. Popularity is a measure of the number of friendship nominations received by the respondent. The nominations range from 0 to 30 with a mean of 4.81 and a standard deviation of 3.79. When a person receives more friendship nominations it is a stark example of high visibility within an adolescent’s school.

The second operationalization of standing out is centrality. Centrality is a measure of the number of links required to link all other peers in the adolescent’s friendship network. Centrally situated adolescents stand out because they are a focal node, much of the information flowing through the network flows through members with high centrality scores. The centrality variable is calculated in the Add Health data using Bonacich’s formula (Bonacich 1987). Centrality for the research sample has a mean of .85 and a standard deviation of .62. The variable ranges from 0 to 4.29.

Density and Blending In

The concept of blending in is operationalized by the variable density. A highly dense network is marked by uniformity and a lack of individuality (Bearman 1991). When there is less individuality, each member stands out less, that is, they blend in more. High density thus functions to provide the protective shell discussed above when coupled with higher rates of peer delinquency. The variable is defined as the number of ties in the adolescent’s
friendship network divided by the total number of ties possible. The variable is represented in the research sample as a percentage and ranges from 7.6 to 100. The mean for the sample is 29.72 with a standard deviation of 14.01.

METHOD

The dependent variable for this paper is dichotomous, and therefore, the assumptions of ordinary least squared regression cannot be maintained. To compensate, logistic regression analysis, designed to handle dependent variables of this nature, was used to analyze the data. The logistic regression analysis for this project interprets the odds ratios for the independent variables that represent the individual variable’s influence on the likelihood of victimization while holding all other variables in the equation constant. An odds ratio of 1.5 can be understood as a 50% increase in the likelihood of violent victimization for the given variable net of the other variables present in the equation. On the other hand, an odds ratio of .5 signifies a 50% decrease in the likelihood of violent victimization for the variable in question while controlling for all other variables present in the model.

The statistical method used in this paper anticipates victimization as the data used to construct the primary independent variables were collected in the first in-school survey. The data used to construct the variable victimization come from the in-home interviews conducted approximately a year after the first wave of in-school surveys were administered.

ANALYSIS

Model 1 from Table 5 predicts the respondent’s likelihood of victimization while holding the basic control variables of age, sex, race, and income constant in addition to the respondent’s own level of aggression. The entire model was significant at the 99% confidence level with a pseudo $R^2$ of .2210. The primary control variable for this study is the individual respondent’s score on the aggressiveness index. Notably, while accounting for the other standard controls in the equation, the respondent’s individual level of aggressiveness is a powerful predictor of victimization as a one-unit increase in aggression results in an 838% increase in the likelihood of violent victimization. This result is significant at the .01 level. Regarding the other basic controls, as students age one year their chance of victimization increases by 9%—net of the other variables. Though the literature claims that younger children and males are at greater risk of victimization, as mentioned above, victimization (as I have previously defined it) only includes serious nonfatal forms of physical violence. As Model 1 shows, younger children
are actually safer than their older counterparts in terms of violence. Also, while considering the included variables, females are 57% less likely than males to be victims of violence, which follows the literature. Black students are 59 percent more likely than white students to suffer from violence. The remaining racial categories are not different from white. The family’s income also influences victimization. Net of the included variables, every thousand dollar increase in the respondent’s family annual income results in a 1% decrease in the likelihood of victimization.

Model 2 from Table 5 incorporates the key network content variables for the sample, racial heterogeneity and the ego network’s average delinquency. As a group, these two variables statistically improved the Model’s pseudo $R^2$ to .2271 ($P < .0001$). Consistent with the role expectation hypothesis suggested by Sutherland and Cressey (1974) and Miethe et al. (1987), a 1% increase in the racial heterogeneity of the ego network results in a 1% increase in the likelihood of victimization, while holding all other variables constant. For network delinquency, a one unit increase in friends’
delinquency results in a 16% increase in the likelihood of ego’s victimization. This result is significant at the .10 level. In Model 2 we also see that the racial category Asian becomes significant, meaning that Asians are 60% less likely than whites to become victims of violence. Interestingly in Model 2, with the introduction of network delinquency and racial heterogeneity, we see that the odds ratios for aggressiveness fall from 9.38 to 8.89; slight in the grand scheme of the project but noteworthy for several reasons more prominent in Model 3. Similarly, from Model 1 to Model 2, the coefficient for black has declined slightly, meaning that some of the variance of the variable victimization that is associated with being black, and separately, having high aggression, is explained by the network content variables.

