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"The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it."

–Karl Marx, “XI” from “Theses on Feuerbach”

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EDITOR’S NOTE

We are proud to introduce the first volume of *Eleven: The Undergraduate Journal of Sociology*. Conceived in August 2009 by four sociology students, *Eleven* was originally forged to offer a much-needed forum for undergraduate papers. With this goal in mind, we sought generous help from Professor Sandra Smith and the UC Berkeley Department of Sociology. These sources of support provided honest advice and necessary inspiration.

Since its inception, *Eleven* was intended to fulfill two promises: to expand the recognition of exceptional undergraduate work in the social sciences and to give students the opportunity to share their research with a community of fellows. These two promises—one that, no doubt, encourages individual scholarship and one that resists academic individualism by inspiring dialogue—have propelled *Eleven* from an embryonic spark to a new-fangled publication.

*Eleven* was also envisioned as a social experiment, a burning desire to explore the limitations and possibilities that might emerge from a publication that embraces Marx’s “Eleventh Thesis.”

Earnestly, we asked ourselves a series of questions related to the thesis that Engels portended would be “the brilliant germ of the new world outlook.” What types of social scientific methods present more than mere interpretation and speculation? Should we privilege papers written to address an empirical puzzle and snub research driven by theoretical concerns? Would a paper that embodies the command that one should “change” the world offer policy recommendations along with analysis? Could our modest journal promote enough transformation to actually constitute “a change” in everyday terms, let alone in line with Marxist ideals?

We still have not fully answered these questions. Nor are we done lifting our namesake thesis to the light, watching our inquiries refract in multiple directions. What we do know, however, is this: scholarship written from a perspective that seeks to promote social change is fairly easy to spot. This scholarship seeks to visibilize otherwise invisible affairs not from a top-down gaze but from a standpoint already informed by speaking nearby, what Patricia Hill Collins might call an outsider-within perspective.

We see variations of this orientation in all four of the articles published in this edition. Alyssa Newman, once a multiracial black high school student herself, sought to explore both the trials and triumphs for multiracial black high school students who assert a multiracial identity and the conditions under which a multiracial identity is possible. José
Abstract
This paper investigates the role of peers and community in the development and assertion of racial identity for mixed black students at a high school in Northern California. A survey of 129 students from all grades and racial backgrounds found that students felt pressured to conform to stereotypical notions of race. In addition, interviews with seven mixed black students showed that there was little differentiation of racial identity (all identified as multiracial) and a rejection of the “one-drop rule.” While school peers and others in the community often imparted expectations of stereotypical black behavior (in terms of taste in music, style of dress, manner of speaking, etc.), the school’s noticeably mixed race population lent visibility and normalcy to the adoption of a multiracial identity. Experiences among mixed black students varied depending on factors such as the racial demographics of the neighborhood they lived in, what other high schools they have attended, their phenotypical appearance, and their fortitude in asserting a mixed race identity.

Keywords
race, multiracial, identity, youth, stereotypes
Recently, national attention was finally drawn to the complexity of the multiracial experience when the 2000 Census, for the first time, allowed multiracial individuals to check multiple responses for race categorization. With the 2010 Census fast approaching, a deeper understanding of the multiracial identity is needed. Namely, a robust analysis of what factors influence a multiracial person’s self-identification is necessary to clarify whether or not, with the option available, they will claim their multiple racial identities.

In a nation that relies heavily on race as a social indicator—a cue that tells us about who a person is, including assumptions about a person’s class, education, and social status—the existence of mixed race individuals challenges the ability to recognize race immediately and utilize racial assumptions. In the colonial history of the United States after the decline of white indentured servitude, race was a simple indicator—it defined whether a person was slave or free. Today, however, with the broad spectrum of nationalities, accents, cultures, and other social backgrounds that comprise the American demographic, a simple glance at a person’s skin color does not easily convey much, especially when that person appears to be “racially ambiguous.” As Omi and Winant (1994) observe:

One of the first things we notice about people when we meet them (along with their sex) is their race. We utilize race to provide clues about who a person is. This fact is made painfully obvious when we encounter someone whom we cannot conveniently racially categorize—someone who is, for example, racially “mixed” or of an ethnic/racial group we are not familiar with. Such an encounter becomes a source of discomfort and momentarily a crisis of racial meaning (p. 59).

The history of black multiracials—unique among any other multiracial groups given its multitude of former census categories (e.g., mulatto, quadroon, octoroon) and the contemporary multiracial movement—makes for a very interesting moment to look at black multiracial identity. The mixed black identity provides a special lens to view race in the United States, one that can expose racism from multiple sides, from colorism within the black community to overt or covert instances of racism within broader society. At this moment, when a growing and increasingly vocal multiracial population is gaining power in public discourse, issues affecting the mixed black community will be more pertinent and visible to the rest of society than ever before. Even more, President Barack Obama’s multiracial black identity as well as his public discussion of race punctuate this reality emphatically. Multiracial people can no longer be ignored or rendered invisible, whether in schools, the local community, or in political and social debate.

This study focuses on black multiracial high school students and how their interactions with peers, teachers, administrators, and others in the community affect their identity formation and views on race. I specifically looked at how their self-identification may or may not have changed over time, and what incidents or experiences may have affected identity formation and formulation. I limited the study to black multiracial students to see how the legacy of hypodescent or the one-drop rule may have had a continuing impact in pressuring students to arrive at a black monoracial self-identification. Part of the intent behind undertaking this research was to help identify how race is constructed and reinforced. Only by identifying and understanding the mechanisms by which race is constructed and reconstructed are people able to fight against the elements of privilege and oppression inherent in a system of hierarchically structured racial categories. The literature review that follows elaborates on this hierarchical social order, the history of black multiracials in the United States, and the conceptions of race and hypodescent that likely impact the way mixed blacks view their racial identity today.

**LITERATURE REVIEW**

Much of the work within the literature is inspired by the unique position—an ambiguous, intermediate standing in terms of racial identification, and, unfortunately, an often marginalized space—that multiracial or mixed race individuals occupy in the United States. In part, these difficulties arise because race itself is constantly evolving in order to maintain relevance in face of groups it cannot accurately categorize. Many social scientists conceive of race as a social construction, a view that distinguishes “between race as a physical category and race as a social category” (Banton 1979:128). In other words, social scientists distinguish between the biological concept of race and race as perceived biological differences given significance through social meaning and status assignment (p. 128). Racial distinctions are a necessary tool of dominance, and racial

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1 The terms black multiracial, mixed black, and multiracial black are intended to indicate persons who are part black in heritage and “mixed” with one or more other racial heritages and may be used interchangeably.
categories have traditionally served primarily to separate the “subordinate” people out. Given this function of race, the fact that racially mixed people fall under multiple racial categories makes their standing in a racial hierarchy somewhat open for question (Spickard 1992). The United States has addressed the status of multiracial individuals and the questions they generate uniquely by following the “one-drop rule” of racial assignment for people of mixed black racial descent.

The “one-drop rule,” a socio-legal-sanctioned decree that operates by a principle of hypodescent, stipulates that any person with as little as “one drop” of African blood is considered to be black (Davis 1991; Fredrickson 2002). This system of racial classification reinforced the idea of the exclusivity and purity of whiteness; only those “untainted” with any other blood could maintain the privilege of a white racial status. In addition, the “one-drop rule” conveniently added to the “property” of slave-owners since any children born to slaves were automatically given the same slave (and, therefore, property) status as their shackled parent. As F. James Davis (1991) confirms: “American slave owners wanted to keep all racially mixed children born to slave women under their control, for economic and sexual gains, and [to] define such children as anything other than black became a major threat to the entire system” (p. 114; emphasis added). Even with a strict prohibition against sexual relations across races, white men were able to sexually violate black slave women across an extreme power differential in which slave women, completely devoid of rights and humanity, were powerless to resist or consent to such advances. Moreover, Davis elaborates, “it was intolerable for white women to have mixed children, so the one-drop rule favored the sexual freedom of white males, protecting the double standard of sexual morality as well as slavery” (p. 114). This two-fold benefit from the “one-drop rule” enabled white men to not only enjoy racial dominance but also gender and sexual dominance, while simultaneously ensuring that white women, the epitome of white racial purity, would continue to protect the sanctity of whiteness through “racially pure” progeny.

As the “one-drop rule” demonstrates, the United States solution to the problem of racial classification is one that relies almost exclusively on ancestry, as a person need not appear phenotypically identifiable as black to be considered black. However, much of the dominant scholarship on race fails to recognize the United States system of racial classification as unique in that respect, often treating the U.S. system as the standard rather than an exception. Loïc Wacquant poignantly remarks that since “the sociology of ‘race’ all over the world is dominated by U.S. scholarship,” and “U.S. scholarship itself is suffused with U.S. folk conceptions of ‘race,’ the peculiar schema of racial division developed by one country during a small segment of its short history, a schema unusual for its degree of arbitrariness, rigidity and social consequentiality, has been virtually universalized as the template through which analyses of ‘race’ in all countries and epochs are to be conducted” (Wacquant 1997:224). In fact, throughout the world the question of racial designation of multiracial people has been answered differently (Davis 1991; Wagley 1965). According to Charles Wagley, “the criteria for defining social races differ from region to region in the Americas. In one region, ancestry is stressed, in another region sociocultural criteria are emphasized, and in still another, physical appearance is the primary basis for classifying people according to social race” (Wagley 1965:532; emphasis original). These different methods of classification demonstrate variation across the United States, Latin America, and the Caribbean and help expose the complexity of maintaining racial hierarchy when confronted with people who do not neatly fit into a preassigned racial category.

A brief survey of the literature related to how multiracial people are racially assigned across the Americas helps to demonstrate the diversity of systems of racial classification outside of the United States context. For example, Harry Hoetink’s work on race in the Caribbean shows how even among the Caribbean islands, which he divides into Hispanic and non-Hispanic categories, the “models” of race relations differ stemming from their experiences during colonialism and slavery (Hoetink 1985). In much of the Hispanic Caribbean, “a color continuum developed within which subtle differences in skin color, hair texture, and facial features were noted and essentially catalogued in an extensive vocabulary, with all its social implications, but without any group striving after (or succeeding in) the maintenance of strict endogamy, which might have created a clear separation from all others” (p. 61). A robust emphasis on color and extensive vocabulary for racial mixtures also exists in many parts of Latin America (such as Nicaragua and Brazil), which represent alternative models to the United States racial classification system (Lancaster 1991; Wagley 1965). These differing models not only determined how multiracial people were classified, but also generated messages about the social acceptability and discouragement of interracial unions. Hence, the status of multiracial people in these societies was intimately connected to the models of race relations that have historically developed within a given country. F. James Davis (1991), for example, chronicles seven different statuses for racially mixed progeny: a lower status than either parent group, a higher status, an in-between status, a variable status, and more. These scholarly works expose different ways race is socially constructed around the world.

"HOW CAN YOU SAY YOU'RE ONLY ONE?"
While skin color is considered extremely important to the system of racial classification in many of the countries previously discussed, it is also a salient factor in the United States as well. As darker skin color has typically been used to identify and separate “subordinate” people, inversely, white skin was used to denote privilege. Within the black community, or other communities of color, people of mixed racial descent (and their monoracial counterparts) often encounter the issue of colorism. Since many mixed blacks tend to have somewhat different physical features than those of their monoracial black counterparts, skin color, hair texture, and other phenotypical elements are often relevant to a discussion of the mixed black experience. G. Reginald Daniel (1996) insists that colorism “persists into the present due to the enduring Eurocentric bias in the larger American society,” and asserts that Eurocentric features can both denote privilege in some circles and result in discrimination and social exclusion in others (p. 131). Multiracial blacks potentially contend with the oscillating experience of having their European features valued (thereby, providing them with an elevated status) and/or having others resent them for it (being relegated to a relative outsider status as someone who is “different”). This simultaneous insider/outsider status also contributes to another aspect of the mixed black experience, namely, a potentially heightened exposure or vulnerability to racism and discrimination. For example, one study compared different perceptions of racism between white, black, and black-white multiracial students on the urban campus of a Southern university. The black-white multiracial students reported the most experience with perceiving racism and prejudice on campus, which was attributed to the unique viewpoint that multiracials have on race and the multiple fronts from which they can experience racism (Brackett 2006). While lighter skin color and an approximation of European phenotypical features may denote privilege to mixed blacks in some surroundings, these characteristics do not exempt them from experiencing racism or discrimination in all contexts. In fact, several scholars note that a multiracial ancestry may make them more vulnerable to racial attacks in certain situations (Daniel 2002; Rockquemore and Brunsma 2002; Renn 2004; Brackett 2006).

Context also has a significant impact on the way the mixed race person identifies his or herself. The research of David Harris and Jeremiah Sim (2002) exposes just how fluid and contextual multiracial identity may be. Using data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, Harris and Sim demonstrate how multiracial adolescents included in the study gave inconsistent answers regarding their racial identity when interviewed at home (survey questions administered by an interviewer and often with family members present) and when answering a self-administered survey at school (Harris and Sim 2002). In addition, these researchers found that patterns surrounding contexts of identifying monoracially and multiracially varied among the multiracial groups they studied (white/black, white/Asian, and white/American Indian youth).

While context is one area of mixed race identity that continues to deserve more attention in the literature, the legacy of the “one-drop rule” has also limited the scope of multiracial research by making the various ways a mixed race person may racially identify unproblematic. Taking the racial identity of multiracial people for granted (in effect, assuming that they identify monoracially as a member of the “subordinate” group of their racial heritage as the “one-drop rule” would imply) has stymied further inquiry into the mixed race identity and what forms it may take. Yet, one would be remiss in not highlighting significant work that has contributed to the study of multiracial blacks.

In their seminal 2002 work, Rockquemore and Brunsma uncover three different types of multiracial identities. First and most common is the “border identity,” in which individuals see their identity as “in-between” and incorporate both or all into a sort of unique hybrid. Next, they posit, are people who adhere to a “protean identity” and thus vary their racial identity depending on the social and cultural context. Lastly, people who ascribe to a “transcendent identity” do not identify with any race and really see race as a false category. They answer the frequent inquiries about their race with “I belong to the human race,” or leave the check boxes for race on questionnaires blank, or check “other” (Rockquemore and Brunsma 2002). Kristen Renn (2004) also noted similar patterns in mixed race identities among college students, and found slight differences between students who adopt monoracial, “border,” “protean,” and “transcendent” identities by factors such as gender, whether the individual had two parents of color or one and despite racial demographics of their current community.

As the United States Census and many other government-administered surveys now allow respondents to check more than one box for their racial identity, new data and opportunities for research are enabling even more questions relating to multiracial identity to be asked. In looking towards the future of mixed race and the multiracial movement, Daniel (1992) argues for “the next logical step in the progression of civil rights, the expansion of our notion of affirmative action to include strategies not only for achieving socioeconomic equity, but also for affirming a nonhierarchical identity that embraces a ‘holocentric’ racial self” (p. 333). In addition, Gino Pellegrini (2005) focuses specifically on the growing multiracial movement in the
post-Civil Rights era and the push for the right to assert a multiracial, multifaceted identity. This work looks at the role of colleges and multiracial campus groups in fostering the movement, and how these college campus movements helped propel and fuel the larger national one. Angela Kellogg (2006) also found that most of her mixed race respondents sought to establish a multiracial, multifaceted identity and sought to assert that they were “double not half” to claim their multiple heritages. These scholarly works represent a move away from the tacit acceptance of the “one-drop rule” and monoracial identity. In fact, these works align more closely with the findings from my research, pointing towards a collective move away from monoracial identification.

METHODS AND SETTING

The methodology for this research consisted of in-depth qualitative interviews with seven multiracial black high school students and a survey of 129 of their peers. In designing the study, I wanted to be able to focus on a single campus to see how attitudes about race in this singular, specific community affected students’ racial self-identification. My research was conducted in the early months of 2008 at Oakview High,2 a school in a Northern California suburb, which, according to the school’s 2005-2006 accountability report card, was populated by 1,545 ninth to twelfth graders. The school’s “socioeconomically disadvantaged” population represented 46.5 percent of total enrollment, and another 18 percent of students were described as English language learners. In terms of ethnic categories, the school reported the following statistics: White (non-Hispanic), 45 percent; Hispanic or Latino, 20.1 percent; Asian, 6.3 percent; African American, 18.4 percent, Multiple or No Response, 6.3 percent; and Other, 3.9 percent. These responses include 1.5 percent or less for American Indian or Alaska Native, Filipino, and Pacific Islander.3 Aside from the category of “Multiple or No Response,” no further details on mixed race students could be found. In addition, the consolidation of “Multiple and No Response” is potentially misleading since there are a variety of reasons why there may be “No Response” on the ethnic category for a student—that is, a “Multiple or No Response” may be completely unrelated to whether students refuse to respond based on their belonging in multiple racial or ethnic categories (such as those multiracials who embrace Rockquemore and Brunsma’s (2002) “transcendent identity”). In fact, there is no way to distinguish whether the combination of these two response types overinflates the multiracial population of students on campus or whether that number is minimally impacted by a small number of non-responses being included in that category.

The racial demographics of Oakview High School provided an ideal context for undertaking this research, largely because of the racially diverse setting and sizable representation of a variety of racial groups on campus. While the school accountability report card shows a 45 percent white-identified student population, the report does not reflect the proportion of those students who are first or second generation of Russian or Ukrainian descent. Nevertheless, the further differentiated ethnic breakdown of the white category contributed to a campus environment that did not seem to be dominated by any one racial group. For investigating the ways in which black multiracial students receive messages about their racial identity from their peers, having a diverse student body was valuable in that I did not merely get a picture of how, for example, monoracial black students interacted with and impacted the racial identity of their black multiracial counterparts, but also how other non-black racial groups interacted with students of mixed black racial backgrounds.

The specific racial environment at Oakview High was deliberately chosen and represents a highly specific educational institution setting. As such, I do not purport to extend the findings of this study as generalizable to other social settings. Rather, I hope that the unique dynamics of the high school where I situated my research and the detailed attention I paid to the racial messages received by black multiracial students at this school will expose the mechanisms by which interactions with peers, teachers, administrators, and others in the community may (or may not) impact the ways students construct their racial self-identification. By exposing these mechanisms, it is possible that they will work in similar ways across other settings such as a predominately white high school. Therefore, this case study is merely an opening of a conversation, one that will hopefully, in time, demonstrate the multiple ways in which messages about racial boundaries and belonging are sent to multiracial black adolescents and the extent to which the “one-drop rule” continues to (or ceases to) shape the racial perception of those with one black parent and one parent of a different race.

To get an overall picture of how the campus setting was perceived by

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2 The names of the high school, interviewees, and cities or suburbs have been changed to preserve anonymity. Some of the pseudonyms used were suggestions from the interviewees.

