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"The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it."
–Karl Marx, “XI” from “Theses on Feuerbach”

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EDITOR’S NOTE

It is with great pleasure that we bring to you the sixth volume of Eleven: The Undergraduate Journal of Sociology. As a journal founded upon the pillar of encouraging critical engagement with the world, we remain unyielding in our efforts to build an ever-growing platform for sharing outstanding undergraduate scholarship. We work toward this purpose with the guidance of the University of California, Berkeley’s Department of Sociology. Therefore, we would like to express our deep gratitude for the department faculty, which – along with sociology programs around the globe – makes Eleven possible by nurturing inquisitive and critical minds in its students.

In celebration of our founding principles, it brings us much joy to be publishing four authors who hail from four corners of the country and examine diverse facets of the world in their research. It further delights us to share these authors’ insights and perspectives with an even broader audience. We are confident that this volume presents a collection of papers with the potential to spark inspirational thought, discourse, and action.

We begin this volume with Allison Ramirez’s piece exploring economic activity patterns on the San Xavier Indian Reservation. Her qualitative interviews and data mapping shed light on the residual issues in business development near reservations. DeAnna Smith questions the traditional African modernization rhetoric by proposing the possibility for multiple alternative modes of organization. Dalton Richardson utilizes a more quantitative approach to highlight patterns in feelings toward the Confederate flag, a topic increasingly relevant in today’s volatile political climate. Finally, Donna Lee closes out our journal with an examination of South Korea’s panopticon and synopticon models of cyber surveillance. She brings new perspective to the traditional interplay between subjects and public authority as Americans enter our own uncharted political territory with the 2016 presidential election.

It is not only our authors’ scholarship that allows us to incite social change through sociological thought; we also rely on our readership to spread the provocative dialogue. On that note, we invite you to read this journal with an open mind, and we hope the ideas within inspire you as much as they have inspired us.

Nancy Liao,
Eleven Editor-in-Chief
San Xavier’s Formal and Informal Economy

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Abstract
This paper explores where economic activity takes place on the San Xavier Indian Reservation, and the social significance of location. Qualitative data was collected from fifteen semi-structured interviews in San Xavier. One of the main findings was that for the sectors recorded (government, formal, and informal), establishments that are located in the center of the northeastern region prefer hiring from within the reservation, whereas establishments located on the borders of the reservation are more likely to hire from off the reservation. In addition, the informal and formal sectors tend to complement each other, rather than compete. There is a general push for development on the San Xavier Indian Reservation, and there are also financial incentives in this particular reservation for local and private entrepreneurs.

Keywords
Indian reservations, entrepreneurship, economic development

INTRODUCTION

Though government owned and operated enterprises are embraced throughout Indian Country, citizen-owned businesses may also act as economic multipliers and contribute to Indigenous communities’ social and political organizations (Cornell, Jorgenson, and Timeche 2007). Citizen entrepreneurship may also reduce dependency on outside markets (Cornell et. al 2007). Miller (2012) argues Native economies can become more resilient by diversifying economic establishments on American Indian reservations and decreasing the amount of tribal dollars spent on non-local businesses. Furthermore, American Indian entrepreneurship enables tribes to create and enforce their own laws. In this paper, Indian, Native American, Indigenous, and Native Nations are used interchangeably to refer to Native American people located in the United States.

Cornell and Kalt (2000) propose that American Indian economic development is most beneficial when formal regulatory systems inherit informal norms of a society. Champagne (2007) suggests that traditional economic norms determine the course of development and whether a community is suited for capitalism. Braun (2008) then states that economic stability can only be achieved when Indigenous peoples find a middle ground between non-Indigenous values and their own. Given that values and cultures of American Indians are diverse, a single development strategy might prove to be insufficient. Examining the role of policy, entrepreneurship, and location may shed light on the way Indian organizations utilize their environment.

Sovereignty, a driving force of development, is jeopardized by Indigenous peoples’ economic efforts (Cattelino 2010). This relationship creates what Cattelino (2010) calls a double-bind. The double-bind is associated with western society’s expectation that American Indians are entitled to sovereignty due to their underprivileged status. Therefore, when development results in gains, and strays from western society’s interpretation of “poor Indians,” non-Indigenous individuals feel that American Indians have been stripped of their sovereign rights. Cattelino’s (2010) analysis states that there is not only a mismatch between government and economic activity within American Indian communities, but there is also a mismatch between the goals and expectations between American Indian communities and non-Indian communities.

While there is an ongoing conversation about the political and cultural elements of American Indian development, what is less discussed is development’s spatial significance. Kain’s (1967) spatial mismatch hypothesis (SMH), attempts to explain the ways in which location and access to employment could indirectly leave part of a metropolis underdeveloped.
Wilson (1987) then applied the spatial mismatch hypothesis to the underachievement of inner-city African Americans. The SMH was based on inner-city populations and its contributions are applicable to communities outside of the metropolis. This analysis utilizes Geographic Information Systems to illustrate the location, expectations, and hiring patterns within the San Xavier Indian Reservation.

Moving forward, I will discuss how location and market proximity influence businesses’ hiring decisions on the San Xavier Indian Reservation. First, I will broadly discuss past and present American Indian development efforts. Second, I will discuss San Xavier’s economic history. Lastly, I will discuss how my findings suggest that hiring preferences vary from location and access to the Tucson’s consumer market.

BACKGROUND ON AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Tribal casino gaming has contributed to the social, physical, and economic wellbeing of nations who have chosen to undertake tribal casino gaming. For instance, gaming has decreased unemployment as tribal casinos employ both high-skilled and low-skilled labor (Akee, Splide, and Taylor 2015). Taylor and Kalt (2005) maintain that between 1990 and 2000, the median household income increased by thirty-five percent for gaming tribes compared to the fourteen percent increase for non-gaming tribes. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 (IGRA) established three classes of casino gaming and defined how profits can be used.

1. Class One gaming is classified as traditional games, such as those part of ceremonies and celebrations and social gaming. This class can only be regulated by tribal governments.
2. Class Two gaming is classified as bingo and basic card games. This class is overseen by both federal and tribal governments.
3. Class Three gaming is classified as all other forms of gaming which include slot machines and advanced card games. This form of gaming is regulated by tribal governments, overseen by the federal government, and also involves negotiations (compacts) between tribes and states which cover shared criminal and civil jurisdiction, gaming regulations, and financial assessments.

IGRA mandates that gaming revenues go towards economic development, tribal government, charitable organizations, and social programs. In the case of the Seminole Nation, Cattelino (2008) asserts that gaming revenues were allocated to social and government sectors prior to the implementation of IGRA. Angela Gonzales (2003) compares IGRA’s tribal gaming compacts to modern day treaties. Gonzales (2003) expands on this idea by claiming that the act of negotiating a compact denies nations of their sovereign rights. Due to the variation of views on IGRA, it would be useful to capture that variation of interpretations among tribes themselves.

Grant and Taylor (2007) contend that while there is a global trend towards privatization, North America’s Indigenous governments continue to control and engage in economic affairs. According to Grant and Taylor (2007), Indigenous government’s engagement in economic transactions dates as far back as the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. Tribal business is often discussed in terms of casino gaming. While gaming is an obvious aspect, tribal development should also encompass development policies and land regulation.

Natural Resources

Many Nations have attempted to develop their economies by extracting natural resources found on tribal lands. However, environmental concerns surrounding air and water pollution are often in debate when discussing natural resource extraction. For instance, in the 1940’s, private companies began mining uranium from the Navajo (Diné) Indian Reservation, located in northeastern Arizona. Faulty mining practices left Diné residents with over five-hundred abandoned mines and water and infrastructure contaminated with radiation (Stepp 2014). Despite the Diné Nation’s poor mining history, private companies are still extracting resources on their reservations.

The Shoshone-Bannack are also battling the repercussions of resource extraction. According to the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development (HPAIED) (2014), the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and a local large-scale potato farmer negotiated a lease to operate a phosphate mine on the Shoshone-Bannock’s Fort Hall Reservation. In the mid-1940’s, the Food Machinery Corporation (FMC) also began operating on the Shoshone-Bannack Reservation (HPAIED 2014). It is stated that over a half-century of mining has left areas of the reservations hazardous for human use. Tribal members also fear the contamination will harm the reservation’s natural environment (HPAIED 2014). This is not a singular case. Pollution due to extraction is an ongoing battle in American Indian communities.

Additionally, nonrenewable natural resource distribution centers on American Indian Reservations also contribute to dependency on coal. The Crow Nation of southeastern Montana first began extracting oil and gas in the early 1920’s, and it is now the forefront of development for the Crow Nation (HPAIED 2014). This has proven to be problematic as the global market has left the Crow Nation economically vulnerable. Still, the Crow Nation is actively pursuing the coal-mining firm Cloud Peak Energy.
to begin mining on reservation lands (HPAIED 2014). In the case of the Crow Nation, environmental consequences of resource extraction are rarely discussed.

The Indigenous Nation also farms and leases land to private farmers. However, farming cannot sustain a tribal economy. Joseph G. Jorgensen (1998) affirms that he previously did not support gaming because agricultural production on reservations contributed little to tribal economies, as it is both labor and capital intensive. To illustrate his point, the Seminole Nation used cattle production as collateral for loans that could not be obtained otherwise (Cattelino 2008). As stated, the use of resources and land varies among nations, yet the struggle between land utilization and health (physical, social, and environmental) remains consistent.

Citizen Entrepreneurship

Citizen entrepreneurialism, either formal or informal, is viewed in Native Nations as a way to create resilient tribal economies. Establishments that qualified as informal are those that are privately owned and operated but not taxed by a government entity, whereas those classified as formal are taxed establishments. As the United States’ participation in the global market steadily increases, establishments become more vulnerable to the global economy’s fluctuations (Sassen 2012). Like other communities, American Indian economies are also vulnerable to the global economy’s fluctuations. Thus, tribal citizen entrepreneurialism has the potential to create stable micro-economies within reservations. Ideally, this would happen so that tribal economies’ dependency on global markets would decrease with the increase of private internal businesses.

Cornell et al. (2007) contend that citizen businesses can contribute to tribal sovereignty by reducing Indigenous communities’ reliance on federal funding. The authors suggest that citizen-owned enterprises can provide nations with the economic upper hand and equip Indigenous communities with diverse employment opportunities. The incorporation of citizen-owned enterprises is universally underutilized (with the exception of a few Native Nations), despite the tax advantages that may be present on reservations (Cornell et al. 2007). Unfortunately, little research has been conducted on American Indian private formal sectors and American Indian informal economies.

Despite the entrepreneurial advantages present on reservations, aspiring business owners are faced with discouraging obstacles. These barriers include gaining consent from tribal governments and acquiring approval from tribal citizens who have land rights. The limitations that exist are due to outdated laws that dictate current tribal economic affairs.

For example, the Dawes Act of 1887 granted parcels of Indian land to the heads of households, leaving reservations divided into lots. Surplus land that was not granted to a head of household was then collected by the federal government and sold to settlers. It is argued that the act’s intent was to collect Indian land, and assimilate Indians residing on reservations, but others saw the act as a humanitarian effort (O’Brien 1989). Regardless of the controversy surrounding its actual intent, the act has delayed economic development on American Indian reservations.

The stated literature provides a brief but fundamental understanding of the history, research, and legislation that impacts economic development on American Indian Reservations. Though there are many ways to develop an economy, each Native Nation is diverse in culture and may require a specialized form of economic regulation that may not be successful if applied to a culturally dissimilar nation. Indigenous nations are not homogeneous, and it is important that these findings are not generalized. Thoroughly analyzing San Xavier’s informal economy, along with its relationship to the community’s formal sector, could provide insights that may support future development in San Xavier.

THE SAN XAVIER INDIAN RESERVATION

Wa:k Ceksan—also known as the San Xavier Indian Reservation—is located southwest of Tucson, Arizona. Though the San Xavier Indian Reservation is geographically disconnected from the Tohono O'odham Nation’s main reservation, San Xavier operates as one of the Tohono O’odham Nation’s eleven districts, as seen in Figure 1. San Xavier, as part of the Tohono O’odham Nation, has previously engaged in economic activities such as casino gaming, copper mining, foreign trade, and agriculture. It is also home to the first Foreign Trade Zones ever established on an American Indian Reservation, Foreign Trade Zone No. 48. This community’s formal and informal economy has not yet been examined, but doing so will provide insight into the ways in which Indigenous communities function.

In 1959, ASARCO Grupo Mexico began mining copper, silver, gold, and other minerals on the San Xavier Indian Reservation. In 1997, ASARCO sold its Grupo Mexico shares for $323 million. In 1999, Grupo Mexico purchased shares and debt from ASARCO which totaled to $2.2 billion. After filing for bankruptcy due to a drop in the global cost of copper, ASARCO re-incorporated itself as ASARCO Grupo Mexico in 2009. The distribution of copper was formerly seen as profitable, but the private company that once mined on the reservation stopped active mining on the reservation in 2001.
In 1993, the Tohono O’odham Nation converted its class two casino, located south of Tucson, into a class three casino. The Tohono O’odham Nation has since elevated its economic standing as a result of the conversion. Tribal gaming is thought to improve a community’s well-being through job creation. In addition, transfer of gaming rewards to individuals usually takes the form of per capita payments. However, the Tohono O’odham no longer distributes these payments. Ultimately, gaming has provided the Tohono O’odham Nation a chance to structure and independently fund their programs without the influence of the United States federal government.

Next, I will discuss economic development in terms of for-profit tribal institutions, natural resources, and citizen entrepreneurship, as they are common economic strategies in American Indian communities. However, this is not to say that all American Indian economic undertakings fit into these three categories. Lastly, I will discuss how previous claims about American Indian economic development relate to the San Xavier Indian Reservation.

### METHODS

To understand entrepreneurial activity in San Xavier, I conducted fifteen semi-structured interviews. This sample consisted of nine informal entrepreneurs, four formal entrepreneurs, and two public officials from San Xavier. Recruitment methods of the informal sector consisted of distributing flyers, approaching visible establishments, networking in informal social networks, and using snowball sampling. Interviews with formal entrepreneurs and public officials were less structured as their purpose was to obtain background information regarding taxes, land rights, and the government’s influence on economic affairs.

In total, I contacted fifty-five establishments within San Xavier to determine the number of individuals each institution employs. The Desert Diamond Casino’s Tucson and Sahuarita locations employ an estimated number of 1243 individuals. However, I was unable to acquire the number of individuals at each individual location, and therefore I do not include them in Table 1, which presents statistics that include outliers. Excluding one outlier (The Tohono O’odham Swap Meet, which employs 205 individuals), informal businesses (N=18) had an average of 4.11 employees. Privately-owned formal businesses (N=13) had an average of 10.58 (excluding the outlier Empire CAT, which employs 142 individuals).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Number of Establishments</th>
<th>Mean Number of Employees</th>
<th>Median Number of Employees</th>
<th>Mode of Employees</th>
<th>Range of Employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8.54</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal (Prof)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20.69</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>13.16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 provides the mean, median, mode, and range of individuals employed in San Xavier’s government, formal, informal sectors. Outliers are included in Table 1.

I entered vocational information from all sectors, along with the number of individuals each establishment employs, into Geographic Information Systems (GIS). To do this I downloaded a geographic address...
locator from the United States Census Bureau’s website, found under the geographic TIGER/line portion of the website (https://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/data/tiger-line.html). Next, I downloaded 2010 geographic shapefiles such as descriptive and basic street lines for Pima County. In addition, I download geographic lines for all American Indian Reservations. I clipped these files to isolate the San Xavier Indian Reservation on GIS. After the files were clipped, I input the locational and employment information. Then I arranged the maps, classified the employee quantities, and inserted descriptors. Lastly, I exported the maps as JPEG images.

The remainder of this report will present my findings about a study I conducted, which examined government-owned enterprises, formal private businesses, and informal businesses. The project is exploratory and it incorporates various methodologies. This report may provide insight into the function of Indigenous economies given their distinctive political status. It will also contribute insight into the function of Indigenous economies that border cities and countries.