The third model from Table 5 adds the network form variables Friend Involvement, Popularity, Centrality and Density. As a block, these structural network variables contributed to improving the pseudo $R^2$, which is now .2323. The change from Model 2 to Model 3 was significant at $P<.01$. These structural network variables changed the Model in a few significant ways. First, network delinquency is no longer significant. This means that these network form variables explain, at least in part, how the influence of the network takes place. That is, one’s position inside their network mediates the effect of the content (norms) of the network. Second, continuing the pattern seen in Model 2, as we introduce network delinquency in tandem with the network form variables, we see a decline in the OR of aggressiveness, meaning they are significantly interrelated. The position an adolescent occupies within his/her own social network also mediates some of the effect of one’s own aggression on being a victim. The same can be said for the variable Black. As we introduce network characteristics and structural components the odds ratio for the variable black decreases. Some of the effects of race on victimization are mediated by network content and form for black respondents.

Now to Model 3’s network form variables themselves. The more central a person is in their network the less likely they are to experience violent victimization; as centrality increases by one unit the likelihood of victimization decreases by 25%, while controlling for the other independent variables. This result is mediated when the network content interacts with the networks form. Conversely, as the density of the friendship network increases by 1% the likelihood of victimization decreases by 1%. In this Model, popularity is not statistically significant nor is friend involvement.

Models 4, 5, and 6 in Table 6 explore the interactions between network delinquency and the network form variables popularity, centrality, and density. Each model focuses on a single structural characteristic and its
interaction effects with network delinquency.

Model 4 examines the relationship between the respondent’s network delinquency score and their victimization and whether it is conditioned by how central the respondent’s own position is within the network. Thus, the model includes the cross-product of centrality and network delinquency. This cross-product term is statistically significant at the .05 level. To understand this interaction, it is necessary to solve the logistic regression equation. To do so, I created “high” and “low” categories for both centrality and network delinquency. High centrality is defined as the mean value for centrality plus two standard deviations, and low centrality is the mean minus one standard deviation, as minus two standard deviations is outside of the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Victimisation</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept (_cons)</td>
<td>0.1389</td>
<td>0.1430</td>
<td>0.1258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.07**</td>
<td>1.07**</td>
<td>1.08**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.43***</td>
<td>0.43***</td>
<td>0.44***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>1.49***</td>
<td>1.51***</td>
<td>1.51***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>0.43*</td>
<td>0.42*</td>
<td>0.43*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Income</td>
<td>0.99*</td>
<td>0.99*</td>
<td>0.99*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressiveness</td>
<td>8.58***</td>
<td>8.51***</td>
<td>8.57*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Content Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Delinquency</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>1.6781**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Heterogeneity</td>
<td>1.08***</td>
<td>1.01***</td>
<td>1.09***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Form Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend Involvement</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popularity</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality</td>
<td>0.74***</td>
<td>0.75***</td>
<td>0.76***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density</td>
<td>0.9893**</td>
<td>0.99**</td>
<td>0.99**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction Terms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Delinquency * Centrality</td>
<td>1.42**</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Delinquency * Popularity</td>
<td>1.09***</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Delinquency * Density</td>
<td>0.99*</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P > .01*** P > .05** P > .1*
real range of the observed data. The “high” and “low” values for network delinquency are defined in the same way, with the high category being plus two standard deviations above the mean and the low category being one standard deviation below. Using these values, the predicted probabilities of victimization were calculated while holding all other variables at their means to predict the likelihood of victimization. The predicted probabilities of victimization using these values are displayed in Figure 1, and the interaction is plainly seen.

**Figure 1**

When analyzing respondents who are embedded in highly delinquent networks, the support for the adverse effects of “standing out” become apparent. Given the delinquent network, individuals with high centrality are more likely to become a victim than their low centrality counter parts. That is, standing out in a delinquent network increases one’s risk of violent victimization. Figure 1 shows that those adolescents who have high centrality within a highly delinquent network have a 21.1% chance of victimization, while those who occupy less prominent positions within equally delinquent networks have a 16.18% likelihood of victimization. In networks with low delinquency the effects reverse. For respondents whose friendship networks have lower levels of delinquency and who occupy a more central position,
the ego’s risk of victimization decreases. When the ratio of definitions is unfavorable to committing delinquent acts, then the normalized social practices of the peer group pull the adolescent further away from situations in which engaging in violence is possible. Figure 1 illustrates this phenomena, as adolescents with high centrality and who occupy non-delinquent networks only have a 6.74% likelihood of becoming victims of violence.

To summarize, high centrality “amplifies” the effect of the network’s delinquent content on the teens risk of violent victimization. In other words, one does not want to be central in a highly delinquent network, which supports the original hypothesis for adolescents who stand out in highly delinquent networks.