3 Although the report shows a majority of students on campus were White, both students and teachers acknowledged that the proportion of minorities on campus has gone up since the 2005-2006 school year. However I was not able to obtain exact demographics for the current school year.
In short, I was able to relate to my interviewees and sensed that they felt interview subjects almost certainly invoked a sense of shared life experiences. As a female undergraduate student not terribly older than the students I interviewed, also from a black multiracial background, my similarities to the students from all grades and racial backgrounds during their history course. The survey asked for students’ racial backgrounds, opinions of groups on campus (whether they tended to be monoracial or mixed), whether they or their fellow classmates had been treated differently by others due to their race (and whether differential treatment was received from other students, teachers, administrators, people in the community, or friends and family), and any specific incidents that described differential treatment they had either experienced or witnessed on account of one’s race. The survey was only intended to briefly reference how students of all racial backgrounds interpreted the racial situation on campus and to get an overview of how their experiences as racialized bodies may or may not have differed. As a general and simple measure for assessing the school’s racial mood, the survey was a valuable tool in getting a portrait of how experiences related to race were seen by all students.

In addition to the survey, I also conducted in-depth interviews with seven multiracial black students from Oakview High. Interviewees were recruited either from contact information voluntarily given at the time of the school-wide survey or from referrals (snowball sampling) through other interviewees. I interviewed five juniors and two seniors. Two of the seven interviewees were male. All respondents had one black or mixed black parent (no interviewee had two mixed black parents), and all mothers were non-black with the exception of one. Interviews were conducted mostly on campus, although some took place in the respondents’ homes, and lasted from thirty minutes to a little over an hour. Questions were geared towards understanding students’ perspectives and experiences relating to their racial identity from early childhood to the present.

The interview sample disproportionately favored female and part-white students from a family in which the father was the black parent. While the administration of the survey was largely impersonal, conducting in-depth interviews with students about their experiences with race (which at time could be sensitive or painful in their recollection), was a process in which my own positionality and relation to the subject could not be removed. As a female undergraduate student not terribly older than the students I interviewed, also from a black multiracial background, my similarities to the interview subjects almost certainly invoked a sense of shared life experiences. In short, I was able to relate to my interviewees and sensed that they felt

4 Please see the Index of Interviewees on page 27.

SUMMARY OF SURVEY RESULTS

The surveys were meant to determine if students thought that their high school maintained cliques with a monoracial character. For those of mixed race descent, a large degree of monoracial solidarity across campus cliques created either the odd outsider/marginal status to all groups or conformity to a single monoracial group. When students reflected upon the groups or cliques on campus, 62.4 percent of students said that they themselves hung out with friends from all sorts of different racial backgrounds, while 57.1 percent responded that their peers mostly hung out in monoracial groups. These results expose an interesting disconnect between how students interpreted their own behavior as compared with their perceptions of fellow classmates.

The survey also sought to capture perceptions of differential treatment on the basis of race. The survey specifically asked students if fellow students, teachers, school administrators, family, friends, and/or others in the community ever treated them differently because of their race. For each section, the majority of students reported that they had not felt they were treated differently because of their race. However, the two highest categories with “yes” responses were “by fellow students” at 41.7 percent and “by others in the community” at 39.4 percent. Interestingly, when a similar question was posed about the respondent’s perception of whether their classmates had ever been treated differently because of their race, more than half of students—54.7 percent—responded “yes”. Therefore, the “by fellow students” category consistently received the most “yes” responses on the question regarding differential treatment by race. Peers tended to be the ones reinforcing racial norms and behaviors, as the open-ended response sections on the surveys showed. Appendix A includes tables enumerating the complete breakdown by percentage of “yes” and “no” responses by category for both questions about the respondent’s experience and his or her perceptions regarding the experience for others on campus.

The open-ended questions often revealed painful realities for students.
Many students shared a feeling of differential treatment from their peers. These feelings ranged from non-acceptance to struggling to prove belonging to one’s own racial group to outright exclusion based on racial difference. Several responses were common among survey respondents. For example, many students perceived stricter enforcement of the no-red-or-blue clothing policy (meant to deter assumed gang associations on campus) for black and Mexican students than for Asian and white students. In addition, students often reported hearing racial jokes on campus from fellow students and occasionally also from teachers. Furthermore, a sizable number had even experienced racial joking personally. One student wrote: “Some students make jokes and say ‘it’s because you’re black.’ But they laugh and act as if they were playing but it really hurts.” In fact, students commonly reported stereotypes, racial jokes, and sometimes even racial slurs, and a few students actually described very blatant experiences with racism. The range of students and their experiences showed that highly racially charged behaviors were certainly not limited to any one race and that there had certainly been incidents at the school and the community more generally that were predicated on race.

Focusing on the African American respondents, a notable portion reported feeling a set of expectations regarding how they were supposed to act based on their racial identity. These students felt excluded or different than the other black students due to the way they talked, their interests, and/or their mannerisms. One girl commented: “My friends think that I should be more ‘ethnic’ because I’m black.” Family members also enforced these behavioral expectations. For example, another student reported: “My family makes me feel like I should act a certain way because I’m black. It’s almost like they’re ashamed I pronounce my ‘er’s.'” These social expectations were also repeated in the interviews with mixed black students, demonstrating that they were a central part of campus life relating to the enforcement of racial boundaries.

There were also a considerable number of mixed-race survey respondents. Several of these mixed-race students reported no instances of differential treatment on campus and did not interpret racial discrimination or differential treatment for their classmates either. Among the “yes” and detailed responses, the answers of mixed black students mirrored those of their monoracial black counterparts in that they reported certain behavioral expectations associated with being black or part black. Their responses also pointed out that people similarly make assumptions about the other, non-black side of their heritage. This meant that they could have dual, competing expectations of their behavior based on any one of their multiple racial backgrounds. For example, one mixed white and black male explained that “people think because I’m half white I’m some preppy character.” Another student, a multiracial black female, wrote that when she spoke a certain way or exhibited a specific set of preferences her aunt would remark “Oh, that’s what white people do” or “That’s the white in you.” Aside from these expectations stemming from students’ whiteness, they also described negative expectations and assumptions placed on black people by society’s common black stereotypes. For example, one mixed black and white female wrote: “People look at me funny in stores assuming I’m gonna steal because I look black.” Mixed black survey respondents were vulnerable to differential treatment based both on the fact that they were racially mixed and on the fact that they were part black. While the surveys were significant in getting a rough portrait of the racial environment of the campus, the in-depth interviews were necessary to understand the complicated, contradictory, and often confusing experience of being a mixed black student at Oakview High School.

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW RESULTS

The opportunity to speak at length with seven of the mixed black students at Oakview High enabled me to examine their experiences in detail. With each interview, I attempted to cover a wide range of topics and themes: their histories (including how they have racially identified in the past); their views on being multiracial; how it has impacted their interactions with the black community; the ways in which they feel certain expectations of behavior based on their race; how they contend with stereotypes about any of the racial groups included in their heritage; and their ability to make connections with other mixed-race individuals.

Racial Identification

Since my central question was to understand how students racially identified and what impact that self-identification had in their lives, one of my first tasks was to determine how students had thought of their racial identity in the past, if it was fluid depending on their surroundings; and, if it had changed at all over time, why it had changed and how they arrived at their current racial self-identification. Nearly all interviewees reported that they had always identified as mixed race from as early as they could remember. Students often described memories of having to check boxes indicating their race, and most claimed to have either always checked multiple boxes or to have always selected the “Other” box and then written in their
mixed racial background. These students were assertive in accounting for their mixed heritage, and they were willing to exert the extra effort necessary to write in all of their races under “Other” if the form did not allow multiple boxes. Jalyn, an effervescent senior with a black, Native American father of Cape Verdean descent and a white mother of Irish and French background, explained that she checks “Other” because “I feel it’s kinda unfair if I just check black or I just check white.” Another student, Derek, a gangly, tall, 16-year-old junior with a tightly curled miniature afro from a black-white biracial family, reported that he simply had never felt personally pressured to choose one side and always responded as mixed. Another interviewee, Ryan, rebelled against the race question on the form entirely if it did not allow for the checking of multiple boxes. Ryan a muscular, 17-year-old junior on the football team with a Vietnamese and French father and black mother, skips the question entirely: “Because to me the question is saying choose what race you are. I don’t just choose one, I don’t just answer to one thing. I’m both, or I’m all three .... I see it as you making a choice, like are you this or are you that. If I’m both I’m not going to answer your question.” While his firm stance is closest to the “transcendent identity” that Rockquemore and Brunsma (2002) describe, most students ascribed to the “border identity.” That is, most students tried to incorporate their multiple heritages into a hybrid and recognized themselves as “both” or “all” rather than one race.

Only two students, Isabella and Olivia, said they had changed the way they answered the question about racial identification on these forms. For Isabella, the way she answered forms depended on her mood. She said: “I usually mark Black/African American and Caucasian, but a lot of times I find myself just putting black, because that’s what I feel like I’m considered from a lot of people. Sometimes I’m just like whatever; I’m just considered black, and then sometimes I’m just specific about it.” Isabella, a well-dressed black-white biracial junior who recently transferred to Oakview, grew up in and had previously attended schools in predominantly white neighborhoods. For Olivia—a light-skinned, tall, athletic junior with a Filipino, white mother who was born in Hong Kong and a black father who was born in Texas—changing her racial identification on forms was more related to specific periods in her life or certain incidents that affected the way she thought about her racial identity. In elementary school Olivia reported that she only checked the “Pacific Islander” box. She could not recall why at that young age she identified primarily with her Filipino heritage, yet she remembered clearly when she started changing this behavior and only checked the “Black/African-American” box instead. In elaborating on why she changed the way she racially identified herself she said:

Well it’s because I remember this incident where my best friend and I were arguing over something, and he was like, “You’re not even black!” And I was like, “I am black what are you talking about! How can you tell me I’m not black?” And then that made me mad so I guess I kinda let people know I was black, since they could tell I’m mixed. Also, it was because then I realized I was mostly black. So that incident made me start changing.

By “mostly black,” Olivia meant that according to a strict logic of proportioning her “blood,” she was 50 percent black, 25 percent Filipino, and 25 percent white. Hence, she considered herself “mostly” black. Olivia’s history reflects the possibilities of a highly fluid racial identity among multiracial youth. Finally, the variety of experiences among the seven mixed black students I interviewed is consistent with Harris and Sim’s (2002) finding “that with respect to racial self-identification there is not a single multiracial experience” (p. 618).

Taking Pride in Mixed Racial Background

Nearly all students did, however, express a fairly firm degree of pride in their multiracial backgrounds, and considered their background, in many ways, an asset. In particular, Jalyn expressed how much she enjoyed receiving inquiries about her racial background because then she was able to “show off the whole thing.” In fact, she joked that she loved being multiracial because it allowed her to “say anything about any different race.” Other students also used words like “proud,” “diverse,” and “interesting” when explaining what they liked about their multiracial background. While a palpable willingness to assert a mixed identity showed a degree of comfort and assurance, racial pride did not completely insulate these students from having some painful experiences with race and doubts regarding racial belonging.

Most notably, Isabella reported not seeing any advantages to being mixed race, and thought that it would perhaps be easier to embrace a monoracial black identity even despite negative black stereotypes. She reported numerous struggles with her identity and described coming home from junior high everyday in tears because other students did not understand her mixed-race identity. In addition, Isabella was raised by her white aunt and uncle in a predominately white neighborhood, where people disapproved of interracial couples; she felt that this made people not only look down on her
Parents, but also on her, the child of an interracial couple. Isabella, however, was not alone in her identity struggles as the discussion below illustrates.

**“Acting White” and the Performance of Race**

Nearly every interviewee made repeated references to the idea of “acting white” or the expectation that individuals act a certain way depending on their race. In fact, appropriate racial performance was among the most common themes that emerged in this study. Most students reported being told that they “acted white” and that people’s expectations of how they would behave or talk were different. Getting to the core of what exactly “acting white” meant was complicated, as the interviewees had difficulties articulating what such a blanket, overarching term was intended to explicate. Descriptions ranged from acting “preppy,” speaking “proper,” being “not ghetto,” listening to certain types of music, etc. “Acting black” seemed to express the opposite of “acting white.” “Acting black” referred to speaking in slang, listening to rap or hip-hop, and acting (what was loosely referred to as) “ghetto.” While “acting white” was sometimes used as a sort of insult, at the very least it was meant to convey that a person was acting outside of their expected behavior or mannerisms. Students of all races used the term to reinforce not only racial boundaries and expectations, but also to powerfully contribute to the social construction of race as a salient social category. Through “acting white” or “acting black,” students could decide who was black, who was white, and who somehow violated the social boundary between the two.

Some students intensely internalized the message of “acting white” and “acting black,” and even altered their behavior or their dress based on these expectations. Shonda, a fairly reserved senior captain of the softball team, had spent her freshman year at a predominantly white high school. She shared that her experiences at this high school impacted her behavior and dress. In one example, she explained that she bought clothes from the popular “preppy” retail store, American Eagle, not because she would “normally” wear those clothes, but because she went to a predominantly white high school and adopted the style of dress to blend in there. In addition to subtly adopting the tastes/dress of their surroundings, interviewees also received direct messages or “corrections” regarding race-specific behavior. Students were explicitly told that they did not “act their heritage” or that they “acted white.” As such, students struggled with both resisting and taking part in these stereotypes. For instance, Jalyn expressed her conflicting tensions. Despite asserting that “I don’t think there’s a certain way a certain race acts,” she admitted to, at times, calling her sister a white girl since “if you act preppy, then I’d say you’re acting like a white girl.” While resisting and trying to question stereotypes, Jalyn still actively perpetuated race-based behavioral assumptions. Although it was common for interviewees to question and admit confusion over behaviors that fell under that umbrella of “acting white,” they nevertheless expressed a fear of having the “acting white” stereotype lodged at them. Much of this was due to their desire to claim their black racial heritage, which they did not have full access to if they “acted white.”

**Acceptance, Belonging, and Relationship to the Black Community**

Some of the mixed black students I interviewed were firmly rooted in and comfortable with their black heritage, while others struggled to understand their relationship to a monoracial black community. Many students shared experiences of constantly having to explain their different phenotypical features, fending off expectations of their behavior and with whom they should associate. Students also felt a strong need to prove their belonging or membership when interacting with the black community. While the formula of the “one-drop rule” would indicate that a person who is part black is automatically black, most students’ experiences showed that they felt there was much more to being black than just having the ancestry “in your blood.”

Faith, a quiet, friendly, fair-skinned junior of black, Cherokee, Irish and French heritage, concisely captured the importance of acting according to black behavioral expectations in achieving acceptance. She offered: “I think a big part of being black is that you have to show you are black.” At times, interviewees made conscious efforts to conform to black stereotypes and “talk ghetto,” but often faced repudiations from their black monoracial peers, encountering comments such as “you don’t sound right talking like that” or “you’re such a white girl/boy.” Interviewees with lighter skin recounted that they had to work especially hard to assert their black heritage because their appearance would not always immediately convey their part-black identity. Ryan described his frustration at people’s disbelief upon learning of his black heritage. He elucidated:

Sometimes it got really irritating because people would swear that I’m not black. They’ll say like, “No, forget that, you’re not black” or “No, you’re lying, you’re just saying that.” It’s like, no, I don’t have to prove myself to you. I
Due to his appearance, Ryan was left with the burden of proof. For him, the “one-drop rule” was actually difficult to implement because his phenotypical appearance belied that he had any black heritage at all. Isabella’s identification as black (which she sometimes asserted because she felt that society just saw her as black), however, was also challenged. A student at Oakview High actually told her she wasn’t black since “If you’re fifty percent black and fifty percent white, how can you go around and say that you’re only one?” For Isabella, who struggled with trying to assert her blackness, the rejection of her monoracial black identity by her peers was also seen as a devastating rejection of her blackness. When living in a predominately white neighborhood, her part-black heritage stood out and marked her difference from others in the community, making it more possible within that context for her racial identity to be seen as black. However, in a context in which there was a sizable population of monoracial blacks, her multiraciality was a distinguishing characteristic among that community, and, therefore, she had a harder time accepting her identity as just black without recognizing her mixed heritage as well.

Coping With Society’s Negative Views of Blacks

Coping with and fighting against society’s widely held negative stereotypes about African Americans were also common themes that emerged from this study. For some interviewees, this meant being subject to these negative views; for others, this meant dealing with more direct, overt instances of racism.

Some interviewees were acutely aware of how negatively blacks were viewed in society, partially because their light skin or straight hair made them not immediately recognizable as part-black. Ryan’s previous experience at a predominately white school made him especially aware of his elevated status as a mixed black rather than a monoracial black. For instance, some of Ryan’s white classmates told him, by his recollection: “You’re different; you’re cool, because you’re not just black.” Due to these experiences, Ryan specifically sought to make himself identifiable as black. He purposefully bought the clothes that epitomized the black youth stereotype, and noticed how people responded to him differently depending on what he wore. He explained:

I don’t really look black, it was just what I was wearing that kinda classified me as black. I notice that if I walk into a restaurant wearin’ this shirt [a relatively snug, well fitting t-shirt], no one turns around and looks. But if I walk into a restaurant wearin’ a 3XL tall tee and a fitted cap, everyone looks. Everyone kinda just makes sure they know where their purse is or where their kids are.

Due to the fact that a simple change in dress resulted in a noticeable change in the way he was perceived, Ryan described how he would deliberately and “excessively act black just to piss people off,” trying to prove a point to others about discrimination. His experience at a predominately white school distinctly exposed him to the fluidity of his racial identity. He realized that, in some contexts, he carried the burden of negative societal views of blacks, while, in other contexts, he was subject to a somewhat privileged status as a racially mixed person.

Interviewees also discussed feeling representative of the black race and the black image in certain situations. Especially in situations where there were not many other people of color, students repeatedly reported the sense that they were the black person in the group. Olivia shared a story about trying to project a positive image of blacks to the white parents of one of her friends. She explained:

I was like 11 or 12, and I was self conscious of being black, and I wanted to change the image. I mean, I didn’t really know what stereotype was back then, but I was like, OK, I’m guessing she doesn’t have many black friends for a reason, and if they know that I’m black, and I act proper then maybe she’ll gain more black friends and her parents won’t be like, telling her, “I don’t really want you to hang out with people like them [blacks].”

Interviewees demonstrated that pervasive negative societal views of blacks also influenced their own thoughts about blacks and perpetuating stereotypes that they themselves began to buy into. This internalized negative view of blacks was especially strong in Jalyn’s case, given her father’s absence and that her mother’s rocky relationship with him made for occasional racial stereotyping within Jalyn’s own household. Her mother specifically made generalizations about black men leaving their children, using drugs, and abusing women. For Jalyn, these comments affected how she viewed race,
mixed-race students may not have known each other personally, they likely knew of each other. As such, even though there were no mixed race clubs on campus, there were enough groups of mixed-race friends or “mixed faces” around campus to have a recognized presence on campus.

While most interviewees admitted to both being accused of and also enforcing the “acting white” stereotype, among their multiracial peers, they understood that their social circle was a safe space where racial behavioral expectations were not as rigorously enforced (although enforcement was assuredly not non-existent). Among others who were also racially mixed, they felt less pressure to prove their blackness by adopting black stereotypes. In addition to the comfort of being around other mixed students, interviewees who had experienced predominantly white schools seemed to be more comfortable at Oakview High—not only due to the presence of other multiracial students, but due to the presence of other students of color. For most interviewees, the school’s racial diversity contributed to their relative feeling of comfort and stable mixed race identity.