RESULTS

The majority of the economic activity takes place in the northeast region, partially because many of San Xavier’s residents live in this area. The northeastern border is not a residential area. Figure 2 represents the locational information I collected from formal businesses, government facilities, and informal establishments in San Xavier. After figures 2 and 3, I briefly describe what is illustrated in the maps. The type of establishment and number of employees are depicted in the legend. Figure 2 illustrates that the majority of San Xavier’s economic activity takes place near Interstate 19. Figure 3 is a close-up of San Xavier’s northeastern region, where the majority of economic activity takes place.

- Northern Border: Chico’s Smoke Shop (Private), The Tohono O’odham Swap Meet (Informal)
- Mid Northeastern Region: San Xavier Coop Farm (Private), San Xavier Mission Museum and Gift Shop (Private), The Tohono O’odham Nation Fire Department, San Xavier District Center (Tribal)
- Eastern Border: Desert Diamond Casino-Tucson (Tribal), Tobacco Barn (Private) Empire CAT (Private), Marcus Funeral Home (Private)
- Southern Border: Desert Diamond Casino-Sahuarita (Tribal)

Figure 2 is a map of San Xavier’s economic activity and the number of individuals each establishment employs.

Figure 3 is a close up of economic activity in the northern region of San Xavier.
• Northeastern Region: Indian Health Services (tribal), Interstate 19, San Xavier Del Bac Museum and Gift Shop (Private), San Xavier Co-op Farm (Private)
• Northern Center: Government Facilities, Varied formal and informal establishments

Government

Government-operated development projects have transformed the Tohono O’odham Nation over the past thirty years. For-profit government organizations on the San Xavier Indian Reservation consist of the Desert Diamond Casino-Sahuarita, the Desert Diamond Casino-Tucson, and a café located at the San Xavier Mission’s Plaza. These tribally owned and operated agencies are located on the southern border, northeastern border, and the center of the northeastern region. In contrast, other government facilities are located in the center of the northeastern region.

The Tohono O’odham Nation’s gaming casinos employ a total of 1273 individuals. This figure accounts for the nation’s three locations: Why (located on the Tohono O’odham Nation’s main Reservation), Sahuarita, and Tucson. The Desert Diamond’s labor force collectively employs 771 non-Indians, 384 O’odhams, and 118 American Indians that are enrolled in another federally recognized tribe. It is important to note that both casinos are located on the eastern and southern edge of the reservation. In contrast to these casinos, government facilities that are not located on the borders of the reservation are more likely to hire from within the reservation.

Government officials stated that they only intervene in business transactions when it is in the community’s best interest. In terms of land development, a leading official stated that the procedures are set in place to prevent hazardous business practices. It was also stated that at the district level, the government does not plan to regulate the activity of its informal economy. Overall, government officials are in favor of citizen entrepreneurialism on the reservation. They also stated that while the procedures set in place often defer development in San Xavier, it is not their intention to stymie new businesses. In all of the interviews, participants did not discuss the government’s regulation of non-tribal businesses on the reservation.

Formal (Private)

San Xavier’s private formal sector consists of tribal and non-tribal owners. However, O’odham-owned businesses are more likely to be smaller in size and located in the center of the northeastern region of the reservation. While the borders of the reservation are occupied by a few O’odham business owners, non-Indian owned businesses tend to be located on the northeastern borders of the reservation, closest to Tucson. O’odham business owners located in the northeastern center of the reservation are also more likely to hire from within their social networks than from off the reservation. In contrast, organizations located on the northern borders of the reservation are more likely to hire individuals that are not from the reservation.

The Tohono O’odham Nation has a tax base of five percent. When compared to the combination of state, county, and city taxes of the surrounding locality, which is approximately eight percent, there is certainly a tax advantage in San Xavier. The formal business owners that were interviewed did not refer to the nation’s taxes as troublesome, nor did they state that it influenced their decision to formalize. One business owner explained that while they did not perceive the nation’s taxes as a burden, they were concerned about how the collected taxes are distributed.

When land development was discussed, business owners did not state that the process of development was a problem. One individual stated that they had contemplated opening another establishment, but that they did not have the time or resources to do so. To develop land in San Xavier, one must gain consent of all allottees who have title to the land, have the land inspected for artifacts, get the Nation’s and the district’s approval, and acquire permits. The aspiring business owner must pay for all of the development processes. One individual stated that acquiring consent from allottees alone could take years due to the extensive division of land parcels.

Two other business owners who were first engaged in the informal economy (one is now formalized, the other is in the process of being formalized) are now participating in the Home Site Policy process. The Home Site Policy is—for economic development purposes—endorsed by the Tohono O’odham Nation. This process allows aspiring business owners to open an establishment in the vicinity of their home although it still requires permits and governmental approval, along with the approval of residents within five hundred feet of the establishment. Two business owners stated that developing an establishment allows them to work near their home, which they found desirable. According to the interviewees, the Home Site Policy is an efficient process in comparison to developing elsewhere on the reservation.

Informal

Figure 3 demonstrates that much of the informal entrepreneurial activity takes place within the northeastern region, near San Xavier’s government facilities and local formal business establishments. While informal activity
would otherwise be deemed illegal elsewhere in the United States, with the exception of American Indian Reservations such as San Xavier's non-tribal informal economy, the formal economy interacts directly with the informal economy daily. San Xavier's formal and informal economy tend to complement, rather than compete with, one another. Individuals from all sectors reported regular interaction with business people from other sectors, especially on the behalf of the informal economy, within the northern center of the reservation. For instance, individuals from the informal economic sector sporadically visit private businesses and government facilities to sell food, arts and crafts, and appliances.

With regards to transportation, eight out of nine participants from San Xavier's informal sector stated that they relied on personal transportation. In addition, when participants were asked to discuss San Xavier's economy, not a single participant referred to the community's access to transportation as a source of economic delay. The qualitative data collected indicate that there is clearly a spatial mismatch of opportunity in San Xavier. However, interviewees that did not take part in formal employment said that it was not due to their access to transportation.

It came up that the Tohono O'odham Nation as a government entity has made plans to convert the nation's informal sector. No government official has verified this information. Out of a sample of nine individuals from the informal economy, six stated that their participation was either part-time or sporadic. These participants specified that within their household, they or people within their homes were employed at a formal institution. To date, the District of San Xavier has not attempted to formalize its informal economy, and according to a leading government official, there are no plans to formalize this sector in the future.

**DISCUSSION**

Conversations concerning entrepreneurship suggest that citizen businesses could contribute to the political, economic, and social relations in American Indian Reservations (Cornell et al. 2007; Miller 2012). What is less discussed is the variation between citizen-owned businesses in reservation communities. Despite its small size, the motives and practices of citizen-owned business in San Xavier varied by location. With the exception of the informal economy, the location of a citizen's business determined their market and labor base. Citizen-owned businesses that are located on the borders of the reservation tended to market their products and services to residents of Tucson. They are also more likely to hire from off the reservation. Citizen businesses that were not located on the borders of the reservation tended to hire from within the reservation. They are also more likely to market their products and services to residents of San Xavier.

Since only a fraction of citizen entrepreneurs hired from within the reservation, citizen entrepreneurship can only minimally contribute to San Xavier's political, economic, and social stability. In fact, citizen-owned businesses that do not hire from within the reservation contribute to dependency. This is due to how only a portion of the population has access to employment in these establishments located on the border. If citizen-owned development is not aimed at employing residents of San Xavier, only the business owner has access to this capital, not the community. Thus, only individual citizen entrepreneurs with businesses located on the border profit from such development. Due to the unequal capital distributions of this development, resources that could have otherwise naturally contributed to the social health of the community must be sought elsewhere.

Miller (2012) states that in a healthy economic environment, currency cycles through a community five to seven times. The absence or shortage of this cycle results in fiscal leakage. Miller (2012) goes to assert that citizen entrepreneurship has the ability to reduce and prevent fiscal leakage. Due to the diversity of the market and motives, citizen entrepreneurship only minimally prevents fiscal leakage. While formal citizen entrepreneurship contributes to the community's tax base, it only provides transfers of development to individuals' certain spatial zones. In San Xavier, transfers of development to individuals in the form of employment were more likely to take place in the center of the northeastern region. Citizen businesses in this region also tended to be smaller in size when compared to citizen-owned business located on the borders of the reservation. Given that businesses that are more likely to hire from within the reservation are smaller, and tended to have a smaller labor force, their presence is not enough to offset the practices of businesses at the borders of the reservation.

Non-tribal businesses tend to locate on the border of the reservation and shared many similarities with citizen-owned businesses located in the same region. Formal non-tribal businesses are the second largest establishments after casinos. Many catered to the Tucson market and were located at the borders of the reservation. They are also the least likely to hire from within the reservation. While other sectors of the economy tended to interact with one another, the non-tribal business sector almost exclusively interacted with the Tucson market. These businesses are also clustered in the area previously known as Foreign Trade Zone No. 48. However, current regulations surrounding the previously known Foreign Trade Zone No. 48 are unclear.

In addition, like other development sites located on the borders of the reservation, tribal casinos are also more likely to hire from areas outside of the reservation. Given their documented hiring preferences, it is unclear why
the majority of their labor force consists of mostly non-tribal individuals. In contrast to tribal casinos, tribal establishments located in the center of the northeastern region are predominately made up of an O’odham labor force. The location and polarization of the formal, informal and government sectors suggest that proximity to the Tucson market influences who an organization hires.

The majority of San Xavier’s informal economy is located in the northeastern region of the reservation. The informal economy regularly interacts with private formal businesses and government establishments in the northeastern region. Informal business owners also tend to hire from within their social networks. It is also common for members of the informal economy to have access to personal transportation. Therefore, even though they had access to transportation, members of the informal economy preferred to sell their products and services to tourists and locals. In inner cities, the lack of transportation was correlated to underdevelopment and minimal employment opportunities (Kain 1967; Wilson 1987). I would argue that in San Xavier, formal disengagement is not due to residents lacking access to personal transportation. Rather, it is due to the barriers placed by formal establishments. Also, the informal economy provided participants with a sense of familiarity and employment.

While informal business activity is illegal in most of the United States, in San Xavier the informal economy is not formally regulated. It was even stated that there are no plans to regulate this sector in the future. Cornell and Kalt (2000) argue that economic development would prosper if formal regulatory systems were to adopt informal cultural norms. Champagne (2007) claims that a nation’s culture determines if they will engage in capital and if they will succeed at it. In San Xavier, cultural dynamics are maintained by the district’s decision not to regulate the community’s informal economy. The reflection of cultural conformity is also seen in some informal-turned-formal business owners’ decision to formalize for the collective good. Cornell and Kalt’s (2000) claim, and Champagne’s (2007) cultural claim is in a sense applicable to San Xavier; however, it does not account for the variation of business motivations in San Xavier.

Although San Xavier is not located in the urban center, it is not exactly rural. The reservation’s locational categorization is ambiguous. Braun (2008) maintains that economic stability can only be achieved if the values of non-Indigenous and the Indigenous are met. San Xavier’s locational ambiguity and organizational diversity is an example of an Indigenous nation attempting to find an economic value-oriented “middle ground.” However, even when the “middle ground” is established, transfer of development is not salient. This can be seen in market preference and hiring practices. Though maintaining a “middle ground” stance is preferable, achieving a “middle ground” would require conformity and cooperation of all parties involved. Since there is a stark locational inequality in San Xavier, I would argue that finding a “middle ground” is far from a solution.

There was also no indication of Cattelino’s (2010) double-bind. However, it is not to say that it does not exist. Since this sample only consisted of individuals affiliated with business relations in San Xavier, this sample is not representative of the non-business population. I do think that it is important to note that in the case of large development, in San Xavier, residents of Tucson are the most likely to directly consume and benefit from employment opportunities. In addition, I would suggest that there is a double-bind in the of practices of non-Indian business owners and the government-created business incentives on the reservation.

Throughout this report I demonstrated how businesses that are located on the borders of the reservations are more likely to cater to a non-reservation market. They also have a tendency to hire from outside of the reservation. Although it is said that citizen entrepreneurship has the ability to stabilize the social and economic health of a community, due to the variation among citizen entrepreneurs in San Xavier, I would argue that citizen entrepreneurship alone will not result in social and economic stability. However, this is not to undermine the courageous efforts of O’odham business owners who have formalized in order to improve the social and economic health of San Xavier. Instead, I would argue that regulatory efforts regarding employment disparities, especially at the borders of the reservation, would allow business endeavors to contribute to the community’s social and economic health.

REFERENCES


Alternative Modernities: Rethinking Africa outside Eurocentric Discourses of Modernization

DeAnna Smith
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Abstract
Contemporary social science needs to theorize African modernization without dismissing local particularities. Present discussions of African cities tend to focus on whether Africa is moving towards an elusive modernity. These discussions often engage with homogenizing rhetoric that conceptualizes modernization as the spread of the West. Drawing on Jack Goody and Jan Nederveen Pieterse’s discussion of renaissances and modernities, this essay makes a case against the conceptualization of modernization as Westernization. The local particularities of Lagos, Nigeria and post-independence Zambia reveal that although modernization is a process imbued with power, modernities exist in the plural. If there are modernities (plural) and not modernity (singular), what do African cities emerging as centers of power and control owe to the West, if anything? Looking at African oral culture and urbanity in Nigeria and Zambia, I question Eurocentric ideas of renaissance and suggest that African cities are sites of possibility for alternative modes of organization fundamentally distinct from the West.

Keywords
Modernities, urbanization, Renaissance, homogenization; orality

INTRODUCTION

Africa is going to the moon—at least, according to Jonathan Weltman, aeronautical engineer and chief executive of the Foundation for Space Development. The Foundation for Space Development, a South African nonprofit organization established in 2009, initiated the recently popularized space mission known as Africa2Moon. Since its conception in 2014, Africa2Moon has united the African continent in unexpected ways, drawing engineers and organizers from outside South Africa to the historic undertaking of the first African-led mission to space. The goal of the mission is to place a probe either on the moon’s surface or in orbit around it and project the probe’s images via satellite to African classrooms (Smith 2015). Despite the polemical argument that Africa has “more immediate concerns” than going to space such as “Ebola in West Africa, civil uprisings, religious wars, [and] poverty” (Weltman 2014), African organizers have high hopes for the space mission, viewing Africa2Moon not only as an educational initiative or a historical milestone but as a step toward “shattering prejudices in the rest of the world that often paint [Africa] as a hopeless, dependent and scientifically illiterate continent” (Smith 2015).

For centuries, Africa has existed within political, economic, and philosophical discourses that have denied its complexity and placed its progress under immediate scrutiny. Surely, Africa has more important goals it could be pursing than going to the moon—just as the United States had more important goals it could have been pursuing than planning the Apollo missions in the midst of civil unrest and the Vietnam War. Polemical arguments concerning the ‘right time’ for nations to strive for technological progress are, alas, historically selective. This selectiveness is tied not only to our conceptualization of ‘developed’ and ‘undeveloped’ nations but to how—through the lenses of civilizationism, eurocentrism, and Western modernity—Africa has become the antithesis of the West.

Achille Mbembé (2001) speaks candidly about the narratives produced around the political and philosophical African ‘Other’. He states, “[s]peaking rationally about Africa is not something that has ever come naturally”; “[w]estern consciousness” has never been able to grapple with Africa in a way that is not inherently reductive (2001:1-2). Reductive narratives about Africa, however, do much more than reduce the continent. Africa is conceptualized as the antithesis to the West, and because the study of places is inevitably the study of people, Africans become conceptualized as the antitheses of Westerners. Africans, like Africa, are “wrapped in a cloak of impenetration” (Mbembé 2001:7). Mbembé, taking a more provocative stance than other political scientists who ponder Africa’s dependency, does not intend to be
Mbembé’s observations of Western constructions of Africa are affirmed when we turn to the literature only to find a gaping hole. “[T]here is hardly ever any discourse about Africa for itself… narrative about Africa is always pretext for a comment about something else, some other place, some other people” (Mbembé 2001:3). Situating Africa as a place in, of, and for itself within the broader history of renaissances and considering alternative forms of urbanity can help us reimagine Africa as a site of possibility for alternative modernities. In Renaissances: the One or the Many? Jack Goody (2010) argues that there are certain aspects of societies that allow for renaissances (Goody 2010). While reading Goody’s (2010) book, however, one cannot help but question: although Goody is insistent upon making a case for the existence of non-European renaissances, would a non-western social theorist privilege the same aspects of societies as having the potential to birth a renaissance? This is a question not concerning the existence of renaissances outside of Europe—for surely they have existed—but concerning the very foundations upon which the idea of “renaissance” is built. In “Many Renaissances, Many Modernities?” Jan Nederveen Pieterse (2010) argues that if renaissances can exist in the plural, modernities can exist in the plural as well (Pieterse 2010). However, like Goody (2010), he too excludes the continent of Africa from his discussion.