**Figure 2**

Model 5 inspects the relationship between network delinquency and popularity and their interacting effects on victimization. Identically to the categories for centrality from Model 4, popularity was made into high and low categories using the variable’s mean plus two standard deviations for the high category and minus one for the low. Again, minus two standard deviations remains outside of the real range of the data. The same values for high and low network delinquency are repeated from Model 4. Figure 2 shows the statistically significant interaction by solving the regression equation for these values, and the interaction is apparent and similar to those seen with centrality. Popularity amplifies the effect of network delinquency on victimization. Increasing popularity while in highly delinquent networks increases victimization, again supporting the standing out hypothesis.
Adolescents who received a greater number of friendship nominations and exist in a highly delinquent network are predicted to have a 29.95% chance of victimization. Conversely, those adolescents who received more friendship nominations and who occupied a network with lower levels of delinquency saw the effect reverse; they reported the lowest levels of victimization at a 6.74% likelihood. This is again in line with differential association theory, as influential members of a non-delinquent network are unlikely to find themselves in situations where the risk of violence is high.

Figures 1 and 2 show that centrality and popularity exhibit similar effects on victimization when interacting with network delinquency. Both interaction effects show support for the hypothesis that standing out in a delinquent network increases the odds of becoming a victim.

**Figure 3**

![Predicting Victimization with the Interacting Effects of Network Delinquency * Density while holding all other independent Variables at their means](image)

Model 6 tests the “blending in” hypothesis. It explores the interaction effects of the ego network’s density score and the average delinquency of the respondent’s closest friends on violent victimization. This interaction term is statistically significant. Again, to understand the interaction, the equation must be solved. High and low network delinquency are defined identically to Models 4 and 5; likewise, high and low categories for the variable density were calculated using the variable’s mean plus two standard deviations for the high category and minus one for the low. The predicted probabilities are presented in Figure 3 while holding all control variables at their means. Here the interaction effect differs from those seen using centrality and popularity.
As Figure 3 shows, in a high delinquency network, increasing density reduces the likelihood of victimization. Adolescents who occupy a highly delinquent network and have higher density scores are predicted to only have an 8.53% chance of being victimized while members of the same delinquent network with lower density have a 22.06% chance. This is the protective shell created by blending in, supporting the original hypothesis. Taking the interaction in Figure 3 to its conclusion, in a low delinquency network blending in has less of an effect on an adolescent’s propensity to be victimized. Higher density in social networks where the ratio for definitions favor non-delinquent behavior has little effect on the ego’s chances of becoming a victim, meaning that density does not function to amplify the effects of the network’s delinquent content as centrality and popularity do. Instead, the variable density functions to conceal members of delinquent groups and protect them from violence.

DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION

The models presented in the analysis provide support for the hypotheses that blending into highly delinquent networks provides protection from victimization, while standing out in similar networks increases the risk of engaging in violence. These concepts were operationalized using the variables centrality and popularity for “standing out” and density for “blending in,” while the delinquency of a network was measured by the average delinquency of a teenager’s friends. Occupying delinquent networks in which the actual number of social ties is close to the number of possible ties creates a protective shell around adolescents. On the other hand, standing out in delinquently oriented groups increases one’s own risk of victimization.

In addition to the actual hypotheses, the study shows the importance of making a distinction between a network’s content and form, and that attention should be paid to how content and form interact with one another. Much of this paper relies on theories of delinquency, and especially Haynie (2001) who applied a similar analysis, with the same data and variables, to delinquent outcomes. While I expected victimization to follow from delinquency, especially when delinquency involves violence, my study shows that network form operates differently for victimization than it does for delinquency. Haynie (2001) showed that teens who scored high for all three network form variables were predicted to be more influenced by the delinquent conduct of their peers, that is that the network form amplified the influences of the content present in the network. Therefore, if an
adolescent occupies a highly dense, popular, or central position within a highly delinquent peer group, they are much more likely to also engage in delinquent behaviors. Here I have shown that the structural positing, defined by the variable density, is conceptually different than the positions of central or popular adolescents within highly delinquent networks when predicting adolescent inclinations towards exposure to violence.

These findings however, necessitate some additional clarification in terms of the reality of what the data is showing. The equations from Tables 5 and 6 control the individual adolescent’s own tendency towards serious delinquent acts through the items used to create the aggression variable, many of which include violence. This control allowed me to test how the network’s delinquent content coupled with the teens own tendency towards aggression and their position within the network may influence their risk of victimization. The dependent variable’s name, victimization, however, insinuates that the teens are innocent of instigating violence. To illustrate, take the question listed in Table 1, as it only implies that the adolescent was explicitly attacked: “have you been jumped?.” Answers to the other questions could be in response to the adolescent themself initiating violence; an important point given that this project is heavily concerned with the individual adolescent’s own proclivities to violence. The findings in this paper suggest that standing out in a delinquent network will increase the likelihood of an adolescent engaging with violence, not necessarily becoming the victim of bullying, because there was no way to differentiate between bullies and victims given the data.