Finally, students also seemed to be able to create a safe space around their mixed racial identity by blocking out or ignoring people who tried to challenge their multiraciality. Of course, some students were emotionally sensitive to teasing or challenges to their multiracial identity, but a few students firmly asserted who they were. As Faith explained:

I’m sure there are a lot of things that I have been treated differently because of my racial background, but I tend to block those kinds of things out and they don’t faze me as much. I don’t really base myself off those kind of things, I mean, if you’re gonna be mean I’m gonna ignore you. I’m sure there are people who have not liked me because of who I am. My heritage is a part of who I am …. So if you don’t like it then I’m sorry you feel that way. I can’t change myself to make you happy and I wouldn’t anyway.

Even without this attitude, interviewees created a safe mixed-race space at Oakview High, which allowed them to assert mixed identity and embrace multiple heritages. While the large scale organizing of a national movement to contest the way racial data was collected on the United States Census vocally and visibly asserted a multiracial identity, such confrontational stances were not necessary on the Oakview High School campus (Rockquemore and Brunsma 2002). Rather than being constrained by the “one-drop rule,” interviewees were often expected to identify multiracially.
CONCLUSION

In this study, students’ experiences with their mixed racial background ranged from a reported absence of negative racial experiences at school or in the community to painful struggles with racial identity ending daily in tears. The original intent of this project was to document the changing racial self-identification of multiracial black students and try to locate the incidents or factors that contributed to these changes. However, only one student exhibited a changing racial identity over time and most of the others reported that they had always claimed all of their racial heritages. While many scholars indicate that mixed race individuals will sometimes look to a monoracial identity to solve their identity crisis, most interviewees reported not ever seriously considering it (Hershel 1995; Renn 2004). Students I interviewed seemed to be proud of their multiracial background and embraced it even when it was not convenient to do so. Despite their reported stable, unchanging mixed-race self-identification, interviewees still faced many difficulties associated with race. Students were certainly subject to racism and discrimination from peers, community members, and even family directed at blacks and/or other races. Until racial categories are entirely dissolved, people of mixed-racial descent will continue to wrestle with the untenable position of being both a person within and separate from a given racial community. Even if “mixed” or “multiracial” was established as a legitimate racial category, one cannot be mixed or multiracial without having simultaneous membership in two or more racial categories, and this position, then, is always both insider and outsider to a given race.

While the racial data for the school is slightly dated (from the 2005-2006 school year) and does not make the number of mixed student on campus clear, the school’s noticeably present mixed-race population provided a context in which all interviewees asserted a mixed-race identity. The presence of other students walking around campus and being recognized as mixed, reporting their identity as mixed, or being seen with two parents of a different race made a multiracial identity not all that shocking, notable, or uncommon. This finding suggests a positive correlation between the number and visibility of a mixed-race population and the normalization of the identity. As the population and visibility of mixed-race people continues to grow, it provides at least one mechanism for the normalization of the mixed race identity.

Although there are a number of limitations to this study and even though this research is specific to one campus, my findings certainly align with a growing literature documenting the increasing irrelevance of the “one-drop rule” in determining how people of mixed-racial descent identify (Daniel 2002; Rockquemore and Brunsma 2002; Renn 2004; Kellogg 2006). In addition, my research points to the importance of the specific social context of the high school in which identities are being asserted—namely, the school’s racial demographics. Future research would benefit from an analysis of how other demographic arrangements may impact the way mixed black adolescents racially identify. For example, how might their experience with racial identity differ if they attend a predominately white or black high school, especially if there is a small multiracial population? Does region also impact this experience? Additionally, since my sample largely consisted of black-white biracial students, how might findings differ among black multiracials who have two parents of color? Finally, future work on racial boundary maintenance and racial authenticity would benefit from further attention to the aspects of the performance of race and racial behavioral expectations that my interviewees struggled to articulate. Black multiracials, especially adolescents such as the black-white biracials included in my study, have a unique positionality in relation to this question because at the same time they are reinforcing “correct” modes of behavior in their peers or siblings (i.e., reprimanding each other for “acting white”), they are also actively recognizing the white part of their racial identity by identifying as racially mixed. It is important that scholarly research addresses the ways in which it is possible for students to experience the simultaneous pull to enforce racial boundaries as well as asserting a racial identity that exists “betwixt and between” those boundaries (Daniel 2002:113).

Lastly, to expand the suggestive findings of my case study, future scholarship would benefit from adjusting the way racial data is collected for large scale studies, whether connected to questions of multiraciality or not. Just as the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health enabled researchers Harris and Sim (2002) to take one of the first looks at the contextuality of adolescent multiracial identity on a nation-wide scale, it is important that research on any topic take into account the ways in which race is a dynamic social category. As such, classifications of race should reflect the contemporary arrangements that allow people to identify in ways that resonate with their self-identification rather than from a restricted list of options. In addition, the reporting of these statistics needs improvement. Although the collection of racial data for the students at Oakview High School allowed for the option of checking more than one box, the responses of students checking more than one box were conflated with those who had no response to the racial question, a highly misleading and confusing way to take stock of the multiracial population. The collection of data based on constantly changing, imperfect, and socially constructed categories such...
as race will always lend itself to inaccuracies; however, scholars should be careful not to perpetuate racial classifications that complicate results and blanch out racial complexity and difference.

**TABLES: SURVEY RESULTS**

**Table 1.** Percentage of “Yes” and “No” Respondents for Question on “If Student Ever Experienced Differential Treatment Due to His or Her Race.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By fellow students/classmates</td>
<td>41.1%</td>
<td>58.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By teachers</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>83.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By administrators</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
<td>73.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By others in the community</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
<td>60.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By family members/friends</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>84.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2.** Percentage of “Yes” and “No” Respondents for Question on Student’s Perceptions on “If Their Peers/Classmates Had Ever Experienced Differential Treatment Due to Their Race.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By fellow students/classmates</td>
<td>54.7%</td>
<td>45.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By teachers</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
<td>69.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By administrators</td>
<td>30.9%</td>
<td>69.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By others in the community</td>
<td>41.9%</td>
<td>58.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By family members/friends</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
<td>78.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**The Disappearance of Black San Franciscans: 1970-2010**

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**Abstract**

Of all “major” cities in the United States, San Francisco experienced the most precipitous decline of its African American population between 1970 and 2005. Many African Americans from this study felt systematically excluded from San Francisco. Interviewees separately and repeatedly identified calculating and criminalizing instigators of displacement: the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency’s urban renewal projects in the Western Addition; the San Francisco Housing Authority’s demolition of public housing and enforcement of a “One Strike and You’re Out” law for public housing residents; the San Francisco Police Department’s enforcement of gang injunctions in the Western Addition and Bayview Hunters Point; and real estate agencies’ and banks’ issuance of subprime mortgage loans. Apart from formal instigators of displacement, several other factors fueled the disappearance of black San Franciscans: the exorbitant expense to rent or own housing in San Francisco; the level of violent crime and environmental health hazards that pervade the few neighborhoods African Americans find accessible in the housing market; the underinvestment in public education, which undermines the city’s appeal for raising children; and the absence of middle class African American visibility.

**Keywords**

race, urban renewal, San Francisco, displacement, public housing

**INTRODUCTION**

Of all “major” cities in the United States, San Francisco experienced the most precipitous decline of its African American population between 1970 and 2005. During this period, approximately 88,000 African Americans,

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comprising 13.4 percent of the city’s population, dwindled to approximately 6.5 percent, measuring 46,779 individuals (Farrell 2009; The San Francisco Mayor’s Task Force on African-American Out-Migration 2009:8). Should this trend continue unabated, black San Franciscans will comprise 4.6 percent of the city’s population by 2050, according to the California Department of Finance’s calculations (The San Francisco Mayor’s Task Force on African-American Out-Migration 2009:8-9). This research investigates the factors that have influenced the retention and exodus of African Americans from San Francisco between 1970-2010, comparing demographic transitions in the Western Addition and Bayview Hunters Point neighborhoods.

Testimony from interviewees appeared to corroborate San Francisco State University Professors Antwi Akom’s and Shawn Ginwright’s identification of older age and residential longevity as characteristics of African Americans remaining in the city. However, statistical findings in the San Francisco Mayor’s Task Force report contradict Akom and Ginwright’s dismissal of income as a major determinant factor of remaining in or emigrating from the city. Between 2000 and 2009, the black middle class and upper-middle class populations dwindled by 33 percent and 63 percent, respectively. Furthermore, African Americans living in devastating poverty increased from 55 to 68 percent between 1990 and 2005 (The San Francisco Mayor’s Task Force on African-American Out-Migration 2009:9).

Many African Americans I interviewed feel systematically excluded and targeted for expulsion from San Francisco. Furthermore, interviewees separately and repeatedly identified calculating and criminalizing instigators of displacement: the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency’s urban renewal projects in the Western Addition; the San Francisco Housing Authority’s demolition of public housing and enforcement of a “One Strike and You’re Out” law for public housing residents; the San Francisco Police Department’s enforcement of gang injunctions in the Western Addition and Bayview Hunters Point; and real estate agencies’ and banks’ issuance of subprime mortgage loans. Apart from formal instigators of displacement, several other factors fuel the disappearance of black San Franciscans: the exorbitant expense to rent or own housing in San Francisco; the level of violent crime and environmental health hazards that pervade the few neighborhoods African Americans find accessible in the housing market; the underinvestment in public education, which undermines the city’s appeal for raising children; and the absence of a visible African American middle class.

Additionally, the arrival of crack cocaine in San Francisco created an explosion of robberies and homicides beginning in the 1980s. Subsequently, a fatal combination of Western Addition public housing demolitions, condominium development, and the displacement of Western Addition public housing residents to Bayview Hunters Point public housing instigated violent turf battles between people competing to dominate the volatile drug market. As bullets stopped the heartbeats of those involved in the drug trade as well as uninvolved public housing residents, many of those who accumulated enough money relocated from San Francisco in acts of self-preservation.

The prohibitive cost of living in San Francisco also exacerbated the decline of the population of black San Franciscans. The city’s high cost of living in the city is traceable to the 1990s dot-com boom, which spurred massive rent increases as highly educated Internet industry employees infiltrated San Francisco to purchase newly constructed condominiums. From 1990 to 2005, the percentage of African American households declined by 28.7 percent (The San Francisco Mayor’s Task Force on African-American Out-Migration 2009:9). Besides San Francisco, East Palo Alto, Oakland, and Berkeley are Bay Area regions that have experienced the greatest loss in their African American populations. Many black San Francisco emigrants choose California suburbs such as Pittsburgh, Antioch, Stockton, Vallejo, Fairfield, and Suisun for resettlement (Akom and Ginwright 2007:4). In the aforementioned more spacious, often physically safer localities, the lower land value renders homeownership more financially feasible. Chief factors influencing many African Americans to reside in the city are psychological attachment and—for those living in public housing and paying low rent—economic necessity.

LITERATURE REVIEW

I have classified the literature reviewed for this research into five categories: government-commissioned policy briefs concerning out-migration and African American plight; urban renewal literature; San Francisco Redevelopment Agency urban renewal project plans; documents describing the evolution of an inaccessible housing market in San Francisco; and documents tracking black suburbanization.

Out-migration. Akom and Ginwright emphasize that black out-migration is not confined to San Francisco. Rather, the report highlights the increase of black suburbanites on a national scale, identifying New York and Illinois metropolitan areas’ precipitous losses of their black populations “between 1995 [and] 2000” and the contemporaneous expansion of black populations in Florida, North Carolina, and Georgia (Akom and Ginwright 2007:2).

Ginwright and Akom’s analysis reveals that age is a significant determinant of a black San Franciscan’s likelihood to remain in the city: those who are 45-years-old or younger “are three times more likely than older [black] residents to say they are likely to leave San Francisco” (Akom and Ginwright 2007:7). Also, residential longevity amounting to or surpassing twenty years seemingly influences residents to remain in the city (p. 7). The aforementioned findings are largely consistent with my own; however, I deviate from Ginwright and Akom’s logic in two respects. Ginwright and Akom claim that income is not a determinant factor influencing out-migration (p. 7). I argue, however, that many low-income blacks in public housing are more likely to remain in the city because of the Housing Authority’s low rent levels, while those who have accumulated enough income frequently relocate to suburban localities. In addition, Akom and Ginwright’s document overlooks evictions of urban renewal, public housing redevelopment, and gang injunction enforcement in San Francisco, which I contend are significant causes of out-migration.

Similarly, the Report of the San Francisco Mayor’s Task Force on African-American Out-Migration is rich in data but blatantly depoliticized, as references to urban renewal, public housing redevelopment, and punitive law enforcement measures instrumental in displacing African Americans from San Francisco are implicit, vague, and brief. Furthermore, the San Francisco Mayor’s Task Force on African-American Out-Migration report focuses on strategies to retain and expand the current population of African Americans in San Francisco, detailing indicators of black San Franciscans’ plight, such as rates of high school withdrawal, unemployment, entrepreneurship, homeownership, mortgage loan application rejection, and incarceration (The San Francisco Mayor’s Task Force on African-American Out-Migration 2009:5).

Second, Robert O. Self’s American Babylon: Race and Struggle for Postwar Oakland describes the impact of housing covenants on African Americans who were confined to certain pockets of urban areas when migrating from southern states to labor in the World War II defense industry. This thesis aims to substantiate Self’s argument that government entities have recognized blight—the identification of which justified urban renewal initiatives—as an issue derived from inadequacies in the economic and physical environment rather than a product of blatant “social inequality” (Self 2003:139).

Third, the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency documents, entitled The Fillmore Center: An Urban Design Study for the Western Addition Area 2; and Western Addition A-2 Redevelopment Plan: Official Redevelopment Plan for the Western Addition Approved Redevelopment Project are primary sources which offer insight into the standardized language of “blight” the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency (SFRA) employed to justify the removal of an African American enclave in San Francisco.

Fourth, Richard Walker’s “The Boom and the Bombshell: The New Economy Bubble and the San Francisco Bay Area” (2006) and “Landscape and City Life: Four Ecologies of Residence in the San Francisco Bay Area” (2004) describe the Silicon Valley electronic and Internet industries’ roles in significantly altering San Francisco’s housing and job markets, providing substantial context for the deepening decline of San Francisco’s African American population.

Fifth, Mary Pattillo-McCoy’s “The Limits of Out-Migration for the Black Middle Class” emphasizes the role of housing discrimination in both undermining low-income black residents’ economic conditions and preventing entrance of middle class African Americans into neighborhoods free of institutional neglect. Her findings are relevant from a local and regional perspective. Additionally, it was necessary to examine California’s varying appeal to African Americans throughout the previous decades. For this subject, I found William Frey’s “The New Great Migration: Black Americans’ Return to the South, 1965-2000,” illuminating. Frey (2004) examines California’s shifting role as a leading attractor of African Americans emigrants from the South to its marked reversal.

**METHODOLOGY**

This research entails a diachronic description of two San Francisco neighborhoods: the Western Addition and Bayview Hunters Point. Census data from 2000 demonstrates that Bayview Hunters Point and the Western Addition featured the largest concentration of African Americans in the city at 33.2 percent and 19.5 percent, respectively (City and County of San Francisco’s Mayor’s Office of Community Development, Mayor’s Office of Housing, San Francisco Redevelopment Agency N.d:24).

While the inequalities that exist in the Western Addition and Bayview Hunters Point can be traced to specific periods and analyzed synchronically (the former post-World War II, the latter during World War II and the deindustrialization which ensued), it was crucial to examine each region over...
a seventy year period diachronically, as World War II’s defense industry jobs attracted and confined many African Americans to the Western Addition and Bayview Hunters Point, spurring the creation of communities vibrant in artistic culture, nightlife, and African American entrepreneurship. The neighborhoods’ histories of urban renewal-era and contemporary-era displacement are intertwined, and have impacted a significant number of public housing residents in each region.

My research methodology is comprised of a text-based historical method of investigation with a predominant focus on primary sources. To humanize the statistical trends and to offer a tangible depiction of the neighborhoods under investigation, I interwove historical facts with interviews and participant observation. Employing a snowball sampling method to recruit interviewees, I conducted 18 semi-structured interviews in person and by telephone with current and former residents of San Francisco ranging in age from 21 to 77 years old. I spoke with local government employees and community activists residing in San Francisco. I interviewed ministers and parishioners of a Western Addition church who had either relocated from the city, were long-term residents of San Francisco, or had relatives who relocated and continued to frequent the same church.

In addition to speaking with residents of private housing, it was necessary to interview former residents of San Francisco who had opted to relocate from public housing property, as nearly 50 percent of public housing residents are African American (approximately 4,743), and a third of those who have been granted Section 8 vouchers are African American (San Francisco Mayor’s Office of Neighborhood Services, 2009:12). Interviewees’ vivid descriptions of SFHA living conditions serve as testimony to the environmental health hazards and physical safety risks of residing in such properties, further illuminating potential incentives to relocate from the city. To identify the amenities attracting former San Francisco residents to suburban localities, I interviewed female San Francisco natives who resettled in Suisun City, Oakland, Antioch, South San Francisco, and Pacifica, California. I asked current and former residents of San Francisco to situate themselves in an income bracket, indicate their age, profession, duration of residence in San Francisco, and reason(s) for relocating from, or remaining in San Francisco.

Research classifiable as participant observation included an internship with the San Francisco Mayor’s Office of Neighborhood Services, attendance of a Land Use and Economic Development Committee meeting in City Hall, a town hall meeting in Bayview Hunters Point, and a panel discussion about African American emigration from San Francisco.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Background</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anna*</td>
<td>30s</td>
<td>San Francisco native, mother, and former resident of public housing in Potrero Hill; relocated to South San Francisco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandon*</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Dallas, Texas native; San Francisco resident; employee of a Western Addition church and the Black Coalition on AIDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dana*</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>University student raised in the Western Addition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julian Davis</td>
<td>Undisclosed</td>
<td>Co-founder of the Osiris Coalition, an organization that promotes the social, economic, physical, and political livelihood of African Americans and other minorities in the Bay Area; President of the Booker T. Washington Community Service Center in the Western Addition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ellen*</td>
<td>60s</td>
<td>Texas native; former Bayview Hunters Point resident; current Western Addition resident; retired union employee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franklin*</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Father of three; former Western Addition resident; current Oakland resident, preacher in West Oakland, and Director of Student Services for an Alameda County school; formerly a drug counselor for young adults in the Western Addition cited for drug-related offenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steve Haller</td>
<td>Undisclosed</td>
<td>Park Historian and Branch Chief for Cultural Resources of the Golden Gate National Recreation Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harold*</td>
<td>Undisclosed</td>
<td>Homeless Western Addition church parishioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivan*</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Washington, DC native; South of Market Area resident; former journalist and legal secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katherine*</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Former Western Addition resident who moved to a house in Antioch, California with her husband and daughter</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The median income for white residents in San Francisco is approximately $70,000, measuring almost twice that of African Americans’ median income of $35,200. In fact, blacks in San Francisco suffer from the greatest joblessness rate in the city at 10.4 percent; the highest mortgage loan application rejection rate, which amounts to 1 in 3 African Americans; the highest incidence of withdrawal from freshman year of high school; and an incarceration rate twice that of "all other racial groups combined" (The San Francisco Mayor’s Task Force on African-American Out-Migration 2009:7). In addition to the lowest homeownership rate at 35 percent, in comparison to Asians (50 percent), Latinos (37 percent), and whites (52 percent), nearly 65 percent of African American San Franciscans rent housing (Akom and Ginwright N.d.:2-3). Between 1997 and 2002, the number of black-owned businesses dropped by approximately 25 percent, and those remaining witnessed a 60.7 percent loss of profits. African American poverty rates were higher than all other ethnic groups in San Francisco between 1990 and 2005 (The San Francisco Mayor’s Task Force on African-American Out-Migration 2009:10). Compounding the city’s severest joblessness rate, 28 percent of black San Franciscans subsist “below the federal poverty line” in contrast to “11.8 percent of residents Citywide” (p. 19).