In order to unsettle the idea of Western exceptionalism, we must rigorously interrogate Western epistemology—Western ways of thinking about and knowing our world. This essay will destabilize eurocentrism more radically than the work of Goody (2010) or Nederveen Pieterse (2010). I will not privilege the West or Western systems of knowledge in the following narrative of modernity. Instead, Eurocentric epistemologies and narratives of modernity that center European power and control will take a back seat to (what could be considered) a more Afrocentric lens.

Modernization, as I define it, is a sequence of societal shifts accompanied by a rise in standards of living. The urbanization process allows modernization to occur by streamlining goods, education, and medical services. Therefore the rise of distinct African urbanities precipitates the rise of new modernities. Understanding modernization in this way, I will make an argument against Western exceptionalism with respect to modernization that highlights the distinctiveness of African urbanity.

Engaging closely with the work of Goody (2010) and Nederveen Pieterse (2010), I argue that Africa’s history of oral culture and urbanization is evidence against European exceptionalism and in support of Nederveen Pieterse’s (2010) idea of multiple modernities. With special attention to how oral tradition has allowed African cultures to critique their pasts and urbanization in two African countries—contemporary Nigeria and post-independence Zambia—I suggest that, despite its long history of imperial domination and abjection, Africa is a possible site for investigating alternative modes of social and urban organization in our globalizing world.

THEORIZING DEVELOPMENT AND DOMINATION

Social theorists have tried to grapple with imperialism, power, civilizationism and their effects on development within the context of Africa’s social, economic, and political systems—some with more success than others. Modernization theory and dependency theory are flawed yet widely drawn-upon theoretical paradigms used by social theorists to understand processes of development. Theorized in the U.S. after World War I, modernization theory is a post-colonial theory often associated with the work of W. W. Rostow who tried to map the stages through which societies evolve (Engerman 2003). Modernization theory assumes 1) development is an evolutionary process that is both unidirectional and linear, 2) that biological metaphors are useful in conceptualizing societies, and 3) that changes in cultural values and norms drive the modernizing process (Eder 1992; Engerman 2003). According to this paradigm, societies will experience modernization when they abandon “traditional” values and adopt the values and beliefs of “modern” people (Engerman 2003:39). In addition to failing to take into account systems of power and domination, modernization theory also fails to place countries and regions within their historical contexts, adopting the idea that a singular, unidirectional path to development works for all societies.

Whereas modernization theory dismisses power structures, dependency theory centers them, perhaps to a fault. Dependency theory is a product of the ex-colonial world that is heavily inspired by Marxism. Like modernization theory, dependency theory ascribes to the belief that the Western world is the most developed; however, it is in many ways the antithesis of modernization theory. Dependency theory rejects the idea of a singular, unidirectional process of development; it dismisses biological metaphors to describe societies; it does not emphasize cultural values; and it is exceedingly pessimistic about the prospect of replicating the Western world’s experience of development in ‘undeveloped’ countries. Importantly, dependency theory recognizes that structures are power-laden and asymmetrical and places countries in reference to their capitalist relationships (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003:153). I will use post-independence
Zambia to illustrate that these aspects of dependency theory are viable in considering modernity. However, dependency theory has come under harsh scrutiny by many social scientists, including Nederveen Pieterse (1988), because of its inherently flawed way of understanding countries in terms of stable cores and peripheries. If anything, the financial crisis of 2008, which resulted in the declining purchasing power of Western consumers, and the contemporary economic success and rise in purchasing power of China shows that cores and peripheries are anything but enduring.

Nigeria and Zambia have both experienced colonial domination, however, thinking of these countries merely as periphery countries does not fully capture their internal realities. Dependency theory may place countries within their historical contexts more than modernization theory, but it downplays the role of internal factors, such as internal politics, in a way that makes the relationship between ‘core’ countries and ‘periphery’ countries seem dishearteningly static. Modernization theory and dependency theory are fundamentally limited paradigms for understanding development. I contend that processes of development are best understood when we understand global and local forces as well as interrogate what modernity is and if what we should be thinking about is not modernity (singular) but modernities (plural).

**GOODY AND NEDERVEEN PIETERSE: RENAISSANCES AND MODERNITIES**

Modernization theory and dependency theory are, at their core, theories concerning the path to modernity. Although modernization theory describes a singular, linear path and dependency theory describes a power-laden, multifaceted path, both theories are concerned with the same question: how, in fact, does a society become modernized? Anthropologists of the Western world often position renaissances as the springboards to an elusive ‘modernity’, which remains, despite investigation, a rather ill-defined term in the world of sociology. As stated above, I use ‘modernization’ to signify societal shifts accompanied by a rise in regional standards of living. This view of modernity centers human livelihood while rejecting the idea of modernizing as ‘becoming Western’ or becoming the antithesis of Africa. Although renaissances have been viewed as catalysts of modernization, when we hear the word ‘renaissance’, many of us immediately think of Europe—specifically, the Italian Renaissance from 1330 to 1550. The Italian Renaissance, it seems, is the only renaissance with a capital ‘R’ (Goody 2010).

This capitalization “secures a European monopoly for the achievements of Antiquity” and dismisses the contributions of peoples outside the Western World (Goody 2012:243). In order to dismantle Western claims to modernity, we need to thoroughly dissect the Eurocentric premises for renaissances. Goody (2010) argues that renaissances are not unique to Christian Europe.

A renaissance, as characterized by Goody, is “a looking back and an efflorescence”—two related events that may not occur in session (2010:241). Goody supports his argument that renaissances are not particular to Christian, capitalist Europe by drawing attention to characteristics of renaissances outside the Western world. Goody links literacy, economic prosperity, and secular texts with the ability of a society to birth a renaissance. Among the aspects of societies that he links to renaissances, he views literacy as perhaps the most important, claiming that “all societies with writing… look back to what was composed at an earlier period and that looking back was followed at times by a burst forward” (Goody 2010:273-274). Literacy, he states, “enables one to look back” and economic prosperity “provides the leisure time to do so” (2010:248). Goody’s focus on written language may explain why he, as an anthropologist of West Africa, utilizes evidence from China, Turkey, and Hindu India in the construction of his argument while largely excluding the continent of Africa.

Nederveen Pieterse (2011) builds upon Goody’s discussion of renaissances by asking, “if Renaissance in the singular produces modernity in the singular, do renaissances in the plural produce modernities in the plural?” (2011:149). Nederveen Pieterse’s question is doubtlessly an important one. Thinking not of modernity (singular) but modernities (plural) has the power to redefine our understanding of development. If there are modernities and not modernity, what do countries emerging as centers of power and control owe to the West, if anything? Like Goody, Nederveen Pieterse argues against Western exceptionalism by looking to Asia; and although he aims to “unsettle the cannon” of Eurocentrism, he, too, frames Africa as an “outlier” (Nederveen Pieterse 2011:157).

Nederveen Pieterse’s view of how Africa fits into discourses of modernization is a bit more difficult to untangle than that of Goody, who largely dismisses the continent. In thinking about the characteristics of societies that enable renaissances, Nederveen Pieterse states that “animal traction did not develop [in Africa] nor did an urban culture and writing” (2011:157). Later in his essay he clarifies that this is not the case for North Africa “where an urban culture and writing did develop” (2011:157). Understanding Africa in a global discourse of renaissances and modernities has a lot to do with how we conceptualize the continent. When discussing Africa, many scholars speak of its regions (North Africa, West Africa,
Sub-Saharan Africa, etc.) as if they are all very distinct and disconnected ‘Africas’. Of course, Africa’s regions have varying histories of colonization and regeneration; however, regionalizing the continent at times denies the interconnected nature of all African possibility and progress. In what follows I will expand on Nederveen Pieterse’s work by discussing how African urbanities are evidence of multiple, interconnected modernities (2011:256). Urbanizing regions of the emerging world, are not evidence of Western homogenization; instead, many of these regions are engaging in their own historical modernizing processes. But before discussing how urbanity in Africa has produced modernities distinct from that of the West, we need to unsettle Goody’s idea that only where there is written language there is renaissance. Because alternative forms of communication can provide a means of “enabl[ing] one to look back”, I contend that written language should not be privileged in discourses of renaissance and modernization at all (Goody 2010:248).

AFRICAN ORALITY AND ‘LOOKING BACK’

Goody argues that where there is written language there is the possibility of renaissance. However, his focus on written language alone does not fully explain his exclusion of Africa from the discussion of renaissances and modernities. In fact, written language did exist in Africa during the time of the Italian Renaissance. For example, Amharic—a language spoken in Ethiopia—has existed in written form for over fifteen hundred years (Akinwumi 2011:32). That being said, Goody’s focus is inherently too narrow, because it is more likely that where there is a sophisticated form of communication—written or otherwise—there is the possibility of renaissance. Therefore, given the ability of African orality to look back on and critique the past, Africa should not be seen as a site of lack due to the limited tradition of written language. It should be seen as a site of presence, such as the presence of a rich oral tradition that flourished in 15th century Yoruba communities and flourishes in African societies of the present.

Africa has a long history of oral traditions that are incapable of being traced back to any singular beginning. Sadly, for a long time African orality and the rich body of knowledge that it entails have been dismissed by historians and anthropologists who look at oral data with suspicion (Curtin 1969). Orality is viewed with skepticism because of the temporariness associated with oral record but also because of Western racism. European, colonial anthropologists used African orality to support ideas of African religious backwardness. Akinyemi (2011) argues that “European collectors of African oral tradition had no interest in the literary value of the materials they gathered; they were concerned more with African belief systems and ideological issues contained in them” (2011:28). When Goody privileges written language in his discussion of renaissances, I do not think he is consciously engaging with this tradition of devaluing African orality; however, consciously or not, he is overlooking the complexity of oral tradition and ignoring how oral culture has been utilized throughout Africa as a way of processing and critiquing the past.

According to Akinwumi, 2,000 languages are spoken on the African continent—many of which remain oral languages without written form (2011:27). It is critical to understand that the cultures within which many of these languages have developed are indeed capable of “a looking back and an efflorescence” despite the absence of written language (Goody 2010:241). Orality can and has provided a means of looking back. It is, by definition, a “means of recalling the past” (Akinwumi 2011:27). For Akinwumi, recalling does not only mean preserving or retelling but critiquing. “One major feature of oral tradition […] is the involvement of the community in the creative process as well as in the criticism” (emphasis added, 2011:27). Harold Scheub expands upon Akinwumi’s thought, describing oral history as “more a comment than a record” (Scheub 1985:2). Migration stories and communal histories, which have been passed down through generations, entail “a whole range of information about past religion, trade patterns, or agricultural practices”—information that continues to exist and that has spread across the African continent because African oral culture is a sophisticated form of communication (Curtin 1969:145). Africans have been “organizing, examining, and interpreting” their pasts through oral culture for centuries, and even in contemporary Africa, written word retains a strong connection with oral tradition (Scheub 1985:1). Rather than viewing orality as incapable of helping civilizations record and learn from the past, we can view orality as an unparalleled springboard to unique modernities from which there has undoubtedly been a “looking back and an efflorescence”. Just as Africa has a different history of verbal communication than its Western counterparts, African cities have developed different organizational features that make African modernities distinct.

MODERNITY AND URBANITY IN LAGOS, NIGERIA AND POST-INDEPENDENCE ZAMBIA

In “World Cultures, World Cities”, Andreas Huyssen (2008) claims that urban imaginaries must be understood in context of both the universal
and the particular. He defines urban imaginary as “the cogitative and somatic image which we carry within us of the places where we live, work, and play” (Huyssen 2008:3). These images are important because they impact how we behave in and interact with cities. Although some social theorists continue to argue that globalization produces cultural hegemony, Huyssen argues that this view is the result of ignorance and anti-Western sentiment (2008:4). Instead of imagining cities as becoming hegemonic clumps through globalization, we must wrestle with the universal and the particular in order to create a view of cities that accurately accounts the role of Western mass culture without embellishing it as an imperialistic force that destroys local particularities (Huyssen 2008:4). Together, contemporary Lagos, Nigeria and post-independence Zambia illustrate distinct modernities within the broader context of universal processes such as urbanization and show that these processes are imbued with power.

In mainstream narratives, urbanization, like modernization, is conceptualized as a Western phenomenon. On a global scale, urbanization and modernization are used to imply the movement of some aspect of the West to another region (typically the ‘developing’ world). Although Huyssen is concerned with slightly different matters than Goody and Nederveen Pieterse, he would likely agree with these scholars regarding the all too common conceptualization of modernity in terms of European Renaissance with a capital ‘R’ and European Enlightenment with a capital ‘E’. “[C]olonial cities”, he states, “had their own very specific modernity distinct from the modernity of the Western metropolis” (Huyssen 2008:14). A more holistic understanding of modernity recognizes processes such as urbanization and industrialization while emphasizing changes in regional standards of living and human livelihood. Although the discussion I offer of African urbanization is relatively contemporary—offering a look at urbanity in present-day Lagos and post-independence Zambia—it is important to bear in mind Nigerian historian, Toyin Falola’s, reminder. “Africa has a long and rich history of urbanization dating back thousands of years. Cities in ancient Egypt, the Western Sudan, Nigeria, Ethiopia, the East African City States, and Southern Africa appeared long before the arrival of Europeans to Africa’s coast” (Falola 2009:xi). I focus on contemporary urbanities in Africa to illustrate the existence of modernities in the plural; however, we must keep in mind the broader historical context of these developments.

Since Nigeria’s independence from Britain, Lagos has become one of the most populated cities in the world, drawing Yoruba migrants and ex-slaves to its thriving urban center (Ismail 2009). In 2010, Lagos had a population of nearly 20 million—larger than the populations of present-day New York City and London combined (Okwuashi 2011). Of this enormous population, more than half were youth (under the age of 30). In 1921, youth made up 62% of the city’s population and in 1972 youth composed 78% of the population (Ismail 2009:467). According to the latest report by the CIA World Factbook, Nigeria’s large population of youth is partially related to AIDS mortality, which has caused “changes in the distribution of [the] population by age and sex than would otherwise be expected” (Central Intelligence Agency 2014).

Politically, this city of youth is characterized by a multilayered and at times fragmented political system. Nigerian historian, Okwuashi, describes politics in Lagos as follows:

Almost everyone knows someone with a link, however tenuous, to power…There is considerable interaction (some would say interference) between leaders at national, state, and local levels and at least some sectors of the general public… [characterized by] bribery, corruption, [and] nepotism (Okwuashi 2011:4).

Despite its political qualms, Lagos continues to thrive economically. Okwuashi calls Lagos the “economic and financial nerve-center” of the country, accounting for over half of the country’s commercial and industrial institutions (2011:3). However, in the midst of Lagos’s economic vivacity, poverty remains an extant reality and unemployment runs high. Like all world cities, Lagos is a city of contrasts, with slum dwellers living across from some of the most expensive housing complexes in the country. The organization of Lagos can be seen as a direct response to its political and economic context, making the fabric of urbanity in Lagos distinct from urban centers around the world.

In “The Dialectic of ‘Junctions’ and ‘Bases’”, Ismail analyzes social order and disorder in Eko—the name given to downtown Lagos by locals. Drawing on five years of ethnography investigating ‘area boys’ and ‘area girls’—youth in downtown Lagos who “trade in security through payments demanded and received by… formal and informal economic actors”—Ismail shows that what is often described as Nigerian chaos is characterized by a system of order and disorder (Ismail 2009:465). “In the context of dysfunctional state governance structures… youth create artificial and real territorialities of control, policing and order” (Ismail 2009:465). Lagos, it seems, is characterized not by an ostensible lack of social rules but by the emergence of new rules apart from formal systems (Ismail 2009:464).
Area boys and girls have managed to maintain a level of social control and negotiate urban space informally while producing alternative “pathways for social mobility” through the commodification of protection from harm (Ismail 2009:465).