While not the central focus of the paper, the relationship between the variables racial heterogeneity and victimization (as seen in Models 2 and 3) sheds light on the broader social context of the United States when it comes to race relations. As more races become present in a community, the normative consensus regarding definitions of crime becomes increasingly heterogeneous. As Sutherland and Cressey (1974) hypothesized, this heterogeneity of ideas or lack of normative consensus creates space for criminal activity by condoning behavior patterns, and teaching the techniques necessary to carry out crimes. The results suggest that the process of racial integration in the United States has functioned not to bring us together towards a more egalitarian society, but rather the process has served to highlight our differences and solidify the role of race as an organizing principle. Further research is necessary to assess the proper ways in which we can critically engage in cross cultural contacts so that our differences are not emphasized, rather, we can work to create the space necessary for a more egalitarian future for all. That process begins with ensuring that all
adolescents can go to school safe from violence, and teaching definitions are favorable to cross cultural interactions that will enhance that safety rather than diminish it.

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One Size Does Not Fit All: Dual-Labor Market and Family Structure Among African Americans in the South, 1880-1920

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Wheaton College

Abstract
In discussing labor markets and black families, I am entering into two of sociology’s most contested questions: what is the nature of the relationship between economic and social life? And, in a majority-white context, how does one conceptualize black families? In particular, I examine the relationship between employment patterns and black family structure between 1880 and 1920, a critical time for African Americans during which, for the first time, they had significant freedom to form their own families. Contrary to William J. Wilson’s hypothesis that black families during this period faced a split-labor market in which black workers had access to the same jobs but at lower pay, I argue that a dual-labor market in which black workers had access to a fundamentally set of different jobs better describes the post-Reconstruction period. Furthermore, the relegation of black women to domestic work—a function of a dual-market economy—had serious implications for family structure. While labor market conditions had a substantial impact on family structure, African Americans themselves wielded creative power in adapting their families to maximize their function.

Keywords
black family structure, post-reconstruction, dual-labor market
INTRODUCTION

The debate about black families—whether or not there is dysfunction, the nature of the dysfunction, and what has caused it—continues to capture the modern imagination without much resolution. Public intellectuals and political pundits seesaw between cultural and economic explanations. As rationales get more clearly defined and arguments simplified, historical and sociological analyses are often lost and muddled. A thorough examination of labor participation in the period directly following Reconstruction reveals that African Americans were severely limited in economic opportunities, in different ways for men and women, which had direct impacts on the size and function of the black family. I argue that William Julius Wilson’s emphasis on the split-labor market thesis misses out on how employment-type limitations which can only be explained through a dual-labor market lens, not simply wage differences, affected the structure of black families. In particular, the white ruling class set up separate dual-labor markets for black men and women, establishing the economic conditions under which millions of black families started their own families for the first time. As a result, black fathers had less financial influence and authority than their white counterparts, black mothers had comparably more influence in the financial and food security of their families than white mothers, and black communities came together to share childcare and domestic tasks.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The argument that economic structure predicates family structure is certainly not new. Neither is the effort to explain differences between the development of white and black families in the United States. In approaching this topic, I am entering into one of the oldest questions in American Sociology—that is, the question of how to rightly understand the lives of black Americans in a context dominated by white norms. This debate over black families was kindled by E. Franklin Frazier’s 1939 book The Negro Family in the United States and ignited by the Daniel Moynihan’s 1965 report The Negro Family: The Case for National Action. Frazier (1939:42) argues that development of black families was best when their “organization of family life approached most closely the pattern of white civilization,” seemingly advancing an assimilationist model for black families. Frazier is often blamed for instigating the claim that the black family is both matriarchal and pathological (Ladner 1972); however, recent scholars have suggested that these are mischaracterizations of Frazier’s work and stem from Daniel Moynihan’s use of Frazier’s research (Semmes 2001). Though he sees
disorganization in the black family, Frazier (1939:42) does not target black mothers but rather praises them, saying, “under all the conditions of slavery, the Negro mother remained the most dependable and important figure in the family”. In fact, Frazier (1939:42) advances the structural argument that “fundamental economic forces and material interests might shatter the toughest bonds of familial sentiments and parental love”. Still, the public’s memory of Frazier remains that of a black sociologist who originated an anti-matriarchal ideology, as evidenced by the Black Youth Project’s 2012 article lambasting Frazier, saying that “[he] blame[s] the individuals in the black community” rather than the system and that his “ideology has conditioned us to believe that a matriarchal structure is a negative thing.”