African American Settlement in Specific San Francisco Neighborhoods During WWII

Among the migration streams of African Americans that have impacted the West Coast, the inception of World War II marked the most significant expansion of “industrial and military” job opportunities, fueling an exodus from northern and southern states to western cities such as San Francisco, Oakland, and Los Angeles (Akom and Ginwright 2007:2). During World War II, Naval Shipyard operator John Henry Kaiser ordered trains to recruit African Americans in the Jim Crow South for defense industry jobs on Bay Area Naval Shipyards, according to Tyler, a university student and former resident of public housing in the Western Addition. San Francisco’s African American population consequently surged by 800 percent (Salomon 1993). Tyler noted that Kaiser dictated at which neighborhoods African Americans disembarked. Real estate brokers toured African Americans around particular neighborhoods (Butler 2001), which Tyler pinpointed: Bayview Hunters Point, Visitacion Valley, and the Western Addition. Black migrants had access to both temporary housing subsidized by the government in Hunters Point and Fillmore housing that Japanese internment made vacant (Salomon 1993).

The “overcrowded” Victorian housing in the Western Addition was rapidly “subdivided” to accommodate the defense industry workforce (Haller 2010). Aside from the Victorian housing in the Western Addition, barracks-style housing was constructed for defense industry workers in
people were evicted in an expanded version of A-1. Despite promises from the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency in the Western Addition A-2 Development Plan to find replacement housing for “all persons displaced by Project Activities,” only a handful of displaced African American residents were able to return to the area due to the massive development of moderate-priced housing, and the delayed construction of affordable housing (Wiley 2000:282-291). The SFRA exited the area in January 2009 to follow “state law,” ending a forty-year presence in the neighborhood (Fulbright 2008).

The Western Addition currently features a mixture of public housing complexes, high-priced condominiums, and Victorian houses. Fillmore native residents refer to the region located a few blocks downhill, east of Fillmore Street near the intersection of Geary and Laguna Streets, as the “Fillmo,” where housing projects and more corner stores are visible.

Profile of Bayview Hunters Point

Bayview Hunters Point, located in southeast San Francisco, is home to a highly contaminated, radioactive former Naval Shipyard, which drew thousands of African Americans from southern states for manufacturing jobs during World War II. According to Dr. Mitchell Katz, Director of Health in the San Francisco Department of Public Health, Bayview Hunters Point residents suffer from the greatest rates of hospitalization in the city, “for almost every disease, including asthma, congestive heart failure, diabetes…urinary tract infections,” and, most injurious and potentially fatal, for “violence” (Katz 2006:4). Rates of colorectal, prostate, and breast cancer, in addition to asthma, adult respiratory disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), and pulmonary asbestosis are unusually elevated in Bayview Hunters Point (Epps 2003).

The 550-acre Hunter's Point Naval Shipyard closed in 1974. The Environmental Protection Agency identified the shipyard as San Francisco’s only Superfund site contaminated with volatile organic compounds, diesel, lead, asbestos, benzene, polychlorinated biphenyls, cyanide, pesticides, heavy metals, radioactive waste, solvents, gases, and petroleum byproducts in 1989 (Epps 2003; Hartman and Carnochan 2002:181). PG&E power plants emit sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide (Epps 2003). Additionally, Rhonda and Anna, former residents of southeast San Francisco, cited the presence of cement factories, sewage treatment plants, and Parcel E’s nuclear waste repository in Bayview Hunters Point.
Formal Instigators of Displacement

To comprehend the disappearance of thousands of African Americans from San Francisco since 1970, it is crucial to consider the initiatives of the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency, the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, the San Francisco Housing Authority (SFHA), and the San Francisco Police Department (SFPD), which have functioned to demonize, criminalize, and expel thousands of African Americans from the city. In addition to black out-migration, the gentrification that followed several of the initiatives detailed in this section occurred contemporaneously with the introduction of crack cocaine in San Francisco in the 1980s, a combination which led to the untimely deaths of many black residents.

Phase A-2 of Urban Renewal: Community Gardens to Condominiums

Franklin, a 39-year-old interviewee, witnessed phase A-2 of urban renewal as a young boy in the Western Addition community. He currently lives in Oakland with his wife and children, working as a preacher in West Oakland, and Director of Student Services for an Alameda County school. He was formerly a drug counselor for young adults in the Western Addition cited for drug-related offenses. Between 1977 and 1982, Franklin, spent kindergarten to fifth grade tending to three to four blocks of community gardens spanning Fillmore Street. Circa 1983 or 1984, Franklin watched the removal of the community gardens, which were replaced with the Fillmore Center in 1985, a delayed urban renewal initiative, which featured condominiums, apartments, restaurants, and new shops (KQED, Inc. 2000-2001). Spanning nine acres, the average rent for the Fillmore Center condominiums amounts to $1,600 to $1,700 per month (Butler 2001).

As more white residents began renting property in the Western Addition, beginning with the opening of the Fillmore Center condominiums in 1985 (KQED, Inc. 2000-2001) and continuing into the late 1990s, a neighborhood that was previously predominantly African American area started to become predominantly white. Franklin noted increased police vigilance in the Western Addition in 1995. The 1986 five-year mandatory sentencing laws incriminating those possessing and intending to market powder and crack cocaine were enforced, incarcerating many African Americans (Seattle Times Staff 1995). By 1994, the crack cocaine market had weakened in intensity as, “just about everyone was dead or in jail” according to Franklin. However, rampancy of cocaine-related deaths has persisted into the new millennium; in 2001, autopsies of murdered San Franciscans revealed that, “of those victims … tested for drugs, 72 [percent] … tested positive for cocaine” (Klassen 2005:25).

Redevelopment of Fillmore Public Housing Complexes

Two high-rise public housing complexes in the Fillmore were subsequently demolished after the construction of the Fillmore Center. The first, Plaza East, which residents referred to as the “Outta Control Projects” (C. Goldberg 1996), was located on Turk and Eddy Streets. The second, Yerba Buena Plaza West, which residents refer to as “Turkwood,” was redeveloped as Robert B. Pitts Plaza, situated on Turk and Scott Streets (Feins et al. 1997; Scott 1995). Developer McCormack Baron Salazar received a 1993 grant to redevelop the 276 units, comprising 508 bedrooms in Plaza East. By the redevelopment’s completion in 2002, 193 units comprising 455 bedrooms remained (SFHA 2000-2009), as “low-rise mixed-income” (C. Goldberg 1996) townhouses had replaced the original units (SFHA 2000-2009). Similarly, Yerba Buena Plaza West contained 332 units prior to redevelopment. By 1991, the Community Design Center of Oakland and San Francisco-based ED2’s designs for “neo-Victorian” low-rise townhouses had replaced only 203 of the original units (Scott 1995).

Gentrification, Displacement, and the Arrival Of Crack Cocaine: a Deadly Combination

Franklin has heard multiple theories of crack cocaine’s origin. His perception was that the drug “came out of no where.” Powder cocaine was present in the Western Addition and in other affluent and impoverished neighborhoods prior to the 1980s. Crack cocaine, however, was a novelty, and nobody in his community had the resources to import it into the Fillmore. While crack cocaine’s presence in the Bay Area is traceable to 1974 (Webb 1996), Franklin did not witness its devastation in the Western Addition until 1984 or 1985. The drug’s presence enabled unemployed, impoverished residents to rapidly accumulate significant sums of money. The struggle to dominate the market over this highly lucrative substance, combined with the resentment toward those who were earning higher drug sale profits and were, therefore, able to purchase expensive vehicles, clothes, and jewelry, led to a sharp rise in violent crime rates, Franklin reported. Amidst crack cocaine-related turf battles, the perpetual cycle of retaliatory measures (National Drug Intelligence Center 2001) left many dead. The increase in homicides during the peak of the crack cocaine epidemic is
partially attributable to the allegiances different housing projects formed in attempts to attain material strongholds over this volatile market. According to Franklin, the Fillmore and Sunnydale public housing projects, and the Lake View and Hunters Point housing projects formed separate alliances.

When the Plaza East and Yerba Buena Plaza West buildings were demolished, Franklin reported that residents were transplanted to public housing in Hunters Point, near Candlestick Park. During the peak of the crack cocaine epidemic, former Western Addition residents who had relocated to Hunters Point five to seven years earlier engaged in turf wars with old Western Addition neighbors newly transplanted through gentrification. Vivian, a former North Beach Place public housing resident, said to “put [Western Addition residents in Hunters Point] and let them kill each other,” was “clearly a calculated plan of discrimination,” as “they’re already mortal enemies.

The “One Strike and You’re Out” Law

Lawrence, a Western Addition church minister, law student, and economics graduate student, cited his own research for a law review article about the federal “One Strike and You’re Out” law passed in 1988 (Bowman 1996), which the Oakland and San Francisco Housing authorities began to enforce in 1989. Under the law, the regulations of which President Clinton made more stringent in 1996 (Bowman 1996), the San Francisco Housing Authority evicted public housing residents who had criminal or drug offense convictions (SFHA 2006:73-74), including all cohabitants (p. 71). The SFHA reserves the right to evict residents for criminal activity without his or her “[arrest] or convict[ion] for such activity, and without satisfying the standard of proof used for a criminal conviction” (p. 74). In instances in which a person has been absolved as the perpetrator of the crime, the SFHA has nonetheless “proceeded with evictions” (American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California 1997). In further violation of the law, members of the SFHA consult “arrest records” of youth residents, despite absences of “convictions[s],” which has resulted in the eviction of all of the youths’ cohabitants from public housing (ACLU-NC 1997). Between January of 1996 and June of 1997 (a period when Clinton requested the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development to enact more austere guidelines for the “One Strike and You’re Out” policies), more than one hundred San Francisco public housing units were emptied, their residents incriminated based on “confidential police reports” (ACLU-NC 1997).

In 1990, the SFHA enacted a “ban list” (Lawrence, forthcoming), prohibiting anyone evicted on the “One Strike” Law from entering public housing premises or interacting with any residents on the premises (Hellegers 1999:325). Those who were seen interacting with people on the “One Strike” ban list would be evicted, ineligible to live in public housing in San Francisco (L. Goldberg 1996). Without qualifying for a Section 8 voucher (when the waitlist was open in San Francisco) and without access to public housing units, evicted residents could remain in San Francisco if they could pay afford its rent, Lawrence noted. A San Francisco two-bedroom apartment cost an average of $2,500 in 1999, requiring a yearly income amounting to $100,000 (Hartman and Carnochan 2002:325).

Gang Injunctions in the Western Addition and Bayview Hunters Point

Meanwhile, San Francisco City Attorney Dennis Herrera filed lawsuits against the Bayview-based Oakdale Mob in 2006 and Western Addition-based gangs Eddy Rock, Chopper City and the Knock Out Posse in 2007 (Bulwa and Lagos 2007; American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California 2008). After Herrera’s request for gang injunctions in the aforementioned localities were court-approved, “Safety Zones” were delineated, ranging a few square blocks in perimeter surrounding public housing units, wherein people Herrera listed as gang-affiliated were prohibited from “loitering,” interacting with “other gang members,” and “flashing gang signs” (ACLU-NC 2008). Within the Western Addition “Safety Zones,” Herrera identified dozens of alleged gang members who would be subject to the injunction (Bulwa and Lagos 2007). Additionally, the preliminary injunction Herrera filed imposed behavioral restrictions on “all … members and associates, and all persons acting under, in concert with, for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with [alleged gang members]” (Schlosser et al. 2007:10). This deviation from the lawful enforcement of gang injunctions, whereby police officers are solely permitted to regulate the behavior of “active gang [members],” allows law enforcement officials to exercise discretion in identifying allegedly affiliated members who were not served with court papers when Herrera filed a lawsuit against Fillmore and Bayview Hunters Point gang (p. 10).

As an employee of San Francisco’s Juvenile Probation Department, Tyler described the mechanisms by which police officers in the Western Addition enforce the gang injunction, according to his own observations and community members’ reports. Some members of the SFPD have deduced that youth pedestrians are gang members if the letters “R.I.P.” and “screen-printed” images of perished loved ones are emblazoned on their shirts, according to his observations. Subsequently, the youth and all
of those affiliated with the alleged gang are forced to move out of public housing. If the evictee returns to live in public housing, all of his or her cohabitants are at risk for eviction (SFHA 2006:71).

Tyler characterized the gang injunction as “urban renewal all over again,” a mechanism to facilitate gentrification. He surmised that Fillmore public housing residents living in “Safety Zones” are required to adhere to curfews (Buchanan 2007) to prevent interaction with patrons of the neighboring businesses. Among the most prominent new high-priced developments adjacent to Fillmore public housing is the Fillmore Heritage Center, situated in the Jazz Preservation District, a SFRA-funded $75 million edifice containing 12 levels of condominiums, a Jazz Heritage Center spanning 6,000 square feet, a soul food restaurant, and Yoshi’s San Francisco, a $10 million jazz club and Japanese restaurant. A few months after the gang injunction was upheld in court, Yoshi’s Jazz Club opened in November 2007 (Hamlin 2007). Yoshi’s Co-Founder Kaz Kajimura commented that the Fillmore possesses “… a huge untapped market … including tourists and convention people” (Hamlin 2007).

The Hope VI Public Housing Rehabilitation Program

Hope VI, the federally-funded public housing rehabilitation program, was purportedly enacted to revitalize dilapidated public housing stock in the United States through maintenance repairs; create mixed income units to more evenly distribute the concentration of low-income households; and improve the health of the housing community and surrounding neighborhood. Rhonda bemoaned the program as responsible for the displacement of many African Americans from San Francisco, as the Hope VI program supported the demolition of more dilapidated low-income housing units than were replaced, despite the Housing Authority placement waiting list enumerating thousands of families. Furthermore, a significant number of evicted public housing resident families resettled outside of San Francisco, likely due to residents’ inability to locate local housing priced at a rate substantially affordable to redeem their Section 8 housing vouchers (Hartman and Carnochan 2002:374).

The percentage of residents who returned to redeveloped properties is unimpressive, partially attributable to the SFRA’s reentry eligibility criteria, which denied reentry to those who had been convicted of violent criminal offenses within the previous 2.5 years or possessed mediocre credit histories (Keating 2000:384). While previous residents deemed ineligible to return comprised a small percentage of the original population, the .5 percent of federal urban renewal funding allocated toward locating replacement housing for those displaced through Hope VI initiatives severely narrowed their housing options. In San Francisco specifically, 43 percent of residents displaced through Hope VI relocated to undocumented addresses (p. 384).

After former President Bush allocated six million dollars nationwide for Hope VI, the City and County of San Francisco created a local version, called Hope San Francisco (Hope SF), offering “on-site relocation” to residents of soon-to-be rehabilitated units, according to Rhonda. Hope SF differs from Hope VI in its respective city versus federal funding sources. Furthermore, Hope SF aims to construct market rate housing on site of public housing developments. While the one-to-one replacement ratio (whereby every unit redeveloped will be replaced) is an integral facet of the Hope San Francisco program, Julian Davis, co-founder of the Osiris Coalition, an organization which promotes the social, economic, physical, and political livelihood of African Americans and other minorities in multiple localities in San Francisco, the Bay Area, and beyond deemed it a “policy [goal]” as opposed to a legal contract. Such guarantees of displacement prevention have been dishonored in the past; Hope VI serves as a salient example (Davis 2010).

Lack of Homeownership Opportunities in San Francisco

A couple of the principal reasons interviewees cited for relocating from San Francisco—the prohibitive cost of living and lack of opportunities to secure homeownership—are predictable consequences of the dot-com industry’s impact on housing market values. “Where can we import people to afford the new housing [in San Francisco]? The moon?” asked Paul, a community activist and former Western Addition resident who said that the city’s future demographic is “not forecasted for minorities” nor for anyone low-income.

The Housing Market’s Unwelcoming Environment

Tyler described his housing search in his native San Francisco. As a black person, he said: “You know what places [and neighborhoods] are welcoming.” Olivia, a former Western Addition and Bayview Hunters Point resident who relocated to Suisun City, noted that some Potrero and Bayview residents do not spend time outside their respective neighborhoods, although she is certain some black Bayview and Potrero residents would like to move elsewhere, but are unable to (whether housing in other neighborhoods is too expensive or prospective residents are not “welcoming”). She acknowledged
that Bayview features a concentration of public housing stock, and is likely home to many Section 8 properties, which she felt other San Francisco neighborhoods would not allow. She does not, however, “believe that everyone wants to live around each other. Something else must be going on that prevents them from moving to another part of the city.”

**Foreclosures in San Francisco and the Greater Bay Area**

Residential segregation promoted through exclusionary zoning and discrimination in the administration of mortgage loans worsens and concentrates low-income poverty, and continuously “reincorporates … black middle class neighborhoods … into the ghetto” (Patillo-McCoy 2000:237). Mayor Newsom’s Task Force on African American Out-migration’s final report emphasizes that the black middle class exodus from San Francisco reveals the plight of very low-income African Americans who have remained in the city. It is therefore important to challenge the notion William Julius Wilson detailed in *The Truly Disadvantaged* that the exodus of middle class African Americans further entrenches lower-income blacks in poverty. Rather, in impoverished neighborhoods, low-income African Americans, who are more likely to be renters, have greater interregional mobility than more affluent blacks. This class disparity in mobility is potentially attributable to the greater likelihood of the latter to be homeowners who are attempting to accumulate equity in a local housing market plagued with inadequate demand and rampant foreclosures (Massey et al. 1994:433).

The housing bubble, which “artificial[ly] inflat[ed]” property values, obscured the likelihood that the real estate cycle would regress to stagnation, rendering predatory loan recipients least capable of protecting their properties from foreclosure (Davis 2010). As developers financed the construction of higher-income units in the 1970s and 1980s (Walker 1995:55), the economic necessity fomented from increased rental rates, taxes, insurance rates, and unemployment rates in San Francisco caused people to consider relocating to cities, which previously may have seemed geographically inconvenient and unappealing, Vivian noted. Vivian suspects that “seeds were planted to make you want to live [in communities such as Stockton and Sacramento].” She receives a consistent stream of phone calls and mail from banks and real estate companies, some of which offer unsolicited estimations of the value of her house and offer to purchase it. Other mailings offer home equity loans, and market houses with no down payments or interest-only loans. In Southeast San Francisco alone, where Bayview Hunters Point is situated, approximately 1,200 households entered foreclosure between 2008 and 2009 (Osiris Coalition 2010). Even more, 2,200 homes were documented as “delinquent” on mortgage, possessing only a 5 percent “save rate”—indicating a 95 percent likelihood that the 2200 homes would foreclose (Osiris Coalition 2010). Of all sub-prime loans issued in San Francisco by the year 2000, when the City Survey was administered, 19.3 percent of the recipients were African American (Akom and Ginwright N.d.:2-3). Brandon, a San Francisco resident from Dallas, Texas, noted a striking similarity between the sudden simultaneous presence of Wells Fargo, Bank USA, and Bank of America in Dallas and later, the emergence of the three banks in Bayview Hunters Point. In both localities, after the banks appeared, people residing in neighboring houses began refinancing their homes via subprime loans, and subsequently entered foreclosures at alarming rates.