Keeping in mind Huyssen’s (2008) discussion of the universal and the particular, area boys/girls are the result of both global interconnectedness—Lagos’s global economic context—and local particularly—Lagos’s local political context. Eko has experienced rapid urbanization due to postcolonial and post-slavery migration as well as its integration into global trade (Ismail 2009:467). Within the context of rapid urbanization, booming commerce, high rates of poverty, large waves of migration, and a massive youth population, area boys/girls—who work both informally, outside state provision, and formally, as agents of the state—organize territories of the city in a ways that have political consequences and alter ways of living (Ismail 2009:465).

The system of urbanity that has emerged in downtown Lagos is evidence in favor of multiple modernities. Urbanization in Lagos has given rise to a subculture particular to a specific political and economic climate. In the case of Lagos it is clear that neither urbanization nor globalization is a homogenizing force. Area boys/girls animate and organize a city that is characterized by the indigenous features of Yoruba settlements and features adopted from elsewhere in the world, offering stability and safety to society in innovative ways (Ismail 2009:468).

Similar to Lagos, urbanity in pre-independence Zambia’s Copperbelt was also organized by indigenous and foreign features. The fabric of urbanization in Zambia’s Copperbelt, however, was quite distinct from that of Lagos. The stark contrasts between pre-independence and post-independence Zambia reveal the existence of modernities (plural), show how unique realizations of modernity have been crafted by histories of colonization, and reveal the impact of colonial histories and power on African urbanization. Pre-independence, Zambia was regarded as having one of the fastest growing metropolises; today, it sits at “the bottom of the World Bank’s developing countries index” (Sutcliffe 2012).

Historically, copper has been integral to Zambia’s economy. Copper mining was largely centralised in what is known as the Zambian Copperbelt—the region along the border of Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The copper mining industry, which largely drove the nation’s economy pre-independence, contributed substantially to Zambia’s “rising standard of living, [and] bustling urban centers” (Ferguson 1999:235). Through mining, pre-independence Zambia acquired “symbols of modern status”, including a “state-of-the-art” airline with destinations to major Western cities such as London and New York (Ferguson 1999:235). The promises of Zambia’s modernization were visible and plentiful in its thriving metropolises; however, the country’s economic vitality was short-lived.

Post-independence, copper lost its place of importance in the world-economy, and so did Zambians. Copper, which was utilized extensively in electrical equipment such as telephone wires soon lost relevance in light of technological advancements. Zambia’s copper trade gradually declined from 1970 to 1980, ending in a steep drop-off that left its economy, and its people, in desolation (Sutcliffe 2012). By the late 1980’s, rising standards of living were replaced by rising poverty rates, which became “horribly high” (Sutcliffe 2012); and Zambia—“a country which was once seen as emblematic of the process of African urbanization”—began to de-urbanize (Potts 2005:583).

Theorizations of Zambia’s economic decline differ widely. Ferguson (1999) argues that Zambia’s economic decline was not a product of failing to follow the rules of laissez-faire economics—for surely Zambia’s copper industry was built upon the idea of trading that in which the country had a comparative advantage—but a product of Zambia’s abjection from the world market. Ferguson uses ‘abjection’ to describe Zambia’s expulsion from the modern world following its independence from Britain. Abjection, he states, is “a process that has pushed them [Zambians] out of the place in the world that they once occupied” (1999:236). By exploring a variety of lexical nuances — such as being ‘disconnected’ as opposed to ‘unconnected’ and ‘underdeveloped’ as opposed to ‘undeveloped’ — Ferguson captures the nature of Zambia’s abjection, which is too often conceptualized as Zambia’s failure to follow in the footsteps of the West.

Post-independence Zambia’s history of abjection can help us rethink the conceptualization of modernization and urbanization as inevitable processes. Pre-independence Zambia’s urbanization and post-independence Zambia’s de-urbanization were processes imbued with power. I agree with Huyssen’s view that all cities today are intertwined, and thus, “all cities are world cities”; however, it is important not to forget that there are “vast asymmetries of power and influence between cities” and nations (2008:11). Post-independence Zambia, more so than nations like Britain or the U.S, is profoundly impacted by the woes of the world economy in a system based on membership and exclusion (Ferguson 1999). External powers deeply shaped political, economic, and social life in pre-independence Zambia and now Zambia—a country that has already experienced a long period of rising
standards of living, streamlining of goods, and increased access to medicine and education – has the potential to develop a new, distinct modernity moving forward.

Alas, new modes of social and urban organization have emerged in Lagos, Nigeria, and now Zambia must also seek new modes in light of abjection. In contemporary Lagos, area boys/girls organize the city within a particular political and economic context; and in post-independence Zambia, reliance on copper mining helped produce a fragile urbanity distinct from urbanity in the West, which rarely relies upon exporting primary products for its vitality. Urbanization (and de-urbanization) in these regions reveals that modernities are multiple and that modernization occurs within power-structures, which are constantly changing but have the potential to be determinative. In this constantly changing global landscape, it is important not to dismiss local particularities in the midst of powerful globalizing forces. It is important now, more than ever, to have a comprehensive understanding of development.

CONCLUSION

When we theorize Africa’s modernization it is important to 1) grapple with imperialism and its effects without dismissing local forces, 2) look critically at standards associated with the birth of renaissances, such as written language, and 3) remember that urbanization in Africa is not novel. Modernities have emerged and are emerging in African nations characterized by different organizational elements than the modernities of the West.

In the midst of the contemporary advancements throughout Africa, such as plans for the Africa2Moon mission, social theorists may be compelled to ask what the future holds for Africa’s development. In light of Ferguson’s work, however, perhaps we should not be asking whether African countries are moving towards an elusive modernity; instead, we should be thinking about the meaning of historical variances in the organization of urbanities outside the West. Indeed, “[a] return to modernist teleology, a new grand narrative that would trace the hopeful signs of an Africa once more ‘emerging’ out of the gloomy ashes of Africa’s ‘development’ disaster is neither plausible nor desirable” (Ferguson 1999:253). Despite its long history of domination and abjection, the African continent is a site of possibility for alternative modes of sociality and urbanity that do not exist in the Western world. Perhaps now is the time to stop waiting for African nations to emulate the success of the West, which has largely resulted in “ecological and human degradation”, and look toward the ‘emerging’ world for “sociocultural alternatives” (Ferguson 1999:250-251).

REFERENCES


Affect and Confederate Symbolism in the Texas High Plains

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Abstract
The confederate flag has long been a controversial symbol in American culture. Recent nationwide protests have called into question the meaning of the Confederate flag. I analyze connections between emotional responses toward the Confederate flag and college year. I utilized multivariate linear regression to calculate the strength of correlation between demographic characteristics, the region in which respondents report that they grew up, the belief that the flag is representative of southern heritage and pride, and the presence of the flag in one’s culture or environment. Regression reveals that respondents’ political affiliation and their belief that the flag does not represent heritage and pride are the most important indicators of how they respond to the confederate flag. Respondent gender and region of residence in early life are also statistically significant, but have less explanatory power. I additionally collected qualitative data, and despite college year having no statistical effect on responses to the flag, my analysis of qualitative data reveals that respondents in their junior year and above are more likely to use negative emotional language when describing the flag. Future areas of research are offered.

Keywords
Confederate flag, education, college, affect

INTRODUCTION & RATIONALE
On June 27, 2015, social justice activist Brittany “Bree” Newsome scaled the flagpole outside of the South Carolina state capitol building and removed a flying Confederate flag to protest its presence on state grounds. Upon reaching the ground she was arrested, and the flag was promptly displayed again. Her action, however, sparked a large movement on social media that praised Ms. Newsome for her actions and called for the South Carolina state legislature to permanently remove the flag from the state capitol. Ms. Newsome’s actions represent a larger sociohistorical movement to remove Confederate memorabilia from government sanctioned facilities, such as the attempts of the Georgia state legislature to remove the Confederate flag from the Georgia state flag (Reingold and Wike 1998). While no consensus has been reached about the meaning of the flag, Ms. Newsome’s actions, combined with activism from the Black Lives Matter movement, have reignited the national discussion on the meaning and legitimacy of the Confederate flag.

Theories about the meaning of the Confederate flag can often be separated into two distinct frameworks. The first framework theorizes that the Confederate flag was developed as a symbol of Southern heritage and pride and represents an idealized Southern way of life with an emphasis on states’ rights. The second framework theorizes that the Confederate flag was developed as a symbol of racist ideologies that proliferated through the southern United States. Acceptance of these frameworks often makes it difficult for people to understand why others have different understandings of the flag. I argue that researchers need to understand how interpretations of the Confederate flag originate and are sustained through social interaction. Additionally, I argue that studying value transmission between college students should be an area of focus of future research efforts, as college often forces groups and individuals who share different opinions to interact with each other (Weidman 1989). Since opinions of the Confederate flag are controversial, it is important to understand how people who hold positions of governmental power have learned to interpret the flag and how those individuals also transmit those values to others. Therefore, my research answers the following questions: Is there a profile of college students who identify positively with the Confederate flag? How do affective responses to the Confederate flag differ between college students at different levels of their college education?

Before answering these questions, I first develop a theoretical framework drawing on symbolic interactionism and education theory. I
predicted that as students gain more post-secondary education, their positive interpretations of the Confederate flag will decrease. Then I detail my sample design and method of analysis, and I use my sample’s demographics to construct a profile of college students with positive attitudes towards the flag. After that I show that my null hypothesis cannot be rejected with these data, because political affiliation and opinions of what the flag represents are more important for respondents’ affective responses to the Confederate flag. Finally, I discuss how limitations of my sample design and analytic strategy may have skewed my results, and I detail the ways that future research may overcome these limitations.

LITERATURE REVIEW

While some research has been done on how the Confederate flag functions as a symbol in modern society, no research has investigated how college students’ affective responses to the flag may vary with college class standing. In order to understand how the Confederate flag comes to be understood as a positive or negative symbol, it is necessary to understand two main concepts. First, utilizing symbolic interactionism as a framework for analysis, one can understand how different understandings of the Confederate flag arise and why conflict often occurs between individuals with opposing interpretations. Second, via an analysis of educational socialization, one can understand how the American education system functions as an agent of socialization and the ways college facilitates socialization between faculty and students. An analytical permutation of symbolic interactionism and educational socialization is needed to unearth the potential processes through which meanings of the Confederate flag both arise and are actively shaped in college.

The Confederate Flag

The Confederate flag occupies a prominent position in U.S. history for two drastically different reasons. For some populations in the South, the flag represents Southern pride and resistance to an overbearing federal government in defense of state’s rights (Bonner 2002). However, many other Americans, including many Black Americans, contend that the Confederate flag is a symbol of racism and was born from the desire of the U.S. South to maintain a system of chattel slavery (Newman 2007). As a result of the competing epistemic interpretations of the Confederate flag, many groups are sharply critical of displays of the flag. However, despite the often controversial nature of the flag and the ideologies it supports, the flag is often displayed at gatherings or events in the Southern United States as a way of honoring what the literature has termed the Southern way of life (Lee, Bernthal, Whisenant, & Mullane 2010; Leib & Webster 2007; Newman 2007). These situations underscore current social discussions concerning the Confederate flag and highlight why research is needed to understand the flag as a symbol and its role in subjective understandings of identity.

Much of the literature that currently exists on the Confederate flag can be divided into two distinct circles. The first circle is primarily concerned with the historical development of the flag. Coski (2005) traced the chronological development of Confederate symbols from the Bonnie Blue flag (a blue flag with a single white star in the middle) to the Battle Flag of Virginia (a red flag with a blue X and thirteen white stars) in conjunction with the changing social and political climate of the southern United States. Coski (2005) concludes that the Confederate flag emerged from a political climate that “[prioritized] the South as a distinctive region [that embraced] individual rebelliousness, a self-conscious ‘redneck’ culture, and segregation and racism.” The rapidly changing political climate facilitated the development of new symbols of Southern outrage at Union aggression during the Civil War and culminated in the development of the flag before the Southern surrender at Appomattox Courthouse in 1865. Despite the end of the Civil War and the rejoining of the southern United States with its northern counterpart, symbols of the Confederacy continued to proliferate in the South as protest to the perceived social equality paradigm of the North. This development is further traced by Martinez (2000) who noted the widespread adoption of the Confederate flag as an anti-civil rights symbol for groups such as the Klu Klux Klan during the 1950s and 1960s. The utilization of the flag in this way is a manifestation of what Bonner (2002) calls Confederate nationalism, or the belief that the Confederate flag can be used as a rallying point for those who aspire to recreate the antebellum South as an idyllic time in American history.

The second circle is primarily concerned with the ways Confederate symbols have become commonplace in political settings in the southern United States. Reingold and Wikes (1998) were among the first to detail the ways the inclusion of the Confederate flag in the Georgia state flag was related to so-called “Southern identity.” Reingold & Wikes (1998) found that racial attitudes and measures of Southern identity were correlated in that a higher score on the Southern Identity Index was associated with more conservative scores. However, Reingold and Wikes (1998) only collected data related to the Georgia flag and not the Confederate flag as a distinct object. The lack of research after Reingold and Wikes’ (1998) study further emphasizes one
understanding the development, ritualistic usage, and historical context of flag culture. Vexillology is defined as the scientific and scholarly study of flags as symbols. Modern vexillological theory has roots in Durkheimian notions of totemic symbolism in that flags are conceptualized as modern day totems whose meaning emerges from a magical awe that inscribes a sense of life into the symbols (Marvin & Ingle 1999; Shanafelt 2009). The notion of a flag as a living object can be seen through the ways persons react to the desecration of the flag. Most recently in 2015, student protesters at Valdosta State University in Georgia were filmed walking on an American flag that had been placed on the ground in protest of white supremacy (Floyd 2015). This act elicited outrage from conservative student groups on campus that mirrored national responses to the event.

While the American flag is not a living object in a biological sense, repercussions for mistreatment of the flag have been codified into US law (Luckey 2008). Another way the flag can be understood as a living object is to analyze the ways in which researchers talk about the flag. I, and many other authors, utilize the article “the” before talking about any particular flag, which instills within the flag itself a sense of life. While this paper does not wish to partake in dense philosophical discussions about an object-oriented ontology of the Confederate flag, one cannot deny that flags as a general concept are often considered a living entity by those who recognize them as positive symbols. This is important to remember because affective responses to the flag may be different for those who view the flag as an almost living object as opposed to those who view it as just a flag. Literature on vexillology serves as an important bridge between the Confederate flag and larger theoretical models concerning symbolic interactionism.

On Symbolic Interactionism and Flag Culture

Symbolic interactionism is often cited as one of the three significant theoretical divisions in sociology (Mooney, Knox, & Schacht 2007) and has been utilized as a broader framework through which to understand multiple social phenomena (Fine 1993). Symbolic interactionism, as a sociological framework, was developed in the mid 1900s at a time when the discipline had a greater openness to critical and qualitative perspectives (Fine 1993). As a result, the developmental works of George Herbert Mead (1863-1931), Charles Horton Cooley (1864-1929), Erving Goffman (1922-1982), and Herbert Blumer (1900-1987) are often cited as the beginning (and legitimization) of both critical theory and qualitative studies in the social sciences (Fine 1993). The primary significant tenet of symbolic interactionism is its emphasis on individual interpretations of reality and how individuals’ actions are shaped by those interpretations.
This emphasis can be seen in the foundational premises of symbolic interactionism. As described by Blumer (1969), symbolic interaction is based off of three premises: first, that humans act toward things based on individual understandings of those things; second, that meanings arise from social interactions; and third, that meanings change based on interactions with other people. While Blumer's premises detail the ways in which symbols can come to have meaning and how that meaning can and almost certainly will change, Blumer never makes it a point to define exactly what a symbol is in the context of interactionism beyond simply a “thing”. Blumer's notion of a symbol as a “thing”, while emphasizing the fluidity of meaning, neglects the purpose of a symbol or even what qualifies as a symbol. Therefore, it is necessary to have an operant definition of a symbol to properly analyze how the Confederate flag functions as a symbol.