However, the problem lies in the connection between the Moynihan Report and Frazier’s research (Semmes 2001). In 1965, Moynihan published a report *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action* sparking almost immediate controversy; Liberals understood it as a call to action for policies to ameliorate economic inequalities stemming from racial inequality while conservatives saw his emphasis on family structure as evidence that responsibility lay on black families themselves (Geary 2015). Citing heavily from Frazier, Moynihan argues that the black matriarchal family is a “tangle of pathology” that they must get out of in order to get ahead in society (U.S. Department of Labor; Moynihan 1965:29). However, even Moynihan makes it clear that it’s not the matriarchal family structure itself but that “it is clearly a disadvantage for a minority group to be operating on one principle, while the great majority of the population, and the one with the most advantages to begin with, is operating on another” (U.S. Department of Labor; Moynihan 1965:29). Both Frazier and Moynihan tried to explain disorganization in the black family through structural explanations; however, it was neither Frazier’s thesis that economic changes underlie family organization, nor Moynihan’s argument that the black family is dysfunctional only because it is at odds with the family structure of the privileged that made it into public thought, but rather the concept of a culture of poverty which posited that issues facing the black community were a product of the culture within black families.

The debate picks up again with William Julius Wilson’s classic book *The Declining Significance of Race* (1980), where he argues that race relations and life chances ought to be understood primarily through the lens of the economy and labor markets. Wilson (1980) argues that in the modern industrial age, class has more to do with a black person’s life chances than race, observing that poor and educationally-disadvantaged African Americans are getting squeezed out of the job market while well-educated and middle-class African
Americans have increasing opportunities in corporate and government sectors.

Also in *The Declining Significance of Race*, Wilson posits several noteworthy arguments that for the most part have gone unchallenged, including the fact that employment of black Americans in period between the Civil War and World War II was characterized by a split-labor market, meaning that African Americans worked the same jobs as whites but with lower wages. While helpful in understanding class antagonism—especially the use of black laborers by the ruling class to break strikes and the development of increasing resentment between working class white laborers and black laborers—a split-labor market does not most accurately describe the labor conditions under which African Americans worked in the post-Reconstruction period. I argue that only through the lens of a dual-labor market, in which African Americans were relegated to a select few jobs, can we see the full impact of the labor market on black family structures.

Amidst this general confusion and lack of strong consensus, a few theoretical frameworks for understanding the black family have emerged: the cultural deviant, the cultural equivalent, and the cultural variant (Staples 1993). The first posits that the black family structure in the United States is deficient, and thus, prone to pathological tendencies. The cultural equivalent model suggests the black family is healthy when it conforms to middle-class norms. And lastly, the cultural variant model argues that the black family is a different but functional family form. I argue that black families were shaped structurally by economic forces outside of their control in the period directly following Reconstruction, and black men and women effectively embraced a different family structure to adapt to their economic position. In the dual-labor market system, black women were limited almost exclusively to positions in domestic labor which had dramatic impacts on black family structures for generations to come.

**HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

To understand why the period between 1880 and 1920 was so important for black families, we must first understand the historical background of black peoples in the United States. The first Africans to arrive in modern day United States came as a result of the Trans-Atlantic slave trade, widely regarded as the most brutal and dehumanizing system of slavery in human history. Millions of Africans were enslaved in Western Africa and, if they survived the perilous journey across the Atlantic, joined the ranks of plantation workers in South, Central, and North America. Through the
Transatlantic slave trade and the plantation system of the American South, exploited black labor became the foundation upon which global capitalism relied (Du Bois 1937). White workers became complicit in the color caste as well: the system of slavery fed “[their] vanity because it associated [them] with the masters,” and their ambitions within this system were to “become a planter and to own ‘niggers’” (Du Bois 1937:10).

After over two hundred years of enslavement, African Americans joined in the Civil War effort and, through the transfer of their labor “from the Confederate planter to the Northern invader,” played a critical role in the Union’s victory, thereby gaining their freedom from slavery (Du Bois 1937:46). However, the struggle for full and meaningful freedom was just beginning. The period following the Civil War and Reconstruction is broadly known as the Jim Crow Era, roughly spanning 1877 to the 1950s. A response to some of the collective gains of the black community during Reconstruction such as the establishment of black private colleges and the election of high-ranking black politicians in Southern states, Jim Crow laws severely limited the social and economic mobility of African Americans (Constitutional Rights Foundation 2018; Du Bois 1937). Southern states began to implement full-scale segregation measures—beginning with curfews for African Americans and extending to segregation in all areas of life: separation was implemented in all public spaces, including water fountains, schools, and buses (Nittle 2018). Not only were public ordinances put in place to target African Americans, but “bands of poor whites began to drive [African Americans] from work. Private vengeance was taken upon prosperous and hard-working Negroes” (Du Bois 1937:570). I have chosen to focus this study on the years following the Reconstruction, when black Americans had the first significant opportunity to form their own families independently, prior to World War I, which dramatically altered the economic landscape and sparked the Great Migration of black Americans northward.