**Physical Safety and Environmental Health**

In reference to the prevalent violence, theft, and drug trades near public housing communities in San Francisco, numerous interviewees pointedly indicated that those who can afford to extricate themselves from San Francisco take advantage of those relieving opportunities, in search for greater public safety.

In the particular context of public housing, neighboring residents may pay vastly different rents dependent on their incomes, and the varying degree to which neighbors suffer from material scarcity is painfully visible, and, consequently, can instigate violent behavior. Anna, a former Potrero public housing resident, cited the desire to raise children in an environment safe enough to allow them to play outside without hyper-vigilant supervision to protect them from frequent robberies, theft, and gunfire. Anna was raised and attended school in San Francisco, and currently works in the city. To safeguard her children’s livelihood, however, she resettled in South San Francisco, where her daughter can bike outside and enjoy peace.

Many residents who escape public housing feel removal from such a toxic environment will improve their career possibilities and salvage their life chances. Apart from her nieces and nephews, Vivian is the only person in her family to have graduated from college. During her residence in public housing, one of her brothers was stabbed to death, and another brother was shot to death. In addition to the role material scarcity can play in fueling violence, family histories of neighborhood and housing project rivalry contribute to physical conflict. Black San Franciscans comprise 39 percent of violent assault-related “hospitalizations;” nearly 35 percent of police-documented domestic violence victims; 53 percent of “racially motivated hate crime victims;” and 54 percent of “homicide victims” (City and County of San Francisco, Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice 2007-2008:22).
Many public housing residents contend with the predicament of remaining in units that are physically unsafe, environmentally unsanitary, and unusually affordable, or relocating to safer, physically cramped, market rate units whose rents threaten to drain their bank accounts, noted Tyler. A West Side Court public housing resident cited the mold in her apartment, the brown water that emerges from her bathtub faucet, the paint eroding from her bathtub, and the “particles” which spit out of her kitchen sink (Osiris Coalition 2010). Although Tyler no longer resides in Western Addition public housing, the image remains that continually confronted him upon entering his kitchen at 9 or 10 o’clock at night. When flipping on the light switch, he encountered, “hundreds of cockroaches everywhere, all over the counters, the floor, and rodents running around.” Yet, his mother’s $200 monthly rent enabled her to feed Tyler and his two brothers. Thus, Tyler operated under the notion that his family “should feel happy [they] were not paying [more] for rent,” because the alternative, to “move somewhere else and be broke,” was not necessarily a viable option.

Such resignation may evolve into desperation if physical violence acutely jeopardizes residents’ lives. One day, bullets darted past Tyler in the public housing complex, “kids were ducking, and it was like the Wild, Wild West.” Unfortunately, each public housing unit’s rent increases when residents receive wage raises. Thus, accumulating enough money to move is challenging. A colleague of Tyler’s mother owned an office building with a two-bedroom apartment in San Bruno, a real estate connection Tyler deemed crucial for all prospective African American renters or buyers to be considered for tenancy or homeownership in San Francisco. Tyler’s mother had to struggle to pay the exorbitant rent and feed her three kids upon relocating.

CONCLUSION

The neighborhoods in which African Americans receive lower mortgage loan rejection rates and fewer instances of housing discrimination often pose physical safety and environmental health threats. Those who can afford to relocate to housing in suburban communities such as Antioch, Pittsburgh, Fairfield, Vallejo, Stockton, Suisun City, or urban communities such as Oakland are able to enjoy more spacious, less expensive living environments. Economic necessity traps many who remain in the city—particularly those who live in deteriorating public housing units. External cosmetic public housing renovations devoid of substantial improvement to the atrophying infrastructure have significantly exacerbated a sense of alienation for current and former black San Franciscans. Additionally, prejudicial urban renewal initiatives; the loss of manufacturing sector employment from the city; the combination of the crack cocaine epidemic and gentrification which fueled public housing turf violence; the Internet industry’s impact on the housing market; minimal visibility of, and support for middle class African American professionals; underinvestment in public education; and the SFHA and SFPD’s discriminatory treatment of many low-income black San Franciscans have effectually cultivated a bleak environment.

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Capitalist Development as White Elephant: A Case Study of Argentina’s Yacyretá Hydroelectric Dam

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Abstract
Much neo-Weberian development literature has focused on how institutional-ideological formulas can lead to development outcomes, saying little about cases in which those formulas were implemented and failed. In reaction, some post-modern theory has argued that large development schemes often fail because they are introduced into a complex social world from without. Both moving beyond these theories and using them as points of reference, this paper is a Marxist analysis of the Yacyretá hydroelectric dam, Argentina’s largest and most important attempted development project, initiated in the 1950s and still today not entirely completed. Contrary to neo-Weberian and post-modern theory, seeing development in technical terms, the paper shows how Yacyretá was a political project negotiated between classes. Instead of fomenting it, Yacyretá actually retarded Argentina’s development. The class nature of the project provoked the resistance of those it affected; the resistance changed the nature of the project, turning it into a white elephant instead of a development panacea.

Keywords
development, hydroelectric, Argentina, Paraguay, resistance, class

INTRODUCTION
Though it once seemed to be on a rapidly developing course, Argentina faltered and slowed by the latter half of the twentieth century. The reasons as to why this was the case has been one of the great mysteries for scholars of Latin America. During the 1950s, faced with uncompetitive domestic industry, electricity blackouts, a strong labor movement, and political instability, the Argentine state undertook a sweeping developmentalist project. The program was industrialization—particularly of the automobile, oil, steel, and chemical industries—through the creation of a predictable investment climate for international capital, developing mixed enterprises, and, undergirding the rest, overcoming the country’s electrical energy shortage. Argentina sought to confront its energy needs through development of the petroleum industry and exploitation of the country’s hydroelectric potential. Oil has been very important in Argentina’s history, yet northeastern Argentina lies in a region with water resources so vast that it is considered the Middle East of water (Bozzo 2009). It was no surprise, then, that during the mid-twentieth century Argentina launched a program to construct several large hydroelectric dams, the largest and most important of which, in the center of the Middle East of water, on a stretch of the Paraná River that formed the Argentina-Paraguay border, was Yacyretá.

Yacyretá was the largest development project ever undertaken by Argentina (Ribeiro 1994:23). In fact, when the dam construction was nearing completion in the early 1990s, it was claimed to be the largest civil engineering work under construction in the world (Entidad Binacional Yacyretá n.d.a). While still under construction, in 1987, one study estimated that Yacyretá would be fourteenth in the world in terms of electrical capacity of hydroelectric dams (Ribeiro 1994:25). During the same period, Yacyretá was thought capable of producing 65 percent of Argentine and Paraguayan electricity needs (Entidad Binacional Yacyretá 1991:4). Though production of electricity for Argentina was the central goal, backers of the dam claimed it would also improve navigation, irrigation, flood control, recreation, tourism, fishing, and even land transportation (Ribeiro 1994:25).

Electrification is an integral element in any development program, and, if large hydroelectric dams are the source of the electricity, a series of prerequisites must be met: ample financing, a powerful river, and a clear site for the dam and reservoir. In the case of Yacyretá, a significant amount of funding meant large loans from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank; the area where Argentina’s rivers were most promising meant a partnership with Paraguay; and a clear site meant hastily pushing aside tens of thousands of people.2

After initiation, each of these actors—international capital, the Argentine state, the Paraguayan state, and the expropriated—interacted in

1 The author would like to thank UC Berkeley Professors Mark Healey and Laura J. Enríquez for their helpful feedback and theoretical guidance, as well as the Éleno editorial board, particularly Aaron Benavidez. Please direct correspondence to: simnew@berkeley.edu. An earlier version of this essay won the 2010 University of California, Berkeley Library Prize for Undergraduate Research.

2 The World Commission on Dams estimates that each large dam displaces an average of about 16,000 people (1999:1). One conservative analyst estimated that the number of people that were to be displaced by Yacyretá as of 1997 was 80,000 (Mejía 2000:145). According to one analysis of 50 of the world’s largest dams, there are only three dams that have caused the displacement of more than 80,000 people (Scudder 2005:59-60).
hitherto unanticipated ways. Paraguay sought only rent from the project, and was, therefore, particularly reluctant to take responsibility for the displaced. Argentina committed to the project and secured international capital as backing without realizing that Yacyretá would run into steadfast human obstacles. When the popular classes’ resistance got in the way and caused problems, the state was not permitted to exit—international lenders pressured to continue and the accumulated costs spiraled upwards into the billions of dollars. Yacyretá did not deliver the developmentalist dream, but it did deliver Argentina a white elephant that demanded attention and required resources. The project did end up providing a great deal of electricity to Argentina. Yet, it was not until 1994, nearly 40 years after initiation, when the dam was finished, and, at that point, relocations to make way for the reservoir were far from complete. The reservoir was filled only part way, and the hydroelectricity plant only provided 60 percent of its promised electricity. The developmentalist expectation—based on the assumption that the project would not require tremendous expenditures and a great deal of time—was that Yacyretá would be built and, through the electricity it generated, would both amortize the construction loans it had accrued and provide the electricity the country needed for development. Yacyretá was conceived as the most important project in Argentina’s development panacea. But it did not deliver.

During the latter half of the twentieth century, both Argentina and Brazil were in the throes of their respective developmentalist eras. As Kathryn Sikkink noted, however, their respective development outcomes were very different: while Argentine developmentalism never really took off, Brazil’s was a smashing success. As a neo-Weberian, Sikkink argues that Argentina’s development failure is due to the deep ideological divisions that, in the post-Juan Domingo Perón context, prevented the Argentine ruling elite from uniting behind the national developmentalist project and creating the necessary institutions (Sikkink 1991). Elite ideological heterogeneity was clearly an important factor in Argentina’s problematic development history, as was institutional transience, but by focusing disproportionately on these technical-ideological considerations, Sikkink overlooked the concrete problems Argentina had in overcoming its energy shortage, particularly in terms of hydroelectric power.

The relationship between hydroelectric energy and economic dynamism was clear to the Argentine state when it initiated its developmentalist  

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3 Since 1994, the dam authority, Entidad Binacional Yacyretá, has allowed the level of the reservoir to rise when regional precipitation has occurred.

4 For an Argentine functionary’s perspective on the process from within, see Carrettoni (1998).
ultimately incapable of bringing the change that they were intended to. To execute any such “high modernist scheme” requires overlooking the complexity of society and nature. The high modernist scheme to improve the lives of people is a combination of the ambitious administering of nature by society, the utilization of unrestricted state power to achieve such ends, and the pursuit of such a project over the heads of a weak civil society (Scott 1998:88-89). The pursuit of an abstract plan in the face of a complex world cannot possibly bring about the utopia intended. Indeed, the results of such projects are far worse than if nothing had been attempted in the first place.

It is tempting to see Yacyretá in these terms. However, using internal documents from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (such as appraisal reports, loan agreements, and completion reports), inspection committee reports, government documents, correspondence, press coverage, promotional material published by the dam authority, and anthropological and historical scholarship, this paper shows that the Yacyretá hydroelectric panacea failed politically. The project was a political possibility, the result of tacit negotiations between classes at the local, national, and international levels, and its failure is due to a breakdown in the agreement between classes, not, as Scott would have it, because it was technically impossible or undesirable. During the initial phase, the project appeared to be unfolding just as Scott would expect. But the cohesive binational plan began to unravel as the conditions in Paraguayan resettlements worsened. By the 1990s, the bifurcated state power was faced with a civil society that began to resist. The resistance of the popular classes was formidable enough to transform the project from a high modernist scheme into a stymied development project.

Yacyretá demonstrates that a development outcome is a political question, not a technical one, as both neo-Weberian Sikkink and postmodern Scott opine. Being political in nature, a large-scale development scheme must gain the consent of those it affects. This, however, is a class question. The Argentine developmentalist state, the Paraguayan rent-seeking state, and international capital all united for Yacyretá and with the industrial capital it would attract. The political contestation came from the dislocated people who lived in the project-affected area. At first, the project-affected popular classes consented to the project. But as relocation concessions were cut, they began to resist. In a sense, then, the rise and fall of Yacyretá as Argentina’s development panacea is the story of its failing to remain hegemonic, in the sense outlined by political theorist Antonio Gramsci (1971:80n, 56n); if it were able to give concessions sufficient to maintain the consent of those it displaced, it would have retained its hegemony and perhaps averted its devolution into a white elephant. But, alas, the class structure in which Yacyretá was situated disallowed this.

Yacyretá was much more complex than originally anticipated. After the project had been initiated, the Argentine state slowly pushed the project along and international capital ensured that the state continued. As debts accumulated, the dam authority made successive cutbacks to the funds allocated to the construction of resettlements, and then passed the resettlement neighborhoods off to the respective governments. Paraguay refused to take maintenance responsibility for resettlements in its territory, and they descended into a state of decay. Lacking any other means of addressing their grievances, the affected people rose up against the development project and prevented it from being completed. Yacyretá was, therefore, delayed, and a central part of Argentina’s developmentalist political project was stalled. Yacyretá was conceived as a high modernist project capable of providing electricity for industrial development and improving the lives of all, but in reality, produced urban squalor and a movement of resistance that ultimately undercut the utopian project itself. In order to see how the Argentine state became and remained committed to Yacyretá, this paper will first summarize the project’s political history from conception to construction.

POLITICAL CONSENSUS: HYDROELECTRIC POWER DEVELOPMENTALISM

Between Yacyretá’s conception in 1957 and the end of the construction phase in 1994, the Argentine state was governed by seven regimes: three military regimes, two Radical Party administrations, and two Peronist Party administrations. Each pushed the project forward in important ways, indicating that the Argentine state did indeed have the institutional cohesion to attempt to propel the project forward.

Yacyretá was initiated in February 1957 by the Revolución Libertadora military government of President-General Pedro E. Aramburu and Isaac Francisco Rojas. The Revolución Libertadora started the project by establishing a committee to plan and assess hydroelectric potential in Argentina (República Argentina 1958a). The engineers assigned to the Comisión Asesora proceeded to produce an analysis of Argentina’s energy needs (Comisión Asesora 1958), and determined that Yacyretá was most apt to fill them (Mazza 1958). Immediately the Argentine and Paraguayan governments signed an accord provisionally establishing the initial dam authority (the Comisión Mixta Técnica Paraguayo-Argentina del Apipé) to
carry out a technical study of the potential for a hydroelectric dam at the Apipé rapids and Yacyretá Island (República Argentina 1958b).

Under the Radical Party civilian government of Arturo Frondizi, the dam authority was formally established (Ribeiro 1994:31). The Yacyretá pre-feasibility study was completed under the subsequent civilian president Arturo Umberto Illia in 1964. The study gave further credence to the development project: it estimated that Yacyretá would cost less than $757 million, including transmission lines, and it reaffirmed that the project would pay for itself through the sale of electricity. The study estimated that the construction phase would last eight years, and it promised, as was the central impetus for the project, that it would foment development in Argentina (Comisión Mixta Técnica 1964:173, 177, 185).

In 1969, during the second military government, the Revolución Libertadora overthrew Perón in 1958. It is impossible to determine the extent of EBY’s corruption, and, thus, the degree to which its predecessors by pegging them as corrupt (World Bank 1995:21), cuts that went directly against the interests of the project-affected people.

Despite deep cutbacks in resettlement spending, Yacyretá still did not have sufficient funding. In 1990, an attempt to overcome financial difficulties led EBY to adopt a phased approach to completion of the project. EBY decided that it would initially fill the reservoir to 76 meters above sea level, and use the revenue generated from the sale of electricity generated at that level to finance completion of the expropriation phase of the project, which would allow the reservoir to be filled to the design height of 83 meters above sea level. The partial filling of the reservoir—which itself required expropriations—was deemed sufficient to generate funds for the expropriation, relocation, compensation, and environmental mitigations that were needed to continue the project (World Bank 1995:21-22). Short on funds, EBY deemed it necessary to expropriate the project-affected people to then be able to compensate them.

By 1992, EBY’s funds were exhausted and Argentina negotiated another round of loans from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (World Bank 1992b). Two years later, under Peronist Party President Carlos Menem, construction was finally completed. Menem is known for

Commitment to the political project of Yacyretá by elites was a far cry from benevolent treatment of those who were directly affected. As funds became scarce and as the cost of the project overshot all previous estimates, resettlement funds were curtailed. In 1986, EBY cut $100 million from its budget by decreasing its expenditures on housing, camps, and land acquisition (World Bank 1995:21), cuts that went directly against the interests of the project-affected people.

Project-affected people later singled out the Puente Internacional as a target of protest. In 1983, the presidency of Radical Party Raúl Alfonsín initiated a campaign to overcome delays, initiate investigations, and correct “irregularities” that the project had accumulated during his term in office. He began a campaign to fight corruption and to discredit his political predecessors by pegging them as corrupt (ABC Color [Asunción] 1983, ABC Color [Asunción] 1984). It is impossible to determine the extent of EBY’s corruption, and, thus, the degree to which it was curtailed. But the fact that Alfonsín put such a great deal of attention to Yacyretá shows how politically important it was.

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having called Yacyretá “a monument to corruption,” a monument that his presidency, however, remained committed to seeing through to completion. In 1996, when Menem was running for re-election, his campaign theme song’s refrain was “Menem lo hizo” (“Menem got it done”), referring largely to Yacyretá and the Puente Internacional.

By the time of the completion of Yacyretá, the project had gone from one of the Revolución Libertadora promoted as the silver bullet of developmentalism to something that, after dragging on for so long, was finally completed in 1994 under a president that could not any longer claim it was the key to development but who used it nonetheless as a symbol of something significant that, when finally completed, was a great accomplishment and a worthy reason to re-elect him. In keeping with what Sikkink would expect, EBY’s ability to ceaselessly pursue the development project was undermined, according to a Radical Party functionary involved in the project, since with successive Argentine governments came successive replacements of EBY executives (Carrettoni 1998:180-82). However, each of the seven regimes that governed Argentina from conception through construction of Yacyretá, pushed the project forward in important ways, indicating a high degree of agreement with regards to the value and importance of the large-scale project. Indeed, the Argentine state was so committed to the project that in the mid 1980s, expenditures on Yacyretá accounted for more than 50 percent of Argentina’s public works investments (Ribeiro 1994:33). That the state was consistently committed to Yacyretá is apparent.

International Capital

The Argentine elite’s desire to build Yacyretá was due primarily to a belief that the project would provide the electricity Argentina needed to grow industrially. However, after the initial commitment to the project, the continued pursuit of Yacyretá was partially due to pressure on the Argentine government and EBY by international lenders. International capital supplied large credits to fund the project, and thus any stalling of the project—which, after completion, was supposed to begin to pay for itself—delayed the repayment of loans. After so many years in gestation, the debt accumulated by Yacyretá was truly gigantic. The World Bank’s 1997 estimate for the project put the total cost for Yacyretá at $8.5 billion ( Inspection Panel 1997:7-8, 17). By 2001 the debt was reported to be upwards of $10 billion (Roher 2001).