Milliken & Schreiber (2012:686) define symbols as “abstract representations of social objects that enable people to communicate both verbally and nonverbally and understand each other’s intentions and actions.” This definition makes it clear that the purpose of a symbol is to communicate an ideology or belief. It also becomes clear that a thing can have multiple meanings depending on individualized interpretations of symbols. Through this definition, Milliken & Schreiber also operationalize how conflict may arise when a symbol is interpreted in contradicting ways by different parties. This particular operationalization becomes necessary when discussing the Confederate flag because it underscores the use of the flag as a symbol and allows for a holistic understanding of the fluid nature of the flag. As a result, this framework will be utilized throughout the remainder of the paper to analyze the flag both in terms of history and within the context of existing research.

It is important to consider the Confederate flag within the context of symbolic interactionism as a whole. Milliken & Schreiber's (2011) operant definition of a symbol posits that a symbol allows for nonverbal communication and allows people to interpret the intentions of others. While the first half of this definition does describe the Confederate flag, the flag problematizes the last portion of the definition. Because of the different ideologies as well as the multiple interpretations associated with the flag, it becomes nearly impossible to understand the intentions of others who display this symbol. Furthermore, given that Newman (2007) and Erhlinger et al. (2011) identify the flag as having strong racialized undertones, current operant definitions of symbols do not take into account the divergent communicative effects of the Confederate flag. As a result, a comprehensive model of value transmission for and socialization around controversial symbols has never been developed.

On Educational Socialization

Socialization is often conceptualized as a process in which individuals are taught to think, feel, and act in ways that dominant social groups deem appropriate (Persell 1990). From this definition, it becomes clear why social researchers have long understood educational institutions as agents of socialization (Souza 1999; Wynne 1979). Despite this understanding, there are two main concerns with current research on educational socialization. First, much of the research that has studied the effects of socialization in an educational setting has focused on education at the elementary and secondary levels (Bigler, Hayes, & Hamilton 2013; Brint, Contreras, & Matthews 2001; Ingber 1987). As a result, research has often neglected the socialization processes that occur in post-secondary institutions. Second, sociologists have long been concerned with the end results of socialization and have often neglected the ways the socialization process and individual identity characteristics can affect socialization (Lacy 1978). The two concerns highlighted have contributed to the stagnation of research around educational socialization.

Research into how socialization occurs at the college level is relatively new to the field of educational sociology; as a result, much of the literature is in agreement as to how socialization occurs because research has been very linear and utilizes a few main articles as foundational beginnings. While socialization occurs all throughout the life cycle (Wynne 1977), the socialization that occurs in college has been isolated as important because of its implications for transitions into so-called adult life (Weidman, 1989). Lacy (1978) was among the first to study how different collegiate environments affected socialization. Utilizing longitudinal data, Lacy found that types of interactions and the length of interactions were strongly correlated to the type of residential environment fostered in first-year learning communities. Individuals living in a residential community had more interactions with their peers that lasted longer than interactions with non-peers. Building upon the foundational groundwork established by Lacy, Weidman (1989) developed a model of college student socialization that understood the student as an active participant in the socialization process and not as a bystander who simply received information. At the time, the Weidman model revolutionized the ways post-secondary education was studied and has significantly shaped the research that followed it.

Utilizing Weidman’s model of college student socialization, Dey (1996)
uncovered strong correlations between peer and faculty normative contexts and the formation of political orientations in college students. Specifically, Dey (1996) found that both initial political affiliation and gender function as significant determinants of ending political affiliation. In terms of socialization during college, Dey’s (1996) findings hold serious implications for the ways socialization may occur; it is possible that individuals enter into homophilic relationships by choosing to interact with people who share similar beliefs, meaning that initial beliefs become circularly affirmed. Dey’s (1996) results also show that institutional environment has a significant effect on the development of political beliefs and, by extension, interpretations of reality.

The literature discussed until this point has been focused on the ways in which students participate in inter- and intrapersonal relationships with faculty. Much of this research is predicated on the idea that teachers initiate the process of socialization for students and posit teachers as having static beliefs they simply transmit to their students. However, it is important to note the ways in which faculty themselves participate in socialization. Maloney (2013) notes that socialization is often a top-down approach for faculty, beginning at the highest levels of the leadership systems of educational organizations and institutions andfunneling down to the faculty members. Specifically, Maloney identifies the Teach For America (TFA) model of student achievement as showcasing the ways in which teachers are able to simultaneously educate and socialize their students and stresses the importance TFA places on teacher involvement. Through interviews, Maloney was able to highlight the ways TFA recruits internalized the goals of TFA as an organization. This underscores the ways in which differing approaches to faculty socialization can affect student socialization and makes clear the idea that the socialization process is a continuum that neither starts nor stops in one particular place.

While the literature details many ways in which educational institutions can influence perceptions of reality, many gaps in the literature currently exist. For example, little literature exists that attempts to understand how socialization occurs during individual years of college. Literature about educational socialization at the collegiate level has often conceptualized college as an entire experience and has only recognized divisions between undergraduate and graduate educational experiences (Weidman, Twale, & Stein 2001). As a result, current research is ill-informed on the ways in which experiences are formed through exposure to different classes, faculty members and student cohorts. While scholarship does exist that details the ways that perceptions of the Confederate flag change as individuals enter higher levels of education (Clark 1997; Reingold & Wike 1998; Cooper & Knotts 2006), this literature, again, conceptualizes college as one experience of which respondents either have all, some, or none of. Large literature gaps also exist in the ways controversial symbols are taught at the collegiate level. While research that details the ways in which controversial symbols may be taught does exist (Hardwood & Hahn 1990; Leib 1998), these techniques are often applied to elementary and secondary educational settings and neglect the ways controversial topics are taught at the postsecondary level and those techniques’ influence on value transmission.

In addition to the substantial gaps in the literature, it is also important to remember that these literature bases do not exist in a vacuum and should be considered in conjunction with one another. This is to say that it is possible to move beyond the theoretical abstractions presented in the literature and understand that the process of socialization is uniquely affected by the symbolic interpretations of objects by certain types of communities and societies. Symbolic interactionism is, therefore, a strong theoretical foundation with which to study socialization – this is seen best through the application of symbolic interactionist theories to the socialization process with Maloney (2013) and Leib (1998).

However, despite a common theoretical foundation, the current literature has failed to isolate any unique links between the educational socialization process and interpretations of controversial symbols, particularly in locations where controversial symbols enjoy public, and sometimes prominent, display. Moreover, the severe lack of application of theories to groups outside of secondary educational institutions means that it is impossible to have a comprehensive understanding of the ways that controversial symbols potentially affect interactions throughout the life course. While past research does discuss the ways that some types of education can affect the socialization process and symbolic interpretations, it does not consider education as an important part of the socialization process in relation to interpretations of controversial symbols. This leads me to my main hypothesis:

H1: As students gain more post-secondary education, their positive interpretations of the Confederate flag will decrease.

METHODS

Data Collection

I utilized convenience sampling for this survey. I initially distributed
the survey to one section of an upper level sociology course at a large (30,000+ student population) public university in West Texas. I recruited subjects through interpersonal communication with sociology faculty who administered the survey to their class. Sociology faculty then emailed their students a link to the original survey, hosted through an online survey program. After initial testing, corrections were made to the survey and the survey was readministered to three introductory sociology courses and one upper level social work course at the same university. A link to the corrected survey was also made publicly available via the university’s campus wide online announcement system. The survey consisted of 17 qualitative and quantitative questions with three filter questions and four questions concerned with respondent demographics. Thirty-four responses were not fully completed and thus removed from the data pool, leaving the total modified N at 79. The survey was open for responses for approximately one month. All individuals who completed the survey and entered an email address were entered into a drawing for one of five Amazon e-gift cards. I stored these data in a locked folder on my personal, password-protected computer and kept respondents’ email addresses separate from the survey data to protect confidentiality.

Respondent Demographics

Table 1 shows a condensed view of all demographic data. All 79 respondents reported their self-identified gender, race and ethnicity, and political affiliation. I additionally used respondents’ earned hours of course credit to determine undergraduate college classification on the one hand, and enrollment in a master’s program without having earned a master’s degree or enrollment in a PhD program having earned a master’s degree but without having earned a PhD to determine classification as a graduate student.

Of the 79 respondents, 42 (53.16%) identified as female, 34 (43.04%) identified as male, 1 respondent identified as genderqueer or genderfluid (1.27%), and 1 respondent (1.27%) identified as “other” without specifying. 34 (43.04%) respondents reported their race or ethnicity as Caucasian or white, 25 (31.65%) respondents reported African, African American, or Black race or ethnicity, 5 (6.33%) respondents reported Asian or Asian American race or ethnicity, 11 (13.92%) respondents reported Hispanic or Latin@ race or ethnicity, 2 (2.53%) respondents reported Indigenous or Native American race or ethnicity, and 2 respondents (2.53%) reported their race or ethnicity as “other” . 5 (6.33%) respondents identified as strongly conservative, 16 (20.25%) respondents identified as somewhat conservative, 20 (25.32%) respondents identified as neither conservative nor liberal, 23 (29.11%) respondents identified as somewhat liberal, and 15 (18.99%) respondents identified as strongly liberal. The average of the respondents’ political affiliation is neither conservative nor liberal ( \( \mu = 3.34, s.d. = 1.186 \)).

Finally, 13 (16.46%) respondents were freshman, 15 (18.99%) respondents were sophomores, 19 (24.05%) respondents were juniors, 13 (16.46%) respondents were seniors, 9 (11.39%) respondents were master’s students, and 10 (12.66%) respondents were PhD candidates. The average of the respondents’ college classifications is junior ( \( \mu = 3.25, s.d. = 1.605 \)).

Table 1. Survey Respondent Demographics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Genderqueer</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42 (53.16%)</td>
<td>34 (43.04%)</td>
<td>1 (1.27%)</td>
<td>1 (1.27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Black/African American</td>
<td>Asian/Asian American</td>
<td>Hispanic/Latin@</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34 (43.04%)</td>
<td>25 (31.65%)</td>
<td>5 (6.33%)</td>
<td>11 (13.92%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Affiliation</td>
<td>Strongly conservative</td>
<td>Somewhat conservative</td>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>Somewhat liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 (6.33%)</td>
<td>16 (20.25%)</td>
<td>20 (25.32%)</td>
<td>23 (29.11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Classification</td>
<td>Freshman</td>
<td>Sophomore</td>
<td>Junior</td>
<td>Senior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13 (16.46%)</td>
<td>15 (18.99%)</td>
<td>19 (24.05%)</td>
<td>13 (16.46%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the 79 respondents, 72 reported what state they grew up in. Of those 72 respondents, 48 (66.67%) respondents indicated that they grew up in Texas, 2 (2.78%) respondents indicated they grew up in California, 2 (2.78%) respondents indicated they grew up in Florida, 2 (2.78%) respondents indicated they grew up in Maryland, 2 (2.78%) respondents indicated they grew up in Mississippi, 2 (2.78%) respondents indicated they grew up in Oregon, 1 (1.39%) respondent indicated they grew up in Hawaii,
Variables and Variable Construction

The primary dependent variable for this study is individuals’ responses to the Confederate flag. This variable was measured with two primary questions. The first question asked respondents to indicate their feelings toward the Confederate flag on a 5-point Likert scale, with responses coded on the following scale: a response of extremely negative was coded with a value of 1, a response of somewhat negative was coded with a value of 2, a response of neutral was coded with a value of 3, a response of somewhat positive was coded with a value of 4, and a response of extremely positive was coded with a value of 5. The second question asked individuals to indicate whether they feel the flag is more a part of their culture or more a part of their environment (something more internalized to the respondent) or more a part of their environment (something more externalized to the respondent) on a 7-point Likert scale, with responses coded according to the following scale: a response of an integral part of my culture was coded with a value of 1, a response of an important part of my culture was coded with a value of 2, a response of somewhat a part of my culture was coded with a value of 3, a response of neither a part of my culture nor of my environment was coded with a value of 4, a response of somewhat a part of my culture was coded with a value of 5, a response of an important part of my culture was coded with a value of 6, and a response of neither a part of my culture nor of my environment was coded with a value of 7. The first variable, which measured respondents feelings toward the Confederate flag, was sorted into three main groups. I coded responses of extremely negative and somewhat negative as a 1, a response of neither as a 2, and responses of strongly positive and somewhat positive as a 3. I also simplified the data concerning culture and environment in a similar way as the previous variable. I coded responses of an integral part of my culture, an important part of my culture and somewhat a part of my culture as a 1, a response of neither a part of my culture nor my environment as a 2, and responses of an integral part of my environment, an important part of my environment and somewhat a part of my environment as a 3.

Model 1

I used multivariate linear regression models to investigate correlations between demographic factors and positive affective responses to the Confederate flag. My first model investigates how basic demographic characteristics may have an influence on affective responses to the Confederate flag. Specifically, my first model measures the potential effects of respondents’ race, gender, political affiliation, or college classification on individual responses to and interpretations of the flag. In order to understand how race may influence affective responses to the Confederate flag, I asked respondents to self-report their race. Individuals were able to choose between Black/African American, Hispanic/Latin@/Chican@, Native American, Asian/Asian American, and Non-Hispanic White/Caucasian with all other responses indicated by an “Other” category. I created a binary indicator variable with values of 1 for Non-Hispanic White/Caucasian respondents and 0 for all other respondents. This was done in order to test for any correlations between positive affective responses or interpretations of the Confederate flag and the social position that comes with being white.

In order to analyze how gender may influence understandings of the Confederate flag, I asked respondents to self-report their gender. I sorted the responses with a binary indicator variable with responses of male having been coded with a value of 1 and responses of female having been coded with a value of 2. One respondent indicated that they were genderqueer and/or genderfluid. Because there were not a significant number of respondents who also indicated that they were genderqueer and/or genderfluid I eliminated their data from the analysis.

I also asked students to indicate their political affiliation in order to measure potential correlations between political affiliation and respondents’ interpretations of the Confederate flag. I asked respondents to indicate their political affiliation on a 5-point response scale, with responses coded on the following scale: a response of strongly conservative was coded with a value of 1, a response of somewhat conservative was coded with a value of 2, a
response of neither was coded with a value of 3, a response of somewhat liberal was coded with a value of 4, and a response of strongly liberal was coded with a value of 5. Initial testing revealed no significant correlation associated with the labels “strongly” and “somewhat”.

Finally, in order to analyze how class standing may influence both understandings of and responses to the Confederate flag, I asked respondents to indicate their class standing based on the amount of credit hours they had completed prior to participating in the survey. I classified students as having a freshman level standing if they had completed less than 30 credit hours, a sophomore level standing if they had completed more than 30 credit hours but less than 60 credit hours, a junior level standing if they had completed more than 60 credit hours but less than 90 credit hours, and a senior level standing if they had completed more than 90 hours but had not yet been awarded a Bachelor’s degree. Additionally, I classified students as having Master’s level standing if they indicated they had fulfilled the requirements for and been awarded a Bachelor level degree but had not yet been awarded a Master’s degree. Finally, I classified students as having PhD student standing if they indicated they had fulfilled the requirements for and been awarded a Bachelor level degree but had not yet been awarded a Master’s degree. I then sorted the responses with a binary indicator variable, with responses of “I agree” being coded with a value of 1 and responses of “I disagree” being coded with a value of 2. Responses of “I neither agree nor disagree” were not analyzed as they did not represent the views of a significant number of respondents (survey N=79, question respondent n=9) and would skew significance toward a response of I disagree during initial testing.

**Model 4**

My final model includes all four demographic variables as well as variables that analyze region and questions of pride and heritage and introduces a new variable that measures whether individuals view the flag as something internal or external to their social settings. In order to measure this phenomenon, I asked respondents to indicate whether they felt like the Confederate flag was more a part of their culture or more a part of their environment. The description of the construction of this variable can be found under the “Variables” subheading.

**RESULTS**

I found that college educational attainment level does not correlate to affective responses to the Confederate flag with the measured quantitative data. However, attainment may still play some role based on the cataloged qualitative data. I also found that there is a somewhat generalizable social profile of persons who report positive feelings about the Confederate flag. Political affiliation seems to be the strongest indicator, followed by viewing the flag as a symbol of pride, geographic region, and gender. Race, college classification, and culture/environment do not function as predictors of support for the Confederate flag in these data.
Social Profile

Table 2 shows the results of multivariable linear regression. In Model 1, when holding race, gender, and college classification constant, movement in political affiliation from conservative to liberal saw a 1.428-point decrease in positive feelings toward the flag (p < .001). In this model, no other demographic variable was significantly correlated with feelings toward the Confederate flag.