Though 75% of black Americans lived in two-parent families between 1880 and 1925, they differed from their white peers in that both parents worked and mothers were more influential in providing financial and food security (Staples 1993). First I will discuss labor conditions for black men, in agriculture and industry, and move to an analysis of the dual-labor market of black women, in which the vast majority of black women were domestic servants.

**BLACK MEN IN AGRICULTURE**

In lower-tier agricultural jobs, recent research has suggested that white
and black sharecroppers received the same mean wages, demonstrating a fundamental flaw in the split-labor market thesis (Alston and Kauffman 2001). Further examination of the data reveals that black men were disproportionately funneled into the lowest tiers of agricultural labor, with nearly 65% of black men working as wage laborers and sharecroppers. By contrast, only 32.5% of whites occupied positions in the bottom tier. Participation in the top tiers of owners, cash tenants, and share tenants was completely flipped—67.5% of white men and 36% of black men held such positions (Alston and Kauffman 2001). The inadequacy of the split-labor market theory to account for similar mean wages of white and black sharecroppers is ameliorated by the dual-labor market thesis, which explains that although blacks and whites may have been paid the same in some instances, black men were disproportionately represented in the lowest tiers of agricultural work.

Although white and black sharecroppers had similar mean wages, the data reveals that black men were much more limited in the range of their wages. The range of income for white sharecroppers (~$150 - $250) was at least double that of black sharecroppers (~$175 - $225) suggesting that white sharecroppers had an economic mobility not shared by their black counterparts. A 1910 study of over 400,000 agricultural workers in Georgia demonstrates that not only were black men relegated to the lowest positions of labor in agricultural work, but that even within those sharecropper positions they did not share the structural mobility of their poor, white counterparts (Alston and Kauffman 2001). Furthermore, white legislators enacted sunset laws throughout the United States that stipulated that farmers could not sell their produce after sunset, citing safety concerns. However, in reality and in practice, this meant that poor farmers—disproportionately black—who worked from sunrise to sunset, could not sell their produce on the market legally or without threat that white farmers or government officials could claim their crops as stolen (Reich 2015). As a result of the dual-labor market in agriculture, exacerbated by lack of mobility and laws that targeted black farmers, black men were not able to provide the same economic support for their families that white men could.

Low pay and low income mobility for black men meant that the black family could not survive without supplemental income. That supplemental income came from two sources: black men taking on other jobs, and black women, who disproportionately participated in the labor market. First, we will examine the other sources of income for black men.
BLACK MEN IN INDUSTRY

In the 30 years preceding 1880, farmers’ wages had only increased 8% while the wages of nonfarm work increased by 46% (Lebergott 1960). The growth of high-paying jobs in industry began long before the end of Reconstruction. However, in this era it meant that for black families farm labor was becoming less attractive compared to nonfarm labor (mostly industrial jobs). The low wages and economic insecurity of agriculture drove many black men into seasonal manufacturing or industrial jobs in logging, mining, and factories to supplement their income. In choosing to supplement their income with temporary wage jobs, black men had to leave their families for months at a time—leaving many black mothers at the helm of household affairs. Others tried to get full-time work in manufacturing (Reich 2015).

In 1890, manufacturing and mining made up a total of 30% of the nation’s Gross National Product (White 2016). And yet, in that same year only 6.8% of black men were employed full-time in manufacturing (Reich 2015). Just as in agriculture, black men faced a dual-labor market in manufacturing. They were given the most physically-demanding, volatile, and unskilled jobs because white supervisors believed black men were biologically wired to do hard labor and mentally unable to learn skills and trades (Reich 2015). For example, 80% of black railroad workers in the South worked outside doing the most grueling manual labor: laying and maintaining tracks. In the most dangerous jobs, among the blast furnaces of steel mills in Birmingham, black men made up 90% of the workforce. In whatever industry they entered, whether on a full-time or temporary basis, black men found themselves in the most physically difficult and dangerous roles with the least payoff and job security (Reich 2015). Dual-labor market conditions for African Americans in manufacturing meant that black men were overwhelmingly funneled into low-skilled, manual labor, with the lowest wages.

Not only were black men disproportionately funneled into unskilled jobs, but even those black men who were able to enter into skilled work were strongly opposed by their white counterparts. In fact, the sentiment against black men in skilled industry jobs was so strong that white labor unions were often mobilized to defend exclusive access to jobs and preserve white labor mobility through strikes. In a case that attracted national attention in 1909, 80 white firemen in Georgia went on strike to protest the hiring of black firemen, sparking violence in the community (Reich 2015). Even for black men who managed to enter skilled occupations without violent opposition, lack of promotion severely limited the economic potential of even the most
skilled black men. As was the case in agriculture, the labor participation of black men in industry and manufacturing exemplifies dual-labor market conditions: they faced constricted access to types of jobs as well as wage and opportunity discrimination within accessible jobs.