While international capital stated that Yacyretá was commensurate with Argentina’s development needs, it continued to fund the project not only to collect interest, but because it saw Yacyretá as the best way of affecting economic policy down the road. In its Project Completion Report, the World Bank dedicated a portion of its “lessons learned” to a discussion of the Bank’s “continued project support in deteriorating circumstances.” The Bank concluded: “This continuity [of support and financing] was based initially on the view that Yacyretá, being the largest public investment activity, was the best vehicle for seeking to influence Government public finance and state enterprise reforms” (World Bank 1995:37). Thus, while the project was initiated and continued by the successive military and civilian governments of Argentina, the governments were influenced by international capital seeking to gain leverage in the Argentine public sector for the purpose of affecting structural reforms.

Paraguayan Interests

While Argentina’s motive to continue the project was a combination of its developmentalist dream and pressure from international capital, across the Paraná the interests were quite different. The Paraguayan state sought rent from the project, wanting to benefit, but was not interested in taking responsibility for extra burden. Argentina had to engage Paraguay to pursue the project, and furthermore, it was politically expedient to set up a binational state enterprise, Entidad Binacional Yacyretá, that had juridical hegemony in the project area of both countries. In addition to construction, EBY also oversaw the expropriation of Argentine and Paraguayan people affected by the project, the afectados. Though it proved to be far from the most expedient development institution, international capital accepted EBY as a temporary interlude whereby the state did the dirty work of bringing the project through to completion—though international capital was very clear it wanted the project to be privatized when completed (World Bank 1992a:13-14). But the temporary phase of expropriation was exceedingly long; and, particularly in Paraguay, it ushered in an era of havoc for the

9 No doubt this statement was partially an attempt to discredit the work of Menem’s political opponents who had been involved in the project.

10 During this period, the Argentine economy was performing poorly, and, thus, dedicating such a great portion of the public works expenditures to Yacyretá meant that many other projects were not built.

11 This figure adds interest and takes into account funds procured for the project dating back to 1960 from the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, as well as local commercial banks.
affected populations, and ultimately provoked their resistance, jeopardizing if not shattering the hegemony of the development project.

EXPROPRIATION, RELOCATION, AND COMPENSATION

The expropriation, relocation, and compensation of the afectados began in Argentina in 1985, and in Paraguay in the early 1990s. At first it went rather smoothly. The impoverished people living on the flood-prone banks of the Paraná initially accepted resettlements and cash indemnification. After all, the alternatives of either being resettled in better homes that were away from the river and its seasonal floods or being given cash indemnification sounded like fine ideas. But as the project accumulated much more debt than was originally anticipated, measures were taken to cut the costs associated with afectados—resulting in the hasty dismissal of tens of thousands of people into shabby resettlement projects.

Before commencing the expropriation process, the Argentine and Paraguayan states conducted censuses to determine the number of people who would be affected by the Yacyretá reservoir. In the 1979-1980 censuses, 34,900 people were counted. After expropriation began, while some people were relocated to resettlement homes, others migrated from the countryside to the project-affected area, so that the population inflow nearly compensated for outflow during the initial phase of resettlement (Bartolomé 1994:44, 51). New censuses were conducted in 1989 and 1990, omitting many who lived in the affected area (Independent Inspection Mechanism 2004:74-78), but official counts still grew.

By 1997, one World Bank functionary estimated that the number of people who would be affected by the project was 80,000 (Mejía 2000:145). The people who in-migrated to the project area hailed from the countryside, fleeing an agrarian crisis, and settled largely in urban Posadas and Encarnación. They started their new lives among those already there, including considerable numbers of oleros, or brick-makers, particularly on the Paraguayan side, as well as other subsistence producers. Most of the tens of thousands of afectados were relocated to several large resettlement complexes constructed in and around Posadas and Encarnación. The following analysis will focus primarily on one resettlement in Paraguay, San Pedro.12

12 The reader who is interested in a more comprehensive analysis of resettlements, as well as political relations between Argentina and Paraguay, should read Newman (forthcoming).

Paraguayan Resettlements

Resettlement in Paraguay occurred, for the most part, in two phases: the first occurred in the early 1990s and focused on the oleros and others who lived on the low-lying, flood prone shores of the Paraná; the second took place in the late 1990s, and attempted to expropriate those living in the areas that were to be inundated when the reservoir was to be filled to 78 and 83 meters above sea level.

Starting in 1992, oleros began relocation to San Pedro industrial park on the north side of Encarnación. Olero families were given houses, 0.5 hectare plots of land, and promised technical assistance and the delivery of clay for a period of five years (Mejía 2000:154-55). The five years of assistance for the oleros was a source of jealousy for non-oleros relocated in San Pedro (Inspection Panel 1997:13). However, the point of contention did not last long: after the five years was up, EBY ceased to deliver clay gratis and the families had to begin to purchase it. They could not afford the price EBY demanded for clay (Inspection Panel 2004:90, 94, 104), and had to find other sources of income. In an attempt to ease the transition to other livelihoods, an Economic and Worker Retraining Fund of $6 million was implemented. It reached very few people, however, and some were not offered any retraining whatsoever (Independent Inspection Mechanism 2004:20, 29). As a severe economic crisis descended upon the region in the mid to late 1990s (Inspection Panel 2004:xx), it is not clear that retraining could have ameliorated poverty. According to Carmen A. Ferradás, an anthropologist who studied the affected populations for many years, the educational programs that were offered only served to train an unneeded workforce (1997:455-56).

According to the World Bank Inspection Panel (1997:13), homes in San Pedro were so poorly constructed that they began deteriorating after only three years. San Pedro afectados also had difficulty getting to Encarnación for work and school. They were faced with either fording the large creek separating San Pedro from Encarnación or braving a bridge made only for motor vehicles. The families in this settlement, unable to make a living, came to call their neighborhood El Parque de los Condenados, “the Park of the Condemned” (Independent Inspection Mechanism 2004:20, 26, 28). A brick-maker juxtaposed his former life with that after resettlement:

Before, when we worked our factories on the banks of the Paraná River, the rain and flooding were our worst enemies. But when the clay quarries were flooded, we became fishermen since there were a lot of fish. Nowadays
here in the Estate we don't have those old conditions and we are in a desert, poor, without clay, and without fish (Independent Inspection Mechanism 2004:29).

While some afectados escaped from El Parque de los Condenados and abandoned their homes (Inspection Panel 1997:13), the Inter-American Development Bank’s Independent Inspection Mechanism was surveying conditions in San Pedro, and came to the conclusion that measures would have to be taken in order to avoid “the creation of a social time bomb in Paraguay” (2004:29). But measures were not taken to deal with the social time bomb; instead San Pedro inhabitants experienced the additional provocation of sewage being directly discharged into the creeks in their new neighborhood (Inspection Panel 2004:120). Due to these conditions, the nurse who was assigned to the health outpost in San Pedro stopped coming, stating that she felt abandoned and exiled (2004:26).

Conditions in the resettlements, as illustrated by San Pedro, were destitute. Pressured by Argentina and international capital, EBY hastily constructed resettlements, in which to relocate afectados. After hastily constructing resettlement neighborhoods, in which afectados considered themselves to be condemned, EBY “emancipated” them—that is, it relinquished responsibility—and the respective governments where the resettlements were located were supposed to take responsibility (Independent Inspection Mechanism 2004:26). After “emancipation,” the resettlements descended into squalor.

Afectados: the Condemned, the “Emancipated,” the Ignored, and the Undocumented

Neither EBY nor Paraguay wanted to maintain resettlements; EBY wanted to pass off the responsibility for resettlements and yield to privatization. However, the Paraguayan government seeking only rent from Yacyretá, did not commit itself to the expropriation phase. EBY built the bare minimum number of low-quality resettlement homes—condemning afectados—and then “emancipated” them, after which Paraguay refused to do neighborhood maintenance. This was of such concern to the Inter-American Development Bank Independent Inspection Mechanism that, at the end of one of their reports, the Mechanism concluded, “the ping-pong game between EBY and the Paraguayan government agencies, with the affected people as the ball, must stop” (2004:41). Perhaps the worst result of the ping-pong game of mutual irresponsibility was that, while EBY did allocate compensation for some of the poorest afectados (that is, the oleros who were previously in the employ of petty capitalists), nobody ensured that they actually got it.

Workers who were, previous to expropriation, employed in the brick and tile factories found themselves largely excluded from the assistance EBY provided. Under Paraguayan labor law, employers who fired their workers were required to pay severance pay (Inspection Panel 2004:91). According to the Inspection Mechanism, “EBY compensated the majority of the brick factory owners, who have then not complied with the Paraguayan labour laws and compensated their workers. The workers now find themselves unemployed or working for the new brick factories under subhuman conditions” (2004:28). Bosses were compensated, while workers were ignored and left to fend for themselves, and the World Bank’s regional office stated that EBY should not interfere to ensure that former employers pay compensation to workers (2004:91).

While some olero bosses were compensated and refused to give severance pay, others received nothing at all because they never produced “official employment records” (Inspection Panel 2004:99). Many olero employees were informal workers, for whom proper documentation did not exist, and thus were ineligible for compensation. The informal workers, who were among the poorest of the afectados, were effectively penalized because, operating under the assumption that employers would follow the labor law in the midst of the endemic corruption characteristic of Paraguay, EBY did not provide any compensation directly to former olero workers (2004:99-102). Having lost employment, former undocumented olero workers were ignored and left to fend for themselves.

The resettlements that were built to allow for the filling of the Yacyretá reservoir caused densification in Encarnación and the surrounding area, as well. This densification reduced the permeability of much of the area’s soils, which affected an increase in run-off water in the urban areas—urban creeks flooded when it rained and inundated the low-lying homes lining the creeks’ banks. Meanwhile, many afectados were left in their homes waiting for the compensation EBY promised. In the Bernadino Caballero and Villa Candida neighborhoods of Encarnación, afectados were promised compensation within 60 days, but years passed with no aid. In addition, houses in the nearby Santa Rosa neighborhood were appraised at well below market value before expropriation (Independent Inspection Mechanism

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13 The Inspection Panel (2004:54, 62) denies that this was the case. The Independent Inspection Mechanism (2004:14-15), however, stated that, since densification of Encarnación resulted from the project, Yacyretá was the cause of the flooding. The latter conclusion takes into consideration the effects of the project as a whole.
order to curtail expenses—that it thought that dealing generously with the slashed funds allocated to housing construction and land acquisitions in deplorable conditions in Argentina. EBY demonstrated in 1986—when it mechanism, no substantial measures were taken to stop the spread of these conditions and lack of income forced them to move where conditions were worse than life at the landfill. The squalor at this resettlement was worse than life at the landfill. The squalor at this resettlement afectedos was not critical to the completion of the project. This conclusion was reaffirmed in 1990 when Argentina and Paraguay decided to fill the reservoir part way, and use the electricity revenue to pay for any outstanding social and environmental mitigation. Allotment of the revenues from electricity sales to social and environmental mitigations, however, ran counter to the developmentalist objective of making cheap electricity available to attract capital investment. The class nature of the project was evident in the contrast between alternatives: cheap electricity for industrial capitalists by cutting resettlement costs or spending more on decent resettlements for the popular classes. As the dam authority reduced its concessions to the popular classes in favor of lean capitalist development, the political hegemony of Yacyretá began to unravel. The conflict of interest between capital and the popular classes ushered in a period of resistance on the part of the affected populations; the afectedos refused to acquiesce to the wretchedness that was foisted upon them.

RESISTANCE OF THE AFECTADOS

Since the goal of providing cheap electricity remained operative, the social time-bomb was not undone—and the affected communities took to organizing a movement of resistance. Resistance was slow to start, which, Carmen A. Ferradás (n.d.:5) demonstrated, was due to poor afectedos taking the initial promise of decent relocation homes seriously. During the 1979 and 1980 censuses, afectado households were given folders with documents about their homes, which they took to mean they were entitled to free relocation homes. In reality, it was only those holding titles that were granted homes gratis. It was only after their dreams of decent resettlement homes were shattered that the popular classes began to resist (Ferradás 1998:196). Resistance was varied: some resistance organizations were bureaucratic and elitist; others mobilized the popular classes for militant action to shut down commercial activity; and other organizations appealed to the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank in an attempt to have international capital mitigate some of the project’s harmful consequences. Resistance organizations of the elite were eclipsed by a combination of militant action and pressuring international capital, bringing the social tragedy to the attention of the world. International capital attempted to conceal the negative effects of the project and silence the opposition; the state’s repressive apparatus was mobilized to disband protestors. Though the movement had difficulty, since afectados lived in such squalor, their resistance was persistent, and they were ultimately able to stall the filling of the reservoir at 76 meters above sea level, a level at which the hydroelectric dam
was only able to produce about 60 percent of the electricity it was designed to (Inspection Panel 2004:x).

Because some of Encarnación’s most important commercial activity resided in the project-affected area—though, of course, the great majority of afectados were poor—encarnacenos affected by the project were of a heterogeneous class composition. This produced uneasy alliances and ultimately resulted in major reconfigurations of the movement of resistance. The organizing to resolve afectados’ grievances in Encarnación was initially dominated by Centro de Comercio e Industria, a group of industrialists and commercial interests that aligned with other elites and, while it excluded the popular classes from decision-making, claimed to represent everyone affected by the project. Soon the tensions in this group led to other organizing. In April 1992, a multi-class group, the Comisión Intersectoral de Afectados por la Represa de Yacyretá, organized its first demonstration, a march in downtown Encarnación. In 1993, the Coordinadora de Barrios y Sectores Afectados por el Embalse de Yacyretá began organizing the popular classes for militant demonstrations. Though the Coordinadora started clandestinely, it eventually grew to hold democratic mass assemblies and stage mass protests that shut down the highway connecting Encarnación and Asunción (Paraguay’s main commercial artery). The Coordinadora also occupied the Puente Internacional that connects Encarnación and Posadas (the symbol of compensation for Paraguayan territory lost), and marched through the neighborhoods of the afectados (the epicenters of their grievances) (Ferradás 1998:177-79).

These militant demonstrations were effective at shutting down commercial activity, and were, therefore, violently suppressed. In February 1998, EBY paid and provided food to the Special Forces of the Paraguayan National Police, and the latter broke up demonstrators with force. This provoked the searing criticism of Paraguay’s most important newspaper, ABC Color: “While they affirm that they do not have the resources to ‘finance’ a beating” (ABC Color [Asunción] 1998a; translated by the author). Though repressed, the afectados continued to take highways and bridges well into the new millennium (Movimiento Binacional de Afectados por Yacyretá 2006). In December 2007, demonstrators staged a protest on the Puente Internacional, and again, they were dispersed with force (Centro de Incidencia y Análisis Político 2007). These militant protests received significant press coverage, which international capital attempted to co-opt.

While the militant afectados were protesting in the streets, non-governmental organizations were petitioning international capital. In September 1996, Sobrevivencia (Friends of the Earth, Paraguay) filed two “requests for inspection”: one to the newly formed Inspection Panel of the World Bank and the other to the Inter-American Development Bank’s equivalent, the Independent Inspection Mechanism. The banks’ boards of directors approved the requests and a long documentation process ensued in which some of the most unsavory aspects of the Yacyretá project were exposed. This, in turn, elicited a reaction from the bank executives in an attempt to avoid tarnishing the reputations of the banks.

The explicit purpose of the World Bank Inspection Panel was to allow average people to change Bank policy: According to then President of the World Bank, James D. Wolfensohn: “By giving private citizens—and especially the poor—a new means of access to the Bank, it has empowered and given voice to those we most need to hear” (1998:vii). Alvaro Umaña, then head of the Inspection Panel, claimed that the Panel was a “tool to ensure accountability ... and to address harm” (1998:vi). It was initiated as a three-member body in 1993—the 50th anniversary of the World Bank, a time when the Bank faced particularly acute problems arising from a dam it financed in India (Umaña 1998a:1)—and began operations in August 1994 (Umaña 1998b:x). While the Panel was supposed to give voice to the voiceless, the Bank did not care to listen.

The Sobrevivencia requests for inspection of the Yacyretá dam project stated that there had been a series of violations of the Bank’s social and environmental operating procedures. The World Bank Inspection Panel looked into the claims, and proceeded to document violations of Bank operating procedures, producing a sketch of the extent to which the expropriated populations were descending into squalor. The report was not well received by the Bank’s executive directors (Treakle 1998:1). Given the lack of appreciation it received, it was no surprise that Bank executives failed to circulate the report to the affected populations. In February 1998, Pedro Arzamendia, one of the central individuals behind the Sobrevivencia request14 sent a letter to Wolfensohn in which he invited the Bank’s President and executive board to go to the project-affected area to see for themselves the conditions the report had documented. Arzamendia (1998) also reminded the Bank that those he represented still did not have a copy of the Inspection Panel’s report. At the end of that month, EBY paid the Paraguayan National Police to brutally disband protesting afectados. Shortly after, the Paraguayan press criticized EBY’s financing of the police in light of lacking funds for resettlement.

14 Arzamendia was Vice-President of Comisión Inter-Barrial de Afectados por Yacyretá.
EBY reacted to the press criticism by attempting to salvage a piece of its legitimacy. In March, EBY published an advertisement in the Paraguayan press containing a letter written on behalf of Wolfensohn from Isabel Guerrero, Interim Vice-President of the World Bank Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean, stating that “the Bank is satisfied with the conclusions of the report which affirm that the resettlement, environmental, community participation, and other policies were completely respected and applied in the case of Yacyretá” (Comunicado de Yacyretá 1998; translated by the author). This letter flagrantly misrepresented the Inspection Panel’s findings, leading Sobrevivencia to write a letter to Wolfensohn in an attempt to publicize the results of the Inspection Panel’s report (Rivas 1998).

Subsequently, the International Rivers Network drafted and sent a letter to Wolfensohn that was co-signed by 85 other environmental, labor, social, and political groups from around the world in support of Sobrevivencia’s request (International Rivers Network et al. 1998). Finally, the Financial Times published an article outlining the Bank’s cover-up of the Inspection Panel report (Suzman 1998).

The Financial Times report captured Wolfensohn’s attention. A month later, the World Bank replied to Sobrevivencia in private correspondence, stating that the letter misrepresenting the Panel’s findings “conveyed an erroneous description of the findings of the Bank Inspection Panel,” and that the Bank was “fully aware” of the problems that arose as a result of Yacyretá (Burki 1998).

A month after the World Bank privately admitted to the EBY conspiracy to distort information about the conditions of afectados, the Paraguayan press printed a story claiming that Sobrevivencia was advocating the boycott of an El Niño relief loan from the World Bank (Nacionales [Asunción] 1998), a clear attempt to slander Sobrevivencia in the context of the El Niño crisis. Several days later, after pressure from Sobrevivencia (Peña et al. 1998) the World Bank recanted by printing an advertisement in several Paraguayan newspapers in which, in very small print in a very large body of text, it was stated that the claim that Sobrevivencia was trying to boycott the El Niño loan was incorrect (ABC Color [Asunción] 1998b).