Table 2. Multivariable Linear Models of Affective Responses to the Confederate Flag

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>-0.054</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.243</td>
<td>-0.285</td>
<td>-0.303</td>
<td>-0.672*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Affiliation</td>
<td>-1.428***</td>
<td>-1.394***</td>
<td>-0.608</td>
<td>-0.129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Classification</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Region</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.759*</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pride/Heritage</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-1.483***</td>
<td>-1.851***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal/External</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-0.240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>5.324***</td>
<td>4.536***</td>
<td>6.069***</td>
<td>7.113***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $r^2$</td>
<td>0.395</td>
<td>0.479</td>
<td>0.657</td>
<td>0.749</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ .001

In Model 2, both political affiliation and the region where the respondent grew up were the largest indicators of response to the Confederate flag. When holding race, gender, and college classification constant, movement from conservative political ideology to liberal political ideology resulted in a 1.394-point decrease in positive feelings toward the flag (p < .001) and a movement from non-former Confederate states to former Confederate states resulted in a 0.759-point increase in positive feelings (p < .05).

In Model 3, when accounting for region and responses that indicated the flag does not represent racist ideology, the aforementioned responses were the strongest indicator of positive feelings. In this model, the correlation between political affiliation and positive or negative responses weakened dramatically, with movement from conservative to liberal only accounting for a 0.608-point decrease in positive feelings (p < .075), a difference of 0.820 points from Model 1 and 0.786 points from Model 2. When holding all other independent variables constant, the belief that the flag does not represent Southern pride or heritage had a significant impact on feelings toward the flag. According to the data, movement from believing the flag does represent pride and heritage to believing the flag does not, correlated to a 1.438-point decrease in positive feeling toward the flag (p < .001).

In Model 4, when accounting for demographic categories, the region in which respondents grew up, the belief the flag does not represent concepts of pride and heritage, and whether the flag is more present in one’s culture or environment, gender and the belief that the flag does not represent heritage and pride were the strongest predictors of feelings toward the flag. When holding all other variables constant, being female correlated to a 0.672-point decrease in positive feelings with males as the reference category (p = .039). This model is the only model in which gender functions as a significant indicator of feelings toward the flag. The belief that the flag is not representative of heritage and pride increased in significance, with movement toward the belief the flag does not represent heritage and pride correlating to a 1.851-point decrease in positive feelings toward the flag (p < .001). The inclusion of culture/environment as an independent variable resulted in political affiliation no longer functioning as a significant indicator of feelings toward the flag (p = .735); the unstandardized value of political affiliation in Model 4 was -0.129, a 1.299-point decrease from Model 1, a 1.265-point decrease from Model 2, and a 0.479-point decrease from Model 3.

In terms of R² analysis, the R² coefficient rose with each model. This is to be expected; as more variables were added to the regression models, the models became more explanatory. Model 1, which included four demographic responses, explained the variance in 39.5% of the data. In Model 2, with the inclusion of region, the R² coefficient rose 8.4 points and explained 47.9% of data variance. In Model 3, with the inclusion of region and questions about pride/heritage, the R² coefficient rose 17.8 points and explained 65.7% of the data variance. In Model 4, with the inclusion of region, questions about pride/heritage, and questions about culture/environment, the R² coefficient rose 9.2 points and explained 74.9% of the data variance.
Education

Despite H1, initial univariate linear regression found that college classification does not have a significant impact (p=0.066) on how respondents view the Confederate flag. Multivariate linear regression (see Table 2) found that college classification does not have a significant impact on how respondents view the Confederate flag when accounting for any other variable measured; this is most likely a result of the small sample size of research data. However, analysis of the qualitative data revealed that individuals in their junior year of college and beyond appeared more likely to utilize emotionally charged language when discussing the Confederate flag, as indicated by use of the words such as “disgusted by…”, “degraded”, and “aggravated by…”. When respondents were asked to indicate how they felt when they saw the Confederate flag, one PhD respondent reported that they feel “anger at the profound ignorance that is enshrined and celebrated in Southern culture” while another senior reported that they feel “threatened” when they see people displaying the Confederate flag. Of the respondents who reported they were juniors and above, 21 out of 48 (43.75%) respondents used negative emotional words when reporting how they felt when seeing the Confederate flag; of the respondents who reported they were freshmen or sophomores, 3 out of 27 (11.11%) respondents utilized negative emotional language when reporting how they felt when seeing the flag.

The analysis of qualitative data in this sample indicates that juniors and above are more likely to use negative emotional language when they identify negatively with controversial symbols. While it is not surprising that juniors and seniors are more likely to use negative emotional language, it is interesting that juniors and seniors were communicating with some of the same language as Master’s students and PhD candidates. I theorize that language choice is the result of socialization. First, it is possible that juniors and above have simply had more education than their freshman and sophomore counterparts, meaning they have developed more of a vocabulary with which to express themselves. Second, it is possible that juniors and above have been forced to interact with people who hold opposing viewpoints and that their language choice is a reflection of the people they have had to interact with, as opposed to their feelings about the symbol itself. Therefore, to answer my second research question, college classification does seem to somewhat influence affective responses to the Confederate flag, at least in the data that I analyzed.

DISCUSSION

The results of Model 1 correlate with previous findings about political affiliation and the Confederate flag (Cooper & Knotts 2006; Reingold & Wike 1998). In Model 2, the strong correlation between feelings and region may be a result of the ways the data was operationalized. Respondents were categorized into two groups based on their state’s historical location in the Confederate States or not. Another interesting potentiality is that respondents who grew up in former Confederate states may be more likely to identify with conservative political ideologies. In regards to Model 3, belief that the flag is representative of pride and heritage may have been a stronger predictor of feelings toward the flag because it is representative of the two competing ideological camps surrounding the flag unlike political affiliation in that it forced respondents to identify with a camp. Analysis of R2 data also indicates that questions about pride/heritage were the most significant indicator of positive feelings toward the Confederate flag, as indicated by the amount of variance explained via the inclusion of pride/heritage and an independent variable.

Model 4 is the most interesting model in this research because it has the most drastic changes of any measured model. In Model 4, the introduction of culture/environment as an independent variable may have weakened the significance of political affiliation because the presence of the flag in one’s culture or environment may affect perceptions of the flag more than political affiliation does. Those who indicate the flag is more a part of their culture than their environment may have internalized the flag as representative of the social culture they have adopted while those who indicate the flag is more a part of their environment than their culture may have externally recognized the flag as symbolic of racist ideologies. These manifestations are not captured when simply analyzing political affiliation because the two variables are not mutually exclusive; one can identify as conservative without having formed an opinion on the Confederate flag. While the presence of the flag in one’s culture or environment itself is not significantly correlated to feelings on its own, it had a significant enough dilution effect on political affiliation.

In terms of education, college classification seems to be a somewhat significant factor in individuals’ affective responses to the Confederate flag. This may be for one of two reasons. First, having a higher level of education may mean respondents have developed more of a vocabulary with which to express themselves; this may explain why some respondents chose to respond to the question using emotionally negative words. Second,
respondents may have been forced to interact with individuals who hold opposing viewpoints, meaning their responses may be a reflection of the people they associate with the Confederate flag. In either situation, length of time in college does seem to affect how people affectively respond to the Confederate flag.

Ultimately, based on the data collected, political affiliation and the perception of the flag as a symbol that is not representative of Southern pride and heritage are the best predictors of one's perceptions of the Confederate flag, with gender and the region in which respondents grew up being significant indicators in certain instances. While the four models did not indicate a strong correlation between college classification and response, analysis of the qualitative data reveals that college classification may have some effect on emotional responses to the flag.

Limitations and Biases

As with any research, limitations and biases are inevitable. The first primary limitation is the sample size of respondents. This is most likely a result of data being gathered exclusively from a public university in West Texas. Demographic questions did not offer responses that accounted for mixed race or mixed ethnicity individuals and also grouped people together without delineating between American citizens and foreign-born students (i.e., a respondent could only choose that they are Asian/Asian American, not Asian or Asian American). The relatively low response rate is most likely a result of the limited public availability of the survey; while the survey was made publically available online for approximately one month, the survey was only publically advertised through the university's online announcement system twice. Furthermore, the survey also did not ask respondents to indicate their chosen college major which means correlation between individual majors or programs and affective responses cannot be measured with the current data.

There also seems to be an oversampling of somewhat liberal and strongly liberal students and this may be the case for three reasons. First, it is likely that the individuals who were taking the classes where the survey was distributed are more liberally minded; it is often theorized that social science and social work programs both contain and produce more liberal leaning students (Dey 1996). Second, it is possible that the controversial nature of the Confederate flag in mainstream media made respondents feel that they could not accurately and truthfully report their political affiliations. Additionally, questions about political affiliation allowed for responses on a modified 5-point Likert scale, with the middle option being "neither conservative nor liberal." This response allowed students to claim no strong political affiliation which has to potential to skew results. Finally, it is possible that logistic regression would have been a better method to calculate correlations between the aforementioned variables; linear regression was chosen for its simplicity of execution and interpretation.

CONCLUSION

The goal of my research was to investigate potential correlations between collegiate educational attainment level and affective responses to the Confederate flag and to assess the possibility of generating a normative social profile of individuals who support the Confederate flag. The results suggest that there is no significant correlation between collegiate educational attainment level, but individuals who report they are in their junior year of college and beyond tend to have more emotionally affective responses to the Confederate flag. This pattern suggests that educational socialization does seem to still play a somewhat important role in the formation of responses to controversial symbols. The results also suggest that while there is no overarching generalizable social profile of supporters of the Confederate flag, politically conservative individuals who do not believe that the flag represents racism are more likely to view the flag as a symbol of heritage and pride with gender being somewhat of a significant indicator.

While I was able to answer both of my research questions with the given data, there are many limitations to my research. One primary limitation may be the current social climate surrounding the Confederate flag. While responses to the survey were confidential, it is possible that some individuals may have not been entirely truthful about their feelings toward the flag or their political affiliation for fear of being stereotyped. Another potential limitation is the small sample size combined with a potential oversampling of people who identify as somewhat liberal or strongly liberal. A final potential limitation with my research is that the questions allowed for respondents to indicate neutral responses to many of the survey questions. In order for the results of future surveys to be more generalizable, a larger sample size combined with questions modified for specificity and questions that force respondents to indicate what response they most identify with are needed.

Ultimately my research is more descriptive than it is prescriptive. As a result of the limitations of my research, I have merely uncovered a potential social phenomenon rather than established any causal link between collegiate educational attainment and affective responses toward the Confederate flag.
Therefore, I highlight three particular areas for future research. Firstly, more research needs to be done about the ways controversial symbols are taught in places where the symbol is understood to represent positive ideologies. Within the context of my research, more investigation is necessary to analyze the ways in which Southern schools teach the history of the flag compared to other regions of the United States, along with the differences in teaching between rural and urban schools. Secondly, more research needs to be done concerning educational socialization at the collegiate level; more specifically, more research should be performed that analyzes how educational socialization occurs in individual years of college. This research proves that social forces are still influential even during college. Finally, there may be a correlation between a chosen major, educational socialization and the understanding of symbols. While the documentation of correlations between political affiliation and chosen majors does exist (Porter & Umbach 2006), there may be valuable information in understanding if some majors are more likely to be either chosen by or produce politically conservative or liberal students. This research may also hold implications for understanding the ways in which value transmission occurs in individual majors. Because socialization is a continuum and affects all aspects of people’s lives, it is important to understand how socialization occurs in different settings and in different stages of life.

REFERENCES


APPENDIX A
SURVEY

1. Please indicate whether you have seen this image before.
   a. Yes, I have seen it.
   b. No, I have not seen it.

2. On a scale of 1 through 5, please indicate your level of positive or negative feelings toward the following image.

   1 – extremely negative  2 – somewhat negative  3 – neutral
   4 – somewhat positive  5 – extremely positive

3. Do you believe the confederate flag is racist?
   a. Yes
   b. No
   c. Other (please specify): ________________

4. Please complete the sentence: The confederate flag is ___________.
   1 – an integral part of my culture
   2 – an important part of my culture
   3 – somewhat of a part of my culture
   4 – neither a part of my culture nor of my environment
   5 – somewhat of a part of my environment
   6 – an important part of my environment
   7 – an integral part of my environment

5. Please complete the sentence: When I see the confederate flag, I feel ________________.

6. Do you believe that individuals or organizations (such as the Sons of Confederate Veterans) should have the right to display the confederate flag?
   a. Yes
   b. No
   c. Other (please specify): ________________

7. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statement: The confederate flag is a symbol of southern pride and heritage.
   a. I agree
   b. I disagree
   c. I neither agree nor disagree

8. Please list any names you have used to refer to the confederate flag.
   ________________

9. Please complete the following sentence: Growing up, I was taught the confederate flag represented ________________.
10. Please complete the following sentence: In school, I was taught the confederate flag represented ________________.

11. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statement: The primary issue behind the Civil War was the right for states to decide their own laws.
   a. Agree
   b. Disagree
   c. Neither agree nor disagree

12. Do you believe the confederate flag should be flown on the grounds of state capitol buildings?
   a. Yes
   b. No

13. Other (please specify): ________________ Do you believe the confederate flag (in all iterations) should be banned in the United States?
   a. Yes
   b. No
   c. Other (please specify): ________________

14. Please indicate your gender.
   - Female
   - Male
   - Transgender
   - Genderfluid/Genderqueer
   - Other

15. Please indicate your race.
   - Alaskan Native
   - Asian/Asian American
   - Black/African American
   - Caucasian/White
   - Hispanic/Latin@
   - Indigenous/Native American
   - Pacific Islander
   - Other (please specify): ______________

16. What is your classification in college?
   - First Year/Freshman (less than or equal to 30 completed hours)
   - Second Year/Sophomore (between 31 and 60 completed hours)
   - Third Year/Junior (between 61 and 90 completed hours)
   - Fourth Year/Senior (greater than 91 hours completed, but have not had a bachelor’s degree awarded)
   - Master’s Student (have been awarded Bachelor’s degree but do not have a Master’s degree)
   - PhD Student (have been awarded a Master’s degree but do not have a doctorate)

17. Please indicate your political affiliation.
   - Strongly conservative
   - Somewhat conservative
   - Neither conservative nor liberal
   - Somewhat liberal
   - Strongly liberal
18. Please indicate what state you currently live in. ________________.

19. If you grew up in the United States, please indicate what state you grew up in. ________________.

20. If you grew up outside of the United States, please indicate the country you grew up in. ________________.
Understanding the Recent Cyber Migration in South Korea Through the Lenses of Panopticon and Synopticon

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Abstract
This paper examines the recent cyber migration in South Korea with theories of Panopticon and Synopticon and the analyses on political and historical landscapes of Korea. The Park administration and the Supreme Prosecutors' Office decided to conduct real-time monitoring on the Internet with the help of related government ministries and private telecommunication enterprises to control online comments on Park's government operation and private life. As Kakao Talk, the most widely used instant messenger application in Korea, cooperated with the government's surveillance plan, Korean citizens, considering this state of affairs as a sign of dictatorship, migrated to Telegram, a foreign messaging application.

Considering synoptical system being more resilient to political riots, the move of the Park administration to panoptical surveillance did not seem very percipient. However, as the administration had already lost too much trust from the public, the president had no choice but to return to panoptical surveillance to maintain her authority. Furthermore, Park seemed to have trust in the rampant mentality of adiaphorization in the Korean public and expected the public's anger to subside soon before it could become an influential political riot threatening her administration.

Her administration's expectations were partly right, but the government seems to have failed to fully understand the nature of adiaphorization that can turn the public's criticism toward other problematic government operations. To keep her administration's authority and legitimacy, it should have focused more on gaining trust from the public, which is often the most secure method of achieving long-term political stability.