Understanding that black men faced not simply a split-labor market but rather a dual-labor market is critical to understanding how their labor participation impacted the black family form. If black men were paid less without being systematically excluded from skilled jobs, they would not have to go far from the home to find waged employment and they would be able to bring home a living wage. In industry, those black men who took part-time jobs were separated from their families for months at a time, and those who worked full-time were forced into the lowest rungs of industry where jobs were physically taxing and had the lowest wages with the most volatility.

The labor conditions under which black men worked meant that they could not support their families on one wage. Consequently, they never had the dominance and authority in the family that comes with complete financial control that white fathers enjoyed. Black mothers were left with no choice but to work.

**BLACK WOMEN IN DOMESTIC SERVICE**

The dual labor market set up by white landowners and legislators ensured that the wages black men earned, whether through wage labor in industry or farming, were not sufficient to support a family. Consequently, and perhaps as a legacy of compulsory work for both men and women under slavery, almost all black women worked. “Who didn’t work?” asked a black woman from East Texas, who could not conceive of a world in which work was not the norm for African American women (Clark-Lewis 2010:13). Indeed, in 1880 Atlanta, black women made up half of the black working population—implying that their labor participation rate was equivalent to their male counterparts (Hunter 2007). In contrast, white women worked at dramatically lower rates—at least ten times less than black women did (Katzman 1978). Furthermore, white women who were employed transitioned quickly into more lucrative positions in small manufacturing plants and clerical fields (Blair 2007; Hunt 1997). For example, in the Northern city of Philadelphia, Du Bois (1899) found that 46% of white women worked in industry while only 9% of black women were able to share in the employment shift.

For black women who worked outside of the home, domestic service was almost always the only job available to them—evidence of yet another
dual labor market. Du Bois (1899), in his study of Philadelphia, found that 88.5% of working black women engaged in domestic or personal service. Even in Chicago, the city of industry, 77% of working black women occupied positions in domestic service in 1890 (Blair 2007). In Southern cities, the proportion was generally even higher. In 1900, 92% of working black women in Atlanta were employed in domestic service (Hunter 2007). Whatever the exact numbers are for each particular locale, the pattern is clearly visible: working outside of the home was the only option for the vast majority of black women, and the vast majority of black women worked in domestic service. Lack of opportunity to work jobs other than domestic work evidences a clear dual-labor market for black women, a phenomenon with major implications for black family life.

In the South, the presence of black women as domestic servants was crucial to maintaining the institution of the white family, and the demand for the black female domestic servant was fueled by white housewives’ need for help in combination with a racial caste system that placed all blacks in a servant class (Wooten et al. 2012). The white American family values of the cult of domesticity and Republican motherhood that tied virtuous womanhood to maintaining domestic affairs and controlling the home, could not have survived without black women as domestic servants. In an era in which almost all meals were made from scratch, the house had to be cleaned entirely by hand, and laundry had to be done almost continuously, a white mother could not conceivably manage the entire household—or raise their children—without help. Black domestic servants, just as Ehrenreich’s Working Poor do today (2001), were essential to supporting society as it functioned in the late 1800s and early 1900s. They served, as minimum wage workers serve today, as an unwilling but indispensable supporting class—sacrificing their time, labor, and own families to the function of society as a whole. In the case of post-Reconstruction society, however, the supporting class was not defined by income or occupation but rather by race and gender. The impacts sustained by black families were high; the dual-labor market for black women in the 1880s through the early 1900s created the conditions for the black family form that continued to impact families throughout the 20th century.

Just as their male counterparts did, black women did not just face a split-labor market, being paid disproportionate wages, but rather a dual-labor market, where they were severely restricted in the very jobs they were allowed to work. The importance in recognizing the difference lies in the implications that follow for the black family form. The domestic servitude of black women had a pronounced impact on the black family. The average
daily hours worked by domestic servants, as reported by domestic servants, was a little over 12 hours in 1900 (Katzman 1978). Working an average of 12 hours a day meant that quite often, black mothers could not return home and take care of their children in the same way that white mothers could. The actual time spent in their mistresses’ house was likely longer—Katzman (1978) estimates that working days of 10-12 hours likely meant 12-15 hours in the employer’s home with afternoon and dinner breaks. Conceivably, if black women were allowed access to the same jobs as white women but were paid less, as the split-labor market theory suggests, the shortened workday and workload would allow them to spend more time with their families. However, in supporting the Republican motherhood of white women by working nearly the entire day, black women were effectively disallowed from providing the same type of service and care to their own children that they were expected to help white women provide to theirs.