Meanwhile, the militant protests continued. According to Kennan W. Rapp, throughout the late 1990s, the EBY offices in Encarnación were the epicenter of sit-ins and protests by various groups of afectados. Though written correspondence between EBY and afectados were restrained, face-to-face interaction was “often explosive, full of invective and mutual threats.” Because Paraguayan afectados had lived under a dictator and were excluded from “great” politics for so long, they came to see EBY as “the state, as it was the only branch of the Paraguayan central government they had ever interacted with” (Rapp 2000:238-239).

Another round of petitioning for inspection occurred, and it followed much the same pattern as the Sobrevivencia request. In May 2002, Federación de Afectados por Yacyretá de Itapúa y Misiones, a Paraguayan social and environmental non-governmental organization, submitted requests for inspection to the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, citing violations of the banks’ operating procedures and the harm done to the affected people. Another set of reports were produced (Inspection Panel 2004; Independent Inspection Mechanism 2004), and again information was suppressed. After publication of an Inter-American Development Bank press release in August 2004 that misrepresented the IDB Inspection Mechanism report’s findings, the producers of the report sent a letter of protest to IDB President Enrique Iglesias. In that letter, they denounced the IDB claim that the project was in compliance with operating procedures and agreements: “Our report said nothing of the kind. On the contrary, the report stated in the Executive Summary, in a whole chapter, and in the conclusions and recommendations, that the design and implementation of the project violated many stipulations of the Bank’s policies on environment and involuntary resettlement” (Leal, Heyman, and Murrietta 2004).

EBY and international capitalists proved intransigent. They fabricated lies, libeled the resistance, and disbanded protesters through police alliances. Opposing this formidable development machine was a popular movement of resistance that seemed to stop at nothing. Sure, the resistance took time to awaken, and in the context of Argentina’s transition to democracy in 1983 and the reconfiguration and redefinition of the role of human rights organizations, there were instances where non-governmental organization leaders betrayed the resistance (Ferradás 1996:93). But the movement ultimately grew strong to stop the project from being completed as intended.

In 1992, the Argentine Secretary of Energy produced a report in which three scenarios for the future of the project were considered: filling the reservoir to 78 and then 83 meters above sea level by 1998; raising the reservoir to 78 meters for an indefinite period of time in 1996; or keeping the level at 78 meters for an indefinite period of time in 1998; raising the reservoir to 78 and then 83 meters above sea level by 1998; raising the reservoir to 78 meters for an indefinite period of time in 1996; or keeping the level at 78 meters above sea level indefinitely (Secretaría de Energía Eléctrica 1992). The resistance was responsible for maintaining the reservoir at 76 meters for an extended period. At 76 meters above sea level, however, Yacyretá only generated 60 percent of the electricity intended (Inspection Panel 2004:x). Operating under capacity, the World Bank estimated that the dam would never pay for itself (Inspection Panel 1997:8). The Yacyretá project had degenerated substantially, failing to attract capital through discounted...
electricity rates. Thus, though the resistance movement was not sufficiently strong to force Yacyretá off the stage of history, it did stall the project, and, by doing so, the resistance undercut the very tenability of the high modernist scheme that claimed to benefit all.

The resistance was delayed at first, as the popular classes among the afectados thought that the promise of relocation to new homes sounded rather good, living in shantytowns as they were. Opposition to the project in the repressive political climate characteristic of Argentina and Paraguay was dangerous. The Argentine resistance suffered as NGOs reconfigured their orientations away from broadly understood human rights subsequent to Argentina’s transition to democracy, and the Paraguayan resistance was misled by elite enturmanos who opposed the mobilization of the popular classes for their own interests. After overcoming these obstacles, the resistance ultimately grew strong enough to prevent the political project of Yacyretá from being implemented in the form in which it was conceived.

CONCLUSION

Yacyretá was intended to provide abundant, cheap electricity for Argentine industrial development. The state led the way in an attempt to foment capital accumulation, and argued that a rising tide of economic prosperity would benefit all. To pursue the developmentalist dream and harness the water resources where they were most plentiful, a partnership with Paraguay was necessary. This entitled Paraguay to collect rent, and it assumed the Paraguayan state would take responsibility for handling an undesired human burden. The dream also meant large loans, which gave international capital great power in the area. And finally, the dream required the displacement of tens of thousands of people. The popular classes that were displaced, Paraguayans in particular, led a resistance that was paramount in subverting the utopian scheme of Yacyretá as development panacea.

Once the Paraguayan partnership was established, the developmentalist scheme was pushed forward by successive Argentine governments—by military regimes, Radical Party developmentalists, and Peronists—partially because, once international capital was engaged, there was no turning back. International capital saw the project not only as a source of interest on large loans, but also as a means by which it could gain leverage in the Argentine economy to affect structural reforms. For these reasons, international capital pressured EBY and Argentina to continue. As the project unfolded, the debt amassed extended far beyond the initial cost-benefit analyses. In fact, one analyst estimated the cost of energy produced at Yacyretá to be three times the region’s average (Rapp 2000:244).

Argentina’s clumsy lurch toward development invites the question: “Why did they choose that sort of development?” Yacyretá was intended to delineate a rupture with the past, ushering in a new age of economic prosperity. It was a project along the lines of what post-modernist James C. Scott calls a “high modernist utopian scheme.” As the central component of the hydroelectric developmentalist project, Yacyretá was seen by those in power as a means to improve the human condition. To be sure, it meant an authoritarian state administering nature over a weak civil society. It was a vision that gained the fancy of successive governments. Yet carrying out the project meant overlooking the complexity of the real world, an omission that stymied dreams of utopia.

Though Yacyretá falls within the vague theoretical parameters of Scott’s authoritarian high modernism, it did not fail because it overlooked the complexity of society, but instead because it pursued the interests of capital—developing the forces of production—over those of the popular classes. The project was only a utopian scheme to improve the human condition if one accepts the claim that hydroelectric developmentalism would benefit all. Under this superficial utopian claim was a class antagonism that instigated resistance. The resistance was formidable enough to transform Yacyretá into something different from the utopian scheme.

The impoverished afectados did not initially resist expropriation because, living in shanty structures on the flood-prone banks of the Paraná, they believed the relocation homes they were promised to be a rather good “scheme.” But during the 1980s and 1990s, when funding was running short, EBY cut relocation spending in an attempt to curtail costs and limit the amount of debt incurred. The project backfired since it was never really intended to improve the human condition; it was a scheme intended to develop the forces of production, and it was claimed that the latter would improve the human condition. As the project unfolded, however, when decisions were made as to which set of interests would be served, resettlement spending was cut. The class interests were not mutual, though the scheme claimed they were. A desire to provide cheap electricity to satisfy the requirements of

15 The World Bank also estimated that the cost of electricity from Yacyretá was above prevailing market prices—more than three times the Argentine average (see the memorandum attached at the beginning of World Bank 1996a).

16 To be sure, considering river and riparian ecosystems, the project overlooked the complexity of nature. The damage large dams cause to river ecosystems is well known, but, in the case of Yacyretá, its damage meant ecocide for one of Argentina’s largest wetlands as well (Blanco and Parera 2003).
capital meant cutting back on spending for the popular classes. That, in turn, precipitated a resistance movement that stalled the project. The outlines of this pattern were foreseen by Marx more than a century prior: “At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production [or class structure] ... From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters” ([1859] 1978:4-5). The high modernist utopian scheme, if pursued within a different class structure, could have succeeded. But the class terrain that determined capitalist development outcomes fettered the project, and by doing so, turned it into a white elephant.

The reason Argentina failed in its most important development project was not due to a lack of elite consensus on a particular developmentalist course of action, contrary to Kathryn Sikkink’s neo-Weberian argument. The Argentine state demonstrated its ideological commitment to the high modernist scheme (as did international capital), and the industrialization of Córdoba demonstrated the need for more and cheaper electricity. The state attempted, with a considerable degree of ideological homogeneity, to develop the project, and it failed.

Thus, contrary to both Scott’s post-modernism and Sikkink’s neo-Weberianism, both perspectives agreeing that the possibility of development outcomes is a technical question (Scott asserting that megaprojects are technically impossible and Sikkink arguing that this sort of development is possible with a certain institutional-ideological arrangement), it is clear that, in the case of Yacyretá, the project was only a political possibility. At first, the classes that lined up for the project were able to constitute the project as hegemonic, gaining the consent of those who were to be dislocated. Ultimately, however, the superordinate part of the class structure dictated cuts be made to the allocation of resources to the afectados, and, after the project was well underway, the consent of the dominated thus came into question. They demanded that which was promised—decent relocation homes, away from the flood-prone banks of the Paraná—and, indeed, they still do.

Though the failure of the project was obvious for years, the high modernist ideology refused to die away. By 2004, funds were being allocated to bring about the promised utopia by another, complimentary means: grandiloquent “coastal treatment” was planned for the shores of the Yacyretá reservoir. According to EBY’s computer-generated television promotionalns featuring luscious gardens and prosperous people, driving shiny cars along the promenades that were planned for the shores of Yacyretá reservoir (Entidad Binacional Yacyretá n.d.b), the utopia was just around the corner.

Yacyretá was the largest development project Argentina ever undertook. It was supposed to deliver more electricity than any of Argentina’s other hydroelectric power plants and to lead to capital accumulation. It took more than 50 years and is still not entirely complete, consumed over 50 percent of Argentina’s infrastructural expenditures at its height, amassed $10 billion in debt, promised a fundamentally different future in which all would be better off, and required the displacement and neglect of tens of thousands of people. Yacyretá failed to usher in the utopia it was supposed to. Instead, for Argentina, Yacyretá was a white elephant that required enormous attention and consumed vast resources, and thus, far from ushering in a developmentalist utopia, the project was a huge stumbling block in Argentina’s path toward increased capitalist industrial development.

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The Chicana/o Compromise: Parenting Re-Socialization of Immigrant Mexican Families in the Bay Area

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Abstract
This study analyzes the underlying childrearing messages that are presented by immigrant Mexican families to their bicultural children at home, public settings, and religious institutions. Ethnographic observations and in-depth interviews with six different and socio-economically diverse Mexican immigrant families in Oakland and Richmond, California are supplemented with an established set of revisionist empirical data. The theoretical analysis is largely informed by the established analytical focus in the existing early development and broad socialization literature, and central attention is given to parental logic, agency, and the overall messages designed to encourage or prevent a Euro-American-influenced transformation in immigrants’ childrearing. The overall delineation of this parental socialization focused on the Mexican immigrant families’ childrearing behaviors as they directly relate to a desired and/or sanctioned household structure, gender personality, and group identity. The practical pedagogical concept of showing and shaping and the particular eco-cultural parental compromises in low- and high-SES Mexican immigrant families are introduced as adequate delineations of the overall Chicana/o family childrearing strategy and outcome.

Keywords  
family, Mexican immigrants, parenting, LeVine, Bourdieu

INTRODUCTION
In recent sociological literature, Robert A. LeVine (1994) concluded that previous Western schools of thought regarding childrearing were neither universal nor world-historical, as previously presumed by early human development scientists like Margaret Mead and Nancy Chodorow. To correct this aspect of sociological literature, LeVine outlined a more “universal” analysis of variations at the population level with a computer metaphor (encompassing “organic hardware,” “ecological firmware,” and “cultural software”) that aims to explain parental behavior across the socio-cultural world. Despite the potential universal applicability of LeVine’s computer metaphor, its application has been limited to a direct comparison between socially established and acculturated Kenyan and Euro-American families. To address such a research shortcoming as well as to expand on LeVine’s universal computer metaphor, I aimed to apply this theoretical framework to analyze immigrant Mexican families’ socio-cultural messages regarding childrearing socialization, as these families become exposed and assimilate in accordance and/or in opposition to the dominant Euro-American culture.

In thus employing a computer metaphor as a revisionist theoretical tool, my research falls in direct line with contemporary developmental scientists, who have used a similar LeVineian conceptualization of childrearing to fill the cross-cultural void in overall parental socialization literature. Earlier social scientists created this void by positing a mother-centric model while ignoring the findings of Chicana/o scholars like Segura and Pierce (1993), who claim that “multiple mothering figures” are the norm for Chicana/o families in the United States (p. 295). Moreover, another useful theoretical framework to understand Chicana/o families’ ethno-specific collectivist/individualistic parenting behavior is provided by Pierre Bourdieu’s (1990) relational concepts of field and habitus. In this study, I would argue that given the duality of Chicana/o families’ childrearing (i.e., raising children for both a Euro-American/individualistic ecology/economy and for a Chicana/o collectivist cultural community) only a LeVineian and Bourdieuan theoretical comparison between the concepts of ecological firmware/field and cultural software/habitus is able to satisfactorily sort out the psychosocial emergence of the distinct Chicana/o parenting behavior and gender/group identity. According to this theoretical logic, I delineate the decision process that leads these families to their enacted parenting styles. Specifically, I asked: How do Mexican immigrant families decide to raise children prepared for both a Euro-American/individualistic ecology/economy and for a Mexican-American/collectivist cultural community?

LITERATURE REVIEW
The Computer Metaphor and Ethnic Revisionism

In “Child Care and Culture: Lessons from Africa,” Robert A. LeVine et al. (1994) analyze the accuracy of Margaret Mead’s “world-laboratory” concept and the overall impact of her 1930s pioneering work, Growing Up in New Guinea. LeVine et al. claim that Mead’s world-laboratory concept, in
which the socio-cultural world provides a vast set of ethno-specific sites of study, is oversimplified and overgeneralized. In essence, LeVine et al. argue that the concept does not accurately portray the inability of ethnographers to control for confounding variables in their study of other cultures, and that the concept fails to mention the numerous biases and thought paradigms of Western scientists, who tend to ask questions “asked” by “middle class Anglo-Americans” (1994:10). To make up for some of the shortcomings of Mead’s theoretical framework, LeVine et al. use a comparison between the “Gusii people of Kenya” (living in a largely agricultural society) and “middle class [presumably, white] Americans” (living in a largely post-industrial society) (p. 13). Lastly, LeVine et al. introduce a computer metaphor that aims to explain these latter world variations of parental behavior according to a biological (“organic hardware”), ecological (“firmware”), and cultural (“software”) set of paradigms.

Also in dialogue with early human development scientists, Denise A. Segura and Jennifer L. Pierce claim that although many Chicana/o scholars have emphasized the existence of “multiple mothering figures” in Chicana/o households, “white feminist accounts of ‘mother-centric’ families” such as those offered by Nancy Chodorow have neglected this Chicana/o family feature (Segura and Pierce 1993:295). Moreover, Segura and Pierce claim that they do not stand alone in their criticism of Chodorow by pointing out that contemporary theorists have criticized her book, The Reproduction of Mothering, for omitting race/ethnicity, sexual orientation, and marital status from its findings (Segura and Pierce 1993). Despite these multiple criticisms, Segura and Pierce claim that “Chodorow’s theoretical framework is useful in understanding the acquisition of gender identity in Chicano/a families” (Segura and Pierce 1993:296).

Before proceeding further, it is important to outline LeVine et al’s computer metaphor by defining its three separate aspects and explaining their combined effect on socio-cultural behavior. Firstly, organic hardware they define as the biological/mammalian similarities (i.e., mother-infant bond, maturation, etc.) across our species that are relatively stable. Secondly, ecological firmware they describe as the population-specific variations that are expected with differing ecologies/economies across the human social world. Thirdly, cultural software they summarize as the population specific “cultural scripts” that determine the cultural models of parenthood and its goals. Lastly, LeVine et al. make the argument for a “cultural mediation model” by arguing that the organic hardware they describe does not explain differences in birth rates across cultures, for instance. Rather LeVine et al. argue that “the extent to which species-wide hardware will be used in child care and development, and how it will be used, are conditioned by the ecological firmware and cultural software of a specific population” (1994:20).

**Bourdieu’s Dispositional Theory of Behavior**

“The habitus, as society written into the body, into the biological individual, enables the infinite number of acts of the game—written into the game as possibilities and objective demands ...” (Bourdieu 1990:63).

Bourdieu’s conceptualization of habitus is a theoretical mosaic that borrows heavily from phenomenology, in general, and from the work of Marleu-Ponty, specifically. From phenomenology, Bourdieu borrows a subjective understanding of individual perceptions, categories, and practices. In essence, Bourdieu agrees to a large extent with phenomenologists’ connection of individual agents (linked through a “common stock of knowledge”) to their perceived objective reality (i.e., the “life-world”). From Marleu-Ponty, Bourdieu adopts both an anti-Cartesian stance (an opposition towards rational and rule-bound formulations of individual agency) and a stable conception of a mind-body connection and interaction. Bourdieu seems to agree with Marleu-Ponty’s description of an embodied social order that operates through the largely unconscious and taken-for-granted interaction between the internalized mental structures and the emerging objective situations the body encounters. Taken in conjunction, Bourdieu used these latter foundational frameworks to synthesize a dispositional theory of action (i.e., habitus theory) that is able to account for the generative and stable capabilities individuals have when interacting and navigating the various social situations (i.e., “games”) present in their social world.

As a whole, Bourdieu viewed the introduction of a dispositional theory of action as the centerpiece of his theoretical endeavors; or as he puts it: “I can say that all my thinking started from this point: how can behaviour be regulated without being the product of obedience to rules?” (1990:65). According to this motivating aim, Bourdieu further delineates the concrete operational mode of his notion of habitus and uses it to make the theoretical leap from “rules” to “strategies” when accounting for an individual’s social behavior. For Bourdieu this theoretical leap sidesteps the Cartesian model of action that depicts individuals as robotic-like creatures acting in mindless conjunction with the social rules of their given society. But more importantly, this leap allows Bourdieu to connect his dispositional theory of action to that phenomenological notion of a taken-for-granted (i.e., second nature) grasp of the stakes of and necessary moves in an infinite
Theoretical Linkages and Differences

Having explained LeVine et al.’s (1994) and Bourdieu’s (1990) particular theoretical stances, it is useful to clarify how LeVine et al.’s argument for cultural mediation differs from Bourdieu’s own relational mode of thought regarding his notions of field and habitus. In essence, the key difference between LeVine et al.’s cultural mediation model and Bourdieu’s relational mode of thought rests on the different lenses these theories provide for analyzing, in this instance, the logic in parental behavior that exists between Euro-American and Chicana/o families. For LeVine et al. (1994) mediation of our species-wide organic hardware by specific ecological firmware and cultural software is driven by a parental desire to achieve an “optimal parental investment strategy,” as in the case of Euro-American (as well as Kenyan/Gussi) families. For Bourdieu (1990), however, agents (in this case, Mexican immigrant families) would not rationally and/or consciously plan and enact behavior in direct relation to some universal socio-cultural scripts or rules. Thus, within a Bourdieuan paradigm, one can argue that Mexican immigrant families would not aim for any sort of “optimal” childrearing parental behavior, but would rather act according to an acquired habitus, or set of dispositions, in relation to their “feel” for the particular game(s)/field(s) (in this case, both a collectivist cultural community and an individualist economy) in which they were enveloped (Bourdieu 1990). Moreover, Bourdieu ([1979] 1984) emphasizes that parental behaviors along with strategies of reproduction are intrinsically linked to the individuals’ synchronic and diachronic position within social space. Thus, in this Bourdieuan light, it is imperative that an analysis of any social groups takes into account the mediating role of differing class positions within seemingly homogeneous socio-cultural groups. It is these latter theoretical disagreements on an optimal parental investment and on the inclusion of class that constitute the theoretical backbone of my analysis. In essence, I sought to determine whether Mexican immigrant families’ ethno-specific parenting strategies and investments allow them to raise children that are optimally prepared for an individualistic ecology and for a collectivistic community or inadvertently lead them to raise children that are half-prepared for both.