Keywords
South Korea, panopticon, synopticon, social networks

INTRODUCTION
Unlike traditional migrations during which people physically move to another place, cyber migration describes the migration of users from a specific internet service, especially Social Networking Service (SNS), to a different service. Usually such migration is triggered by the service's internal characteristics, for example, by dissatisfaction with the service's performance (Zengyan, Yang, and Lim, 2009). South Korea, however, has recently experienced an unprecedented cyber migration for complex political reasons. On September 16, 2015, the South Korean President Park Geun-Hye stated in the presidential Cabinet meeting, “I wish the Ministry of Justice and prosecutions can work together to keep revealing comments [on my government operation and private life] online down” (Lim, 2014).

Within two days, the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office, the prosecution branch of the South Korean government, decided to do real-time monitoring on the Internet with the help of related government ministries and private telecommunication enterprises, and constructed a hotline between the Supreme Prosecutor's Office and a number of telecommunication businesses (including Naver Band, Nate On, and My People).

The private company most affected by its connection to the construction of the hotline was Kakao Talk, an instant messenger application developed by a South Korean corporation KAKAO in 2010. South Korean citizens were both anxious and furious about the government's decision to perform such panoptical surveillance, as well as the private corporations' cooperation with that decision. As it was apparent that surveillance of the public was technically possible and that it had already been conducted from time to time, the people of South Korea started to feel the need to establish collective political actions, ranging from creating political memes to the cyber migration. These actions originated from the entrooted fear of military dictatorship that South Korea had experienced in the late 20th century. Therefore, as a form of political rebellion, people started to migrate from Kakao Talk to Telegram, a free messaging application headquartered in Berlin Germany, and this political action was continued even in offline realms.

In this paper, I contend that the Park administration could not continue with its more subtle and dispersed technological surveillance at a point in which the government had lost too much trust from the public, thus leaving the president and her administration with few choices but to return to centralized and visible, panoptical surveillance to maintain her authority. The term adiaphorization is derived from adiaphorous, meaning...
indifferent or neutral. It is used in Liquid Surveillance by Zygmunt Bauman and David Lyon in order to refer to a shift of an individual's responsibility to conduct ethical evaluation to an unspecified third party. Park seemed to trust in the rampant mentality of adiaphorization in the South Korean public and thus might have expected the public's anger to not last long enough to start any kind of influential political riot that would threaten her administration. Although she did not directly announce such expectation, widespread adiaphorization in South Korea is widely believed to render South Korean unity difficult.

To better understand and analyze this series of political events, I am going to draw from Michel Foucault's theory on the panopticon and examine Zygmunt Bauman and David Lyon's book, Liquid Surveillance. Most of the resources used in this paper are from Korean newspaper articles and statistics describing current political conditions in South Korea which I translated from Korean to English.

A Brief Summary on Current Censorship and Cyber Migration

As soon as Korean people heard about the construction of the hotline between prosecution and many popular telecommunication businesses, they worried that their personal conversations might be monitored. As Kakao Talk became the most widely used instant messaging application in Korea, the anxiety spread quickly. By 2014, it was counted that almost 39.05 million Korean citizens (70 percent of the entire population) are smartphone users, and 95 percent of the smartphone users use Kakao Talk (Choi 2014; Lee 2014). 1.3 times more text messages are exchanged through the application than by SMS (short message service) (Choi 2014). The application became even more widely used as it introduced its PC and MAC version of the application in 2013 and 2014 consecutively. Various rumors spread via online communities suggesting that the Supreme Prosecutor's Office targeted searches on certain keywords in order to surveil people's conversations (Park 2014).

As a response to the public's anxiety, Kakao Talk made an official announcement via Twitter: “Kakao Talk is not a target for surveillance and censorship. We only keep conversation history for five to seven days and do not release the content without strict legal procedure” (Kakao Team 2014). However, this response did not mitigate people's unease—what if the government required conversation history based on so-called “strict legal procedure”?

The situation worsened as the press focused repeatedly on cases of surveillance on the people who went against the government. Jung Jin Woo, the Labor Party's deputy leader who had participated in the political rally following the Sewol ferry sinking1, and an ordinary college student who initiated a rally on the same issue in June, were both under intense surveillance. Law enforcement authorities issued confiscation warrants to get the history of their private conversations, IP addresses, and MAC addresses that can disclose exact locations (Park 2014). To Korean citizens who still remember the history of dictatorship, the current telecommunication censorship meant more than mere censorship; it meant the possible return of authoritarianism and the possible repetition of history.

South Korean citizens had already experienced the era of military dictatorship from 1963 to 1987 under three different regimes. Even though the constitution has defined South Korea as a democratic country since 1948, the nation only gained true democracy in the 1990s. Starting in 1963, former presidents Chung-hee Park and Doo-hwan Chun consecutively initiated and maintained military dictatorship until 1988. Thousands of citizens were killed during the democratic demonstrations throughout the era of military dictatorship—they marched for constitutional amendments for the freedom of speech, the overthrow of the dictatorship, and a direct election system among other democratic reforms. After years of confrontation, South Koreans finally gained a democracy through direct election system in 1987.

In addition to the fact that South Koreans gained democracy through a great amount of sacrifice and political organizing, the fact that President Park is the daughter of former president Chung-hee Park has heightened the public's apprehension and fear of a repetition of the past. The former president Park, who is the most prominent dictator from the era and gained his power through a military coup d'état, also attempted to gain his administration's authority and legitimacy through conducting surveillance on the politicians and citizens who went against the government's stance. Therefore, the current Park administration's similar move made the public more anxious and infuriated. To many South Korean citizens, this telecommunication censorship is an infringement on the freedom of speech and a possible sign of repetition of her father's era, the epitome of military dictatorship.

Additionally, Sung Kim, a computer science professor at Hanyang University in Seoul, South Korea, argues that the national intelligence service has the ability to conduct real-time monitoring and actually did conduct

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1 A national level disaster took place on April 16, 2014, Sewol Ferry sunk en route from Incheon to Jeju. 304 passengers died in the disaster, while only 172 passengers survived (Cho).
unannounced real-time monitoring on blacklisted individuals. Through this monitoring, they collected all types of telecommunication data such as the history of corded telephone usage, internet usage, and Kakao talk conversation (Choi 2014). Data collected from secretive monitoring can be used as evidence in trial. This governmental power, combining the executive branch and the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office, conducts surveillance on individuals without providing information about what, how, and when they were being monitored made the public determined to start collective actions (Choi 2014).

As these government actions were disclosed to the public, many South Korean citizens started to search for a more secure and autonomous application, preferably hosted by a foreign nation that was relatively free of government intervention. Among several alternatives, Telegram, a smartphone and desktop application developed by Russian programmers Pavel and Nikolai Durov, has been the most popular one. Although its headquarters are in Berlin Germany, Telegram decided to place its companies in several countries to maintain its security and to avoid any type of political pressure to release information about users. On its official website, Telegram describes itself as “a messaging app with a focus on speed and security...cloud-based and heavily encrypted” (Telegram 2014). Due to these characteristics, people who need to keep their conversations as confidential as possible, like employees working in financial institutions and high-profile technical gurus, started using the application, which was well-advertised through newspaper coverage. Within two weeks after the announcement of the surveillance, more than three million people had downloaded the English version of Telegram, and the application held first place in the application markets for both iOS and Android phones for many weeks (Choi 2014). Thus, the massive cyber migration from Kakao Talk to Telegram began. As a response to this migration, Telegram recruited “Korean linguists, [professional] translators, and language geeks” to provide a Korean version of the application (Telegram Messenger, 2014). Moreover, Pavel Durov even publicly supported such democratic digital revolution by saying, “Korean citizens are now facing a turning point in terms of democracy, and I wish citizens can regain their freedom. [...] Since I had a similar experience regarding surveillance while I was running VKontakte in Russia, I understand the current situation very well” (Park 2014). Many political commentators interpreted this cyber migration as a new form of democratic contention in the 21st century.

In a world with hundreds of SNS sites and applications in a free market system, cyber migration is no longer uncommon. As briefly mentioned above, cyber migration refers to SNS users’ behavior of switching between different SNS platforms. The academic sources that have been published thus far on cyber migration have mainly focused on cyber migration as a result of the application itself—such as dissatisfaction with the original SNS’s or satisfaction with the new SNS’s technical quality, information quality, communication support, or member policy (Zengyan et al. 2009:7). However, the recent cyber migration that has happened in South Korea shows both distinctive push and pull factors related to political circumstances. The fact that Kakao Talk is under government surveillance pushes people to move to Telegram, which is independent from any form of political pressure.

However, this aftermath seems like an inevitable corollary as the system shifted from synoptical back to panoptical surveillance. After a peaceful time of synoptical surveillance, which functioned well without causing any major problems, why did the Korean government decide to set up a visible censorship tower—a hotline between the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office and Kakao Talk—that had been believed to be eliminated by the Korean citizens? It is therefore important to think through these states of affairs from the perspective of President Park’s regime: why did her administration choose to go back to the panoptical surveillance system?

To answer the question, it is necessary to understand the fundamental difference in the operation of both the panopticon and synopticon—in particular, how the relationship between the trust of the ones who are under examination and the political and economic elites in power affects the efficiency of the two surveillance systems.

Understanding the Panopticon and Synopticon in Political Realm

The panopticon had been an efficient surveillance system until the arrival of the digital media era. The idea of the panopticon was first designed by English philosopher and social theorist, Jeremy Bentham. His idea became widely known through its usage in designing prisons, and Michel Foucault describes it as follows in his book *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*.

At the periphery, an annular building; at the center, a tower; this tower is pierced with wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring; the peripheric building is divided into cells, each of which extends the whole width of the building; they have two windows, one on the inside, corresponding to
Due to these structural characteristics, a panopticon can be efficiently controlled just by having a single watchman in the center of a structure. This system becomes even more efficient once the control tower turns the backlight on so that the prisoners cannot tell whether the watchman is actually watching them or not. The feeling of uncertainty would create fear among the ones being monitored and thus force the prisoners to behave. In other words, the existence of the central tower, whether there is a guard in the tower or not, can efficiently manage the crowd of prisoners.

The design of the panopticon was even in tune with the time in which it was introduced. As the spirit of the Industrial Revolution started to sweep through the European continent, Bentham’s panopticon seemed to be the most efficient and optimal way to achieve both an effectual outcome of maintaining social order and a reducing the financial cost of watching over crowds. Any place that requires efficient monitoring of a crowd could adopt this concept; the structure of the panopticon has been used in many parts of modern society including workplaces, hospitals, asylums, and even schools (Foucault 195-228).

The notion of the panopticon can be applied in politics in the form of surveillance over the voting populous. When the government builds up a visible, tangible, surveillance power, which can be in a form of legislative or other governmental authority, ‘those in power’ have a better chance of controlling the public because it makes every individual think he or she is under constant surveillance. However, the panopticon carries the image of a monolithic central tower holding an overarching set of values that require its members of society to follow. If one fails to follow them, the state will punish the person to maintain social order. Without proper punishment, the social disciplines that keep society functioning will not be upheld. As John Locke argues, individuals have consented to surrender part of their freedom and provide authority to the state in order to protect their rights (Locke 1689:70). Similarly, in the panopticon, individuals are spontaneously following the rules of the panopticon and allow the constant surveillance to protect their wellbeing and rights.

However, one of the problems of the panopticon is its fragility. Monolithic power can more easily create dissatisfaction from the public. Since individuals are under tight and constant surveillance, it is difficult for people to systematically assemble and rebel against the government. Foucault also notes that Bentham’s panoptic structure perfectly isolates prisoners from each other, making it difficult for prisoners to connect and form collective movements. Once prisoners’ organizational efforts are found out by the surveillance system, they would be considered traitors and subjected to punishment. Nevertheless, if the surveillance system fails to find them before the start of the rebellion can be quelled, it becomes difficult to keep the system from collapsing. For centuries, this paradoxical coexistence between efficient surveillance and the risk of possible rebellion has continued until liquid modernity and the era of digital media arrived.

With the expansion of digital media technology and the development of modernity into liquid modernity, the new form of social structure liberated individuals from both time and place. Liquid modernity, an idea introduced by Bauman, is difficult to define in one phrase—Bauman attempted to explain the term by emphasizing the importance of the “individual” in the new modernity. Liquid modernity allows individuals to locate themselves in society, and by freely doing so, traditional social relationships and power dynamics change into something difficult to grasp. Bauman described today’s power relations as a power that “can at any moment escape beyond reach—into sheer inaccessibility” (11). Under the panoptical social structure, the ones in power not only controlled both the time and space of individuals through the ceaseless surveillance but also can build a power structure that everyone within the structure could notice. However, as technology enabled the free usage of time and space, panoptical surveillance could not retain as much power as it did before. Furthermore, as individual ways of forming relationships have changed—it is now less visible in reality as it has moved to digital sphere—people in power had to adapt to this new change. Therefore, from the perspective of people who are implementing surveillance, the advent of digital technology has put them in risk since they have to share the core resources for power with ordinary individuals and reorganize the structure that they have built over the centuries.

Once this liquefied modern society enabled individuals to control their own time and space, they could start forming new relationships within a new social structure. The previous modern society lost its strong power of solidarity and thus freed individuals to find their own ways of thinking and behaving. Before, the daily interactions of a group of individuals was limited to the people physically around them, however, individuals can now not only connect themselves with the people living on the opposite side of the planet, but they can also find those who share similar interests near them. Due to this change in the way people form relationships with others (in this liquefied modern society), individuals face a new task: finding their own spaces to resort to and form new relationships with societies. In doing
so, their personal freedom and decisions become the most important factors they expect from the nation.

As individuals began to have more control over their time, space, and other kinds of relationships formed within this new paradigm, people started to have much more liberty to use their free will. However, Marcuse (1964) questions whether people really aspire to achieve freedom as much as they have aspired to under control. He theorizes that some people might not feel ready to accept freedom, and instead feel anxious since they have to take full responsibility for their actions.

Since there is no way to go back to the point in which people did not have the level of current freedom, the ones in power devised a new type of surveillance system called the synopticon, which used these coexisting contradictory feelings. Bauman and Lyon described individuals under the synopticon as “snails [carrying] their homes, so the employees of the brave new liquid modern world must grow and carry their personal panopticons on their own bodies” (2013:59). In other words, under the synopticon, the principal agent holding responsibility of surveillance has “shifted” from the central surveillance tower to the individuals who had been under surveillance. In the previous era of modernity, when panoptical surveillance was prevalent, individuals or institutions in power squarely asked for certain information from individuals for the sake of “national/institutional security.” Contrastingly, in the era of digital media, individuals think that they spontaneously surrendered their personal information to synoptical surveillance, and they expect to receive wellbeing, security, convenience, and other values in return. For instance, most individuals tend to upload personal stories on Facebook and use personalized Google services for convenience without pondering how such personal information can be used in different circumstances and by the ones in power. However, the feeling of spontaneity taking place here is not real—this “shift” of surveillance is not a complete shift, but it has been manipulated by the ones in power, including governments and big corporations, to make individuals feel this way. Moreover, the ones creating the surveillance systems further accelerate this spontaneous surrender of personal information in order to strengthen their constructed system by using the public’s anxiety and responsibilities that follow freedom.

The decision to remove a monolithic surveillance tower from the public’s eyes to keep pace with the new social paradigm was even more successful than anyone could imagine; the new system is now less susceptible to rebellions. Since the panopticon uses the fear of the public originated from the uncertainty of the existence of the guard, individuals need to first overcome their fear to start a riot. However, once someone starts the revolt, individuals who once shared the fear are more likely to join the army of revolution and topple down the whole system as human history has shown. Furthermore, unlike liquid synoptical surveillance, the panopticon, containing more solid characteristics, is more likely to be shattered by the rift within itself. In other words, the panopticon always needs to be alert towards any movement related to rebellion to protect its existence. However, once the panopticon spontaneously became a synopticon, individuals who spontaneously participated in building an individual synopticon can no longer see the surveillance tower and thus feel more freedom, even if the feeling has been manipulated. Therefore, by seemingly “empowering” individuals, the ones in power are now able to decrease the possibility of the subjects feeling oppressed or alienated, rendering individuals less likely to start political rebellions.