Contrary to the logical assumption that the long hours and physically demanding nature of their work would mean lack of motherly influence on black children, black women did not become absentee mothers but rather adopted different family structures to best fit their economic position. They creatively asserted control in whatever areas they could to create the best conditions possible for their families and themselves. Community ties were incredibly important for black families in the South, where parents often could not afford to be at home during the day. Although two-parent families were overwhelmingly the norm among black families (roughly 85% of all households had both parents), these families frequently lived in a larger and looser network. Extended family and community ties became increasingly important in black families; for example, in a survey of Cotton Belt counties, black households that reported extended or augmented family structures (families with extended family or non relatives) increased from 19.5% in 1880 to nearly 27% in 1900. This means that in black communities, responsibilities spilled over from the nuclear family and into the larger community (Jones 1985). Black women especially, took on the roles of other-mothers and treated the community’s children as their own—taking care of them when they had time off and helping out with the chores of other families when those mothers were working (Collins 2000).

Du Bois (1898) found that formation of stronger communities also resulted from the practice of living-out. The vast majority of black women lived-out, meaning they chose to live outside of their employer’s homes even if they were offered housing. In 1888, 90% of black women domestic servants chose to live-out in Mobile, Alabama. This is an obvious contrast to the structure of domestic work under slavery. For many Southern blacks,
living-out was seen as synonymous to emancipation (Katzman 1978). Not living with their employer meant that black women were no longer at the beck and call of their white employers 24/7. They were able to establish homes that they could call distinctly theirs. Through living-out, black women exerted control over family life that they never could have under slavery.

Furthermore, black women routinely used quitting and taking time off as a way to balance control over financial security and care for their families. Because of the enormous demand for black domestic servants—a tight labor market—black women were able to leverage their position to ask for days off and quit if the conditions were not satisfactory. If these methods did not work, black women would creatively use racial stereotypes to their advantage. Assumptions that black people were inherently lazy or slow allowed black women to take extended breaks during the day and go home to take care of their families. That is to say, if black women were not given time off, they took it (Katzman 1978).

Finally, the employment of most black women in domestic service also provided some level of food security for black families. Often, an unspoken agreement between mistresses and domestic servants allowed them bring home extra food after their work. Known as the food basket or pan-toting, black mothers commonly used this method to ensure that their families were fed (Katzman 1978; Reich 2015). Through living-out, community sharing, creatively finding time to spend with family, and bringing food home from their employer’s kitchens, black women were able to adapt their families to best fit the 12-15 hour workday they faced as domestic servants in white homes.

CONCLUSION

In the period directly following Reconstruction, economic structures set up by the white ruling elite created two dual-labor markets for African-Americans—one for men and one for women. These two dual-labor markets in tandem had a significant impact on the black family form as millions of freed people were starting their own families for the first time. Consequently, men in black families had less financial power and authority than white fathers. Black women wielded comparably more influence in financial and food security, and black communities shared childcare and domestic tasks.

Through a theoretical framework of standpoint epistemology, I have attempted to uncover the relationship between economic opportunities and the familial unit, honing in on the experience of black laborers in the post-Reconstruction Era. I have done so by attempting to understand the conditions of choice that black men and women faced before trying to
understand the structure of their families. Failure to take the black family on their own terms and in their own contexts has led many cultural critics to assign blame to black culture for the high poverty and single-motherhood rates that seem to afflict the poor black community. Rather than judging the merits of the black family against the yardstick of white middle-class family values that emerged from their own specific historical and economic context, I have attempted to understand the black family in light of its own historical and economic context. In the heated conversation about the black family, so few of our modern critics take the time to inquire into and listen to the voices of those whose lives shaped that very institution—the black workers and their families in the post-Reconstruction Era. This paper attempts to honor those women and men who, facing incredible economic odds, managed to survive and even thrive.

REFERENCES


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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Jasper Cattell is an undergraduate student at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver, Canada. He is pursuing an honors degree in International Studies, a minor in History and a minor in Sociology. He has also received a certificate in International Affairs and Strategy from Sciences Po Paris.

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Michael Chen is a current Princeton in Asia Fellow based in Yunnan, China where he is working with the Linden Centre, an award-winning boutique hotel, on sustainable tourism. He recently graduated from Wheaton College (IL) where he majored in sociology and history and minored in Chinese.
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In general, we recommend submissions not have too complex a hierarchy of sections and subsections. In the case of a heading, the title should be separated from the preceding paragraph by two (2) lines and one (1) line from the following paragraph. The heading should appear in 10-point boldface type, left justified. In the case of a sub-heading, the title should be separated from both preceding and proceeding paragraphs by a single (1) line. The sub-heading should appear in 12-point italicized type.

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"The world will be saved by millions of small things, and these things will be done by people like you."

- Pete Seeger