However, in the process of voluntary participation in the form of surrendering one’s personal information through the usage of digital media technology, trust should be formulated before anything else. The relationship between liquidity of society and the premise of trust in order to sustain liquid modernity resonates with one of the meanings of liquidity. When we look up the term liquidity in a search engine, the first meaning that comes out relates to finance. Even though Bauman seems to use liquidity in a scientific meaning, liquidity in finance can provide an insightful perspective in understanding one of the fundamental characteristics of liquid modernity. In business, liquidity refers to the market’s ability to interchange between asset and money without losing the value of both asset and money. In finance, market liquidity is significant. The essence of finance lies in the transaction of currency loans, which are based on the trust between individuals, groups, or institutions involved in exchanges. Without trust in institutions and the regulations set by and controlling the institutions, nobody would attempt to participate in exchanges.

Similarly, in liquid modern society, trust is one of the foremost and necessary conditions for society to exist. Unless individuals under surveillance have enough trust to spontaneously provide their personal information to the ones in power, the synoptical surveillance in liquid modernity cannot exist. In politics, the government assures the public of their safety and wellbeing as a promise, but if individuals do not feel the promise credible, no one will surrender personal information for the surveillance system. Therefore, without the prerequisite trust, no synopticon can exist.
How the Park Administration Lost Trust and the Return to the Panopticon

As explained in the previous part, trust between the government and public is an essential condition for the synopticon to function. Unfortunately, from the beginning of her term, President Park and her administration failed to gain much trust from the people.

Her political background is deeply rooted in her father, the former president Chung-hee Park. He is still known as one of the presidents to receive the most mixed reviews until now. Chung-hee Park accomplished astonishing economic growth during his incumbency, but he is considered the epitome of a military dictator in South Korean history. A large population of the older generation, who are nostalgic for that time in history, now support the current President Park. These loyal supporters of Park are now functioning as the main base of support for ‘the conservative party’. It is not uncommon to have an iconic figure in politics, but, for the past decade, South Korean society has already experienced extreme polarization, especially in government affairs. Therefore, there was a huge discordance between Park’s political supporters and opponents. The opposition and distrust from the progressive parties have been enormous. Between suspicion that the presidential election was rigged, failures to implement her election pledges, biased appointments to high government posts, failure to take appropriate action to a national level disaster, even her constant supporters2 slowly but steadily started to lose trust in the Park administration.

Firstly, many people were questioned regarding the results of the presidential election. Since a democratic country is built upon the principle of elected officials representing the citizens, any suspicion regarding the results of the election puts the legitimacy of the government at stake. Unfortunately, after the 2012 presidential election, there was a large belief that the election was rigged; much proof that the National Intelligence Service (NIS) got involved in the 2012 election was revealed in early January of 2013 (Hani 2013). According to the prosecution, there were about 600 Twitter accounts opened by the NIS. Among the 1.2 million Tweets that were tweeted through those accounts, 640,000 were related to the 2012 election (Hani 2013). Tweets were either rumors or insulting commentaries concerning other candidates running in the election or remarks supporting Park. They could not get complete data on other Korean websites, so the prosecution assumed there to be many more fabricated comments and writings by the NIS surrounding the election.

In a democratic society, every individual has the right to support any candidate he or she chooses, but if a governmental branch, which is supposed to be politically neutral, creates fake accounts to spread rumors or comments supporting a specific candidate, it cannot be considered a fair election. In addition to this intervention by the NIS on the online network, there were suspicious incidents--such as the existence of electoral districts where the number of ballots was higher than the number of electorate.

The administration, which already lacked legitimacy, faced even bigger problems as it failed to implement Park’s election promises. According to the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (Lim 2015), among the president’s election pledges, only 27 percent were fully implemented, 28 percent were partially implemented, and the other 45 percent were not implemented at all. Among twenty different areas of pledges, only the ones related to dwelling have been implemented by over 60 percent, while in four areas—national unification, reform of the prosecution, renovation on politics, and sustainability of the nation—over 60 percent of their pledges were not implemented (Realmeter, 2014). Despite this situation, Park did not attempt to reshuffle the Cabinet, but rather, kept placing people closely affiliated with her party in high government positions. All of the candidates she recommended for a prime minister post were either rejected by the Congress or receded from the candidate position due to strong public opposition. Korean citizens criticized her self-righteousness and inability to integrate both conservatives and progressives to achieve bigger political goals. This series of events made her government not only illegitimate but also incredible.

On April 16, 2014, Sewol Ferry sunk en route from Incheon to Jeju, allowing 304 passengers to die in the disaster, with only 172 passengers surviving (Cho 2014). Most of the survivors were rescued by fishing boats and commercial vessels that were passing by, while the South Korean coast guard focused on saving the few crewmen. The level at which the South Korean coast guard, police, and ROK Navy ships inadequately reacted to the sinking and how passive they were in saving lives revealed itself during the investigation. However, not only did the government officials fail to keep their promises to make a proper special law for the investigation, but also there was no suitable government response to the unfolding investigation. Moreover, Park’s control over national journalism became more evident as the major national news platforms were found to be deliberately skewing the empirical reality of the situation.

Prior to this, the South Korean public had already been angry about immoral and suspicious government operations, but the political apathy

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2Political commentators estimate there 25-30% are constant supporters of Park (Kwon 2015).
that was rampant within modern Korean society kept the citizens from starting political riots. However, the Sewol Ferry sinking made the citizens doubt that the government would put its best efforts to keep its citizens’ security a priority. The infuriated public started to turn its back on the Park administration and initiate rallies in both online and offline realms.

Since 2013, the approval rate for the president and her government operation was over 50 percent, however, starting May 2014, the rate plummeted. According to Realmeter (2014), a public opinion research center, only 39.7 percent of the respondents were supporting her government operation as of December 2014. Furthermore, there were 51.7 percent satisfied with her administration, while 40 percent dissatisfied in 2013. However, the situation was reversed—40.2 percent satisfied but 51.5 percent unsatisfied in 2014. Considering there are 36.3 percent constant supporters and 36.1 percent constant opponents in the whole South Korean population, 15.4 percent of the population who once aligned themselves with the government are now showing dissatisfaction with it.

Taking these recent changes in the South Korean society into account, it is possible to conclude that the Park administration has lost much trust from the public. As I explained previously, without the trust between the public and the government, it became increasingly impossible for the government to conduct its synoptical surveillance. People can only voluntarily provide their personal information if they fully trust the party collecting such information that it will not disclose information to others and the collected information will only be used in the purpose which was originally pronounced. Therefore, all kinds of information provided to the government can be only be voluntarily collected if people trust the government. In this sense, the Park administration lost too much trust from the public, and seems to have concluded that it did not have a choice but to return to a panoptical surveillance system in order to sustain the existence and authority of Park’s government.

**The Park Administration’s Usage of Adiaphorization**

Considering how much trust the Park administration lost from the public, it is understandable why she had to choose to return to the panopticon. However, there is still one lingering question with regards to the possibilities of the systemic structure that might happen under the panopticon. As explained above in Part I, the panoptical surveillance system is not very resilient to rebellions. Unlike the liquid synopticon that can change its shape to adapt to external shock, the solid panopticon is difficult to restore once shattered. Since she saw her father’s panoptical regime collapse, the president should have had been more vigilant about the possibility of public uprising than any other authoritative agency. Therefore, it is difficult to understand how her government could implement panoptical surveillance so easily without making attempts to find other ways to keep the synoptical surveillance.

The answer to this question can be found in Zygmunt Bauman’s description and explanation of the change in moral ethics and moral judgments under liquid modernity. In his earlier works, Bauman attempted to explain significant changes in the culture of morality that happened during the postmodern era. In medieval times, morality determined a lot of different things within a society; it might have defined the relationships between individuals, maybe fundamental rules determining rewards and punishment, stigmatization, and others. In that period, morality was one of the foremost values that decided the structure of the society. However, once rationality and efficiency became more important societal values, morality “can be ‘disruptive’ and can get in the way of rational, impersonal processes” (Jacobsen et al. 2012:80). Therefore, the ones in power attempted to create a distance between individuals and morality.

Firstly, institutions, such as the nation and the church, attempted to take over personal moral responsibility from individuals as a form of systemic institution. This was further enhanced through “distancing” and a “remoteness automation” process with the help of digital technology (Bauman and Lyon 2013:86). Institutions strategically detach individuals from the essence of the occasion in order to keep them from making self-directed moral judgments. In other words, by “[liberating individuals] actions from moral constraints,” institutions receive the power to infuse the rules and make arbitrary assessments based on their rules to control individuals more efficiently (Bauman and Lyon, 2013, p. 86).

As a result of distancing, adiaphorization, which Bauman addresses as one of the “major issues [confronting] (synoptical) surveillance ethics,” takes place (Bauman and Lyon 2013:7). In his earlier works, Bauman used the notion of adiaphorization to explain how morality is becoming more detached from the decision and judgments of each agent. According to Bauman, once “a particular segment of moral actions [is exempted] from moral evaluation,” individuals start to overlook moral misgivings in order...
to keep society functioning (Ryan 2002:82). Such moral detachment can be better understood under the characteristic of liquid modernity and the types of relationships people form with each other and with the ones in power. As society in liquid modernity uses digital technologies as a part of its synoptical surveillance, both personal information and relationships formed under the new modernity are often disembodied. In addition to this disembodiment, “electronic mediation enables a further distancing between the actor and the outcome than could ever have been imagined in pre-digital bureaucracy” (Bauman and Lyon 2013:135). Therefore, people start to leave moral judgments to an unspecified other with the vague expectation that someone else will take care of the action based on his or her moral judgment. In politics, this unspecified other can be the legislative branch, administration, or other citizens. If the “other” performs their task earnestly, adiaphorization would not be that detrimental to the moral system but rather add more efficiency to society as some people expected before. However, if that unspecified moral judge fails to complete their task, there remains no subject or an agent that can uphold the system of morality.

Since this type of morality is a characteristic of the synopticon, the moral system also requires trust between the institution and individuals to function smoothly. If individuals do not trust that the larger institutions will take care of moral misgivings properly, the authority of institutions will decline, and thus the moral responsibilities that individuals once entrusted to larger institutions will inevitably fall back to individuals. However, since individuals have been so accustomed to the institutional moral judgment and responsibility, they no longer have enough agency to make absolute moral judgments without institutional interventions; individuals have lost their sense of absolute and universal ethical codes.

In the current case with South Korea, this discrepancy of moral responsibility is taking place. People are infuriated that the government is not making judgments, punishing anyone or any institution that did not fully attend to their responsibilities to protect society's well being. As a result, the public’s level of expectation from the government has plummeted, and thus we could see the people's cyber migration from Kakao Talk to Telegram: people are showing their anger through their usage of messaging applications. However, due to the rampant mentality of adiaphorization in the public sphere, many people are migrating back to Kakao Talk thinking someone else will keep their voice loud even after they stopped using Telegram. South Korean people have been accustomed to the convenience under synoptic surveillance, so even if the surveillance system changed to a panoptic one, many of them are not willing to deal with inconvenience in order to fight against the panoptic surveillance.

Among the 3 million downloads of Telegram, there were 1.7 million weekly unique visitors[3] (UV) for the application in the mid October, but there were only 1.1 million weekly UV remaining as of the mid November (Kim 2014). When this digital migration first took place, many journalists and even scholars were paying attention to this unprecedented type of cyber migration—many political commentators described this cyber migration as a new form of collective political action (Lee 2014; Lim 2014; Son 2014). However, in about a month, there was not much sign of cyber migration left in South Korea.

Considering the Korean public's anxiety and reaction to any sign of military dictatorship or the repression of freedom of speech, the Park administration's response to the cyber migration did not seem strategic. However, because the migration waned rapidly, it is possible to conclude that the Park administration had taken the widespread mentality of adiaphorization within the Korean public into consideration. Individuals were showing their anger toward the government's action and the cooperation by Kakao Talk rather than by actively making moral judgments. Adiaphorization was even further accelerated due to the inconvenience of changing messaging applications. Similar to social networking sites, the value of messaging applications is highly dependent on the network effect. Therefore, one would face difficulties carrying smooth communication with his or her acquaintances unless the acquaintances also changed platforms together. Under the mentality of adiaphorization, people are already passive in making moral judgments or in punishing moral misgivings. Thus, under situations that bring discomfort, people would deter both judgment and punishment even more.

The Park administration could foresee this circumstance, since the administration had already experienced this during the Sewol ferry sinking. When the tragedy happened, most South Korean citizens denounced the government's handling of the crisis. However, within a few months, many individuals became passive in making moral judgments and stopped talking about the incident and its aftermath. From this incident, the Korean government might have presumed that bearing a few months of denouncement would cause the mentality of adiaphorization to settle things down naturally. The South Korean public has lost much trust in the their government over the course of time. Nevertheless, it is difficult to get over the habitual practice of adiaphorization, since we have already upheld that mentality for a long period of time, and the Park administration tactfully wielded the mentality to quell political riots and avoid criticism in the end.
CONCLUSION

Based on the series of political events that took place before and after the initiation of the Kakao Talk surveillance in the September of 2014, it is possible to understand that the Park administration did not have many other choices but to reconstruct the visible control tower of panoptical surveillance. The Park administration had already lost too much trust to expect the public to spontaneously surrender the personal information and freedom necessary to keep the regime and synoptical surveillance working properly. However, not only was Park beleaguered, but also her administration seemed to have taken the rampant adiaphorization among Korean public into account. Momentarily, 3 million people showed their dissatisfaction through the changing of their messaging application, and countless others criticized her dogmatic and century-old military dictatorship. In a month, most Kakao Talk users who cyber migrated to Telegram returned to Kakao Talk. It seems that the Park administration might have not only expected to be denounced by public outcry after the initiation of panoptical surveillance, but also expected those outcries to be terminated shortly before the public turned to serious political riots, which might have enough potential to overthrow the administration.

Her administration’s expectations were partly true; a lot of people returned to Kakao Talk shortly even if they were aware of the existence of surveillance. Nevertheless, the government seems to have failed to fully understand the nature of adiaphorization. Adiaphorization can mean that no one is blamed, but it can simultaneously mean anyone can be blamed. There are fewer people now participating in cyber migration or actively criticizing the government’s authoritarian decisions. However, this blame is causing other criticisms of government operations to surface. South Korean citizens are now criticizing the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office for being subordinate to the administration, journalists for failing to hold the government accountable, and many other areas of the cabinet. Once these criticisms of other areas of government operation start to accumulate, the Park administration might face even bigger problems in the near future. In this sense, her administration’s decision on conducting Kakao Talk surveillance may not have been the best decision. To keep her administration’s authority and legitimacy, it should have focused more on gaining trust from the public. Solving the underlying problem takes more time and effort than solving the immediate problem, but tackling the fundamental problem is always the most secure method of achieving long-term political stability.

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Do Eon (Donna) Lee is a first year PhD student at the Annenberg school for Communication at the University of Pennsylvania. She is interested in how information circulates in online sphere, and how specific circulation model builds trusts and understanding among different groups of people in both online and offline realms. Her main methodological interests are network analysis, computational method, and causal inference. Before joining Annenberg, she graduated in 2016 with a bachelor’s in Sociology and Communication from the University of Pennsylvania.

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(including titles, headings, and footnotes) should be in Times New Roman, 12-point font.

In general, we recommend submissions not to have too complex a hierarchy of sections and subsections. In the case of a heading, the title should be separated from the preceding paragraph by two (2) lines and one (1) line from the proceeding paragraph. The heading should appear in 10-point boldface type, left justified. In the case of a sub-heading, the title should be separated from both preceding and proceeding paragraphs by a single (1) line. The sub-heading should appear in 12-point italicized type.

Citation and Reference Format

Submissions should follow the American Sociological Association (ASA) Style Guide (Third Edition). All citations in the text should be identified by the author's last name, year of publication, and pagination (if necessary). Identify later citations in the same way as the first. If there are more than three authors of a single work, use “et al.” Citations should follow the following format: (Author Year:Page number). If there are multiple citations, separate each citation with a semicolon (“;”) and a space: (Author Year:Page number; Author Year:Page number).

References should come at the end of the paper and should be prefaced with the heading “References” in 12-point boldface type, left justified. The reference entries themselves should be formatted according to the American Sociological Association (ASA) Style Guide.
“The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew.”

-Abraham Lincoln, December 1, 1862