Breaking From the Broad Socialization Perspective

In general, the socialization process for native born citizens and immigrants alike continues throughout an individual’s life course and educational career (Patrick 1967). The process, however, intensifies during childhood, adolescence, and young adulthood (Ehman 1980:101). Of particular importance in the socialization process, at this stage, are civics, history, and social science courses (California State Board of Education 1997). Teachers of these courses explicitly and consciously discuss United States political culture in these courses to assimilate youth into the nation’s democratic, political, and heavily Euro-American and individualistic culture (Easton 1967; Patrick 1967; Dahl 1991).

The socialization process within schools does not occur in a social vacuum. Whether one plans to observe high school teachers, peer groups and/or presented media, sociological literature has made it clear that child and adolescent socialization is not a universally uniform process. Moreover, it is heavily reinforced or countered by parental childrearing (i.e., parental socialization at home) (Easton 1967; Patrick 1967; Ehman 1980; Dahl 1991). Thus, it was crucial for me to focus on the importance of parental childrearing as truly the primary source for societal differences between class, ethnic, and gender sub-groups, as these differences vary considerably amongst adolescent students within the same classrooms and schools (Langton 1967; Lyons 1970; Abramson 1977; Sanchez-Jankowski 1986; Celeste 2006). Even more, although I took ethnicity, gender, and class into account when conducting my research, I planned to give precedence to the understudied effects of immigrant status in the parental socialization process as it particularly related to family choices regarding education, gender roles, and overall preparation for adulthood.

METHODOLOGY

As previously emphasized, the guiding motive for my research is to directly study the childrearing process within Mexican immigrant families, as to be able to understand and explain not only its concrete mechanisms, but its potential variations within an economically heterogeneous group of families (i.e., low and high SES families) within their own home setting. Previous research on parental socialization of ethno-racial minorities has primarily focused on quantifying the success or failure of the overall process (Patrick 1967; Segura and Pierce 1993). Its central findings have been limited to correlations between socio-economically deprived/ethnic minority environments and children’s low levels of socio-political efficacy and school
participation (Patrick 1967; Lyons 1970; Celeste 2006). Little attention has been given to the actual process by which particular parental styles and children outcomes are reached and maintained across socio-economic groups of the same cultural, ethnic, and national background (Patrick 1967; Mirande 1977; Segura and Pierce 1993). Thus, I intended to study this process within both low and high income and ethnically homogenous home settings to generalize some of my findings to similarly composed Mexican immigrant families within the United States.

To explain the socio-cultural emergence of Mexican immigrant families’ childrearing strategy, I observed and interviewed a total of six immigrant Mexican nuclear families and other relevant extended family members (e.g., grandparents, aunts, uncles, godparents, etc.). To access low-SES immigrant Mexican, I focused my recruiting efforts within Catholic churches in Richmond and Oakland, California, which have recently experienced a sharp increase in its working class Mexican population. I approached members of the Catholic Church in these two cities and asked if they could help me locate recent Mexican immigrant families of limited means within their parish. With the help of these Catholic clergy members, I was able to approach four recently arrived low-SES families. Given my own background as a Mexican immigrant and my fluency in Spanish, I was able to quickly form a strong sense of rapport with three of these four families; this immediate ethno-cultural connection allowed me to gain access to their homes within a matter of days. To access high-SES immigrant Mexican families, I focused my recruiting efforts on the University of California, Berkeley campus, which has a relatively large number of highly educated faculty and staff of Mexican citizenship. By contacting a few references from various faculty/staff members of Mexican descent on campus, I was able to use a snowball sample of willing Mexican immigrant families that allowed me access to observe them more on the basis of my student affiliation with UC Berkeley than due to my similar national and/or ethnic background.

As I recruited these two groups of families, I accounted for variables such as immigration status, household size, acculturation, and class. Once I had been granted access to their homes, I engaged in “field-fluid” interviews, in which I had broad questions that I would ask at opportune moments in the observation process to further shed light on an interesting family interaction or conversation. For instance, I would ask the families something pertaining to authority when they were disciplining their children for misbehaving. Or, I would ask them about their own families’ parenting styles when the subject of Mexico or immigration was brought up in a conversation. Finally, I recorded and analyzed my discussions of these immigrant Mexican families’ childrearing behaviors as they directly related to their desired and/or sanctioned household structure, gender personality, and group identity.

**CHARACTERISTICS OF SAMPLE**

I observed six Mexican immigrant families two at a time (i.e., two families per day in their respective homes, which were either in Richmond or Oakland) for roughly three months. Three of the families were of high socio-economic background, while the other three self-identified as working class. The families were all Catholic, and in all the families both parents were born in Mexico. In two of the high-SES families both parents were fluent in English, while in the remaining high-SES family only the father spoke fluent English. In the three low-SES families, all parents had some degree of understanding of English, but only two were fluent. All the children spoke fluent English, and were between the ages of 8 and 14. English was rarely spoken at home, however, in all six households. As a result, I translated the majority of my interviews from Spanish. Below is a table that succinctly summarizes some key descriptive information about the families I observed.

**Strategy**

To devise a feasible strategy for answering my research question, I needed to take into account the different components of the general socialization process. As a model, I followed Brown and Gary’s (1991) universal socialization process, which takes into account the agent(s), the learning process, the target(s), and the outcome(s). Given the aim, nature, and limited time of my study, I primarily focused on the first three elements of this universal socialization process, and bracketed the outcome component, which has already been extensively studied using surveys and closed-ended interviews (Patrick 1979; De la Garza and Yetim 2003; Celeste 2006).

Lastly, I would like to mention the particular home settings my study required. In essence, I needed to get access to the families’ living room and dinner conversations, the parent’s involvement with their children’s homework or extracurricular activities, and to the family living room and/or other home areas where the family interacted and/or gathered. In terms of these families’ homes, I gained access to most of the rooms where at least one family member was present. Conversely, I had serious difficulties observing any type of extracurricular activities and sibling interactions, as they spent a great deal of their time out with their own school friends.
TABLE 1: COMPOSITION OF FAMILIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family</th>
<th>Income and Education</th>
<th>Household Structure and Size</th>
<th>Language(s) Spoken at Home and Immigration Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low SES</td>
<td>Gomez $34,000, No High School</td>
<td>Two-Headed, 2 Parents and 3 Children</td>
<td>Spanish, Mixed Status Household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pardo $33,000, No High School</td>
<td>Single-Headed (Male), 2 Parents and 4 Children</td>
<td>Spanish, Mixed Status Household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rodriguez $42,000, Some High School (in Mexico)</td>
<td>Two-Headed, 2 Parents and 3 Children</td>
<td>Spanish, Mixed Status Household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High SES</td>
<td>Losano $67,000, B.A.</td>
<td>Single-Headed (Male), 2 Parents and 2 Children</td>
<td>Spanish, All Documented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reynoso $84,000, B.A (Both)</td>
<td>Two-Headed , 2 Parents and 1 Child</td>
<td>Spanish, All Documented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Levi $130,000 B.S. &amp; M.A.</td>
<td>Two-Headed, 2 Parents and 3 Children</td>
<td>Spanish, All Documented</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Having gained access to mostly living room and kitchen settings, I proceeded to observe the manifest behaviors of the following agents of political socialization: parents and/or extended family members (e.g., aunts, uncles, grandmothers) and overall sibling interactions within the home. These manifest behaviors ranged, but were not limited to: verbal and/or written conversations, comments, commands and general physical interactions. For the sake of objectivity and clarity, I used existing socialization literature (which I mostly re-worked from the school setting to the home setting) to operationalize the agent-specific behaviors.

FINDINGS

Raising Mexican [American] Kids

The underlying commonality in parental logic between both low- and high-SES Mexican immigrant parents boiled down to the realization that their kids were being raised as Mexican children in the United States. Pressing and vivid conceptualizations of various ethno-racial and cultural struggles their kids were going to be subjected to were framed similarly between both of these groups of parents. In essence, both groups of parents knew their children had to be raised differently than other children (particularly, Euro-American children) in this country; or as Mr. Losano (a high-SES parent) and Mr. Rodriguez (a low-SES parent), respectively, put it:

I am raising two Mexican kids, not two little white kids. I know that, and white people know that. What would have I gained if my kids had learned to read and write English at four, if they would not be able to talk to their grandma, who only speaks Spanish?

I'm Mexican and my three kids were born here, but they are all still Mexican. I know they are citizens, but they are not citizens like gringos are. I can fool myself and tell them nothing of Mexico; but, if I do that, they are not going to be here nor there. And it's sad to say, but I know they're always going to be like two people; but, they won't be as bad as me. At least they will be able to talk in both languages. And they are going be able to go back and forth whenever they want. I just have to make sure I teach them that they are just like me and like all their cousins in Mexico; they are just really lucky to have all their papers. And it's hard on me to be here, but I'm here to make it less hard for them.

In both of these excerpts, the parental realization of difference and of cultural and/or linguistic loyalties framed a very particular type of parental socialization. The key compromise parents made raising kids whose linguistic and/or cultural difference would place them at a disadvantage in an individualist society emerged from the awareness of the ethno-specific
collectivist demands (e.g., familism, confianza, compadrazgo, respect, and so on) that their kids were going to be subjected to within their own cultural milieu. On the one hand, Mr. Losano’s awareness that primarily teaching his children to speak Spanish at home placed them at a disadvantage in the academic realm was evidence of his family-based compromise to ensure his kids had a proper relationship with their grandmother (and other family members) back in Mexico. On the other hand, Mr. Rodriguez was also aware of a compromised identity result (e.g., dual and/or mixed, in this instance) in the national and/or group identification his kids would adopt through both parental and broad American (e.g., political, cultural, economic, etc.) socialization; but, this compromise he accepted as a necessary struggle his children had to endure to be able to simultaneously relate to their cousins in Mexico and to their undocumented parents at home. In conjunction, the pushes and pulls in the parents compromise differed both in content and degree in various occasions. Both groups of parents encountered elements to compromise upon, but it became evident that the patterns of compromise were greater in number and degree amongst low-SES parents, whose combined lack of cultural and economic resources, as well as predominantly undocumented status, led them to engage in a childrearing that was compromised at times in intent and at other times by outcome. To better illustrate these dual compromises, I will proceed to present the particular family structure of both groups, while also delineating the particular process of childrearing as a complex set of parent/elder-child interactions I classified as showing and shaping.

Showing and Shaping

The basic mechanisms by which these formerly described parental socialization messages are presented fall into the general pattern of showing and shaping. Firstly, parents present/show the various concepts (e.g., ethnic activism) or topics (e.g., a critique of U.S. immigration policy) through a conversation or some type of visual media (usually the news telecast). These concepts and topics are typically linked to examples that are contemporary, historical, and/or hypothetical in nature. These linkages allow children to directly apply abstract concepts and topics to more concrete examples. But, more importantly, these linkages allow the parents to try to shape the ideas of the children regarding these various concepts and topics. For instance, Mrs. Levi (a high-SES Mexican immigrant mother) used a comparison between the current U.S. government to the historical government of Mussolini’s Italy, as means of providing her two middle school children a direct critique of the political system they live in. Similarly, Mr. Gomez (a low-SES Mexican immigrant father) had repeatedly applied his concepts of struggle and repression to the contemporary example of immigrants in the United States to depict the role that large immigrant marches had in the increased number of ICE raids. Clearly, such negative comparisons are indeed intended to shape the beliefs of their children in accordance to their parents’ beliefs. These comparisons, however, are usually enveloped in a family discussion that allows the parents to somewhat cover their role in the shaping process.

These family discussions (negative or positive) are also the mechanisms by which parents relate information to their children in a practical and everyday manner that their children can readily engage. In addition, the parents’ initial description of the concepts and the questions they answer and pose during the family discussions are the mechanisms by which political and cultural knowledge is presented to their children in an instrumental manner that directly relates to the U.S. and Mexican cultural systems. Both these mechanisms are employed even when the parents do not have a structured conversation plan. In past instances when the parent does not have a news telecast to outline the key concepts, she or he has relied on anecdotes, Internet pictures, or books to provide the instrumental socialization messages that children are to then use to answer practical questions relating to either historical, hypothetical, or contemporary issues that relate to them as an economic, political, and ethnic community.

Practical Pedagogy and the Media

In general, there was a pattern of multicultural and college-related posters in high-SES Mexican immigrant homes that arguably intended to convey parental messages of ethnic pride and academic achievement. For instance, one parent had a poster of the Aztec Calendar and another one of UC Santa Barbara (the university the parent attended) at the front of his office. Similarly, there were numerous posters depicting national and global maps as well as past U.S. presidents. These posters were clearly intended to provide geographical and historical literacy for the children.

Even more, I became aware of an anti-violence thematic pattern in a large portion of home or office portraits, paintings, or posters. For instance, I noticed posters of anti-violence activists such as Martin Luther King Jr. and Cesar Chavez in four out of the six homes. In light of these posters, I concluded that such an anti-violence and activist thematic pattern was a proxy for issues pertaining to social change, which conveyed a message of support.
for either ethnic resistance and/or political struggles. In this line of socio-political messages, Mr. and Mrs. Levi, for instance, actively made mental notes to themselves when they came across something they deemed useful in educating their children about ethnic relations and racism. Specifically, the following demonstrates their rationale for renting and showing their two oldest children, Miguel and Lucia (ages 12 and 14, respectively) the film *Babel*:

Mr. Levi: Well, I am always looking for things to show them. And not just things that I think the school can cover. No, other things, you know—like racism. My kids tell me they are sometimes called names, and my little one, they called him a *mojado* [wetback]. And the sad thing is that it was another Mexican kid who called him that.

Mrs. Levi: Yes, that is what made me angry, too. And I just remembered that when we saw the movie. Especially, when they are crossing back at night and the Mexican cop gets really rude with Gael [Garcia Bernal, who plays an undocumented immigrant in the film]. So, I wanted to show them that. So, they know what to expect from people.

Mr. Levi: Imagine if we did not do it. Who else will? At school it’s mostly whites and at home is just us Mexicans. It must be hard for them, so we make sure we teach them important things. And to be proud, too. So, we show them Mexican films all the time.

**Family Styles, Climates, and Groups**

Several early socialization scholars (Lyons 1970; Patrick 1979; Segura and Pierce 1993) have argued that children of low socioeconomic status within an ethnically homogenous (or heterogeneous, for that matter) high school and/or home settings would experience an authoritarian teaching and parenting style that discouraged critical discussions and/or active participation, while promoting forceful indoctrination and/or rote memorization. My own observations within a low-SES home setting, however, are in sharp contrast with the findings of these latter scholars. I observed that low-income Mexican immigrant parents constantly engaged in discussions of controversial issues, such as the Iraq war, crime, racism, political corruption, and immigration reform. In effect, these parents occasionally used these controversial issues as pedagogical tools aimed to demonstrate the democratic/activist routes towards social change and/or towards a complete reformation of the current political system as it related to them as a family and a cohesive ethnic group. An illustrative conversation that occurred between Mrs. Gomez and her daughter, Gloria (age 12), while they were watching coverage of the political parties in a Spanish news telecast, succinctly exemplifies this rather open pattern of childrearing in low-SES families:

Gloria: Ama [short for “mama”/mom], what do the donkey and elephant pictures mean?

Mrs. Gomez: They are just some stupid little drawings. Mexicans should always vote for Democrats. Republicans are all a bunch of racist *gachachos* [pejorative commonly used to refer to Euro-Americans; akin to *gringos*].

Gloria: But what do they do to us?

Mrs. Gomez: They are all those bunch of white people that go to the border and shoot at the poor people crossing, knowing we don’t have any guns on us.

In line with this latter controversial example, but in a much more structured manner, I noticed two distinct patterns of parenting emerging within high-SES Mexican immigrant parents. On the one hand, these parents typically used activities, discussions, or chores designed to grab their children's attention through the incorporation of various visual media outlets, ranging from interactive online videos to small TV clips. The content of such visual media was controversial in nature and typically discussed public health and civil rights issues (e.g., the rise of fast food, condom use, the immigration debate, and/or the Iraq war) that are particularly salient or taboo for Mexican/Chicana/o communities. On the other hand, these parents also heavily relied on impromptu presentations/conversations on cultural and/or academic subject matter (ranging from some proper rules of the Spanish language to Mesoamerican civilizations) in the living room, as well as in collective reading activities designed to convey large amounts of information that the parents deemed essential for their children’s cultural preparation. The content of these presentations/conversations
also dealt with political issues such as racism, the financial economic crisis and/or President Obama’s attitude towards Latinas/os. But these social, economic and political issues were heavily enveloped within a primarily factual framework. Mr. and Mrs. Reynoso, for example, demonstrated this pattern of impromptu conversations when they showed their only child, Victoria (age 9), a map of the Americas with the locations of various ancient indigenous groups; they began by focusing on Mexico, primarily:

Mr. Reynoso: Vicki, mija [term of endearment, meaning my daughter], look at the map and tell me where we’re from.

Victoria points to Mexico City and says: Ugh, you already know I know.

Mrs. Reynoso: Yes, we know, but this is a different map. We just wanted you to see all the different people. Look, the Mayas and the Aztecs. But, I bet you didn’t even know about the Olmecs.

Victoria: I knew who they were. They are the ones from Oaxaca; the ones that look like short and dark chinitos [diminutive of Chinese people].

Mr. Reynoso laughs and says: Esos meros [loosely translates to: Those ones].

In terms of group differences, I rarely observed any type of distinct behavior that I could readily link to any class group, exclusively. Nevertheless, both groups of families’ home compositions fostered or prevented certain family members from participating in family activities and discussions. First, any type of conversation that occurred along 1) adult lines (i.e., between either of the two parents and an adult family member or friend) or 2) gender lines (i.e., between either gender group within a particular home sphere like the kitchen or the living room) prevented the inclusion of children and members of the opposite sex, respectively. For example, in one family gathering at the Rodriguez home the gender ratio in the kitchen was noticeably asymmetrical (with close to four female adults for every child, male or female), the females dominated the discussion and immediately prevented any child from speaking—the children generally left the room and gathered by the TV or in the backyard with the rest of the children. It is important to note, that female children, however, were occasionally allowed to interject in conversation, if they were generally quiet and sat on one of the adult female’s laps. Such compensatory behaviors were particularly salient for Mexican/Chicana female children in low-SES homes, where the gender composition was overwhelmingly female, at any given time during the day. One possible explanation for this phenomenon could be the salient gender roles that exist between the female and male Mexican children that delineated the home sphere as the respectable female place, and the public sphere as the expected male place (Bourdieu 2000; Segura and Pierce 1993). A vivid demonstration of this pattern of expected gender roles within low-SES families was provided by Mrs. Rodriguez when discussing her daughters’ constant complaints of unfairness in the allocation of household chores:

And it’s not like I am one of those women who think my girls are going to live in the kitchen. But I have to teach them how to take care of the household. And I know they always cry and moan about the dishes and the sweeping and all of those things. I do understand them; they are three and their brother is just one (and he is the dirtiest, too). But, they have to know at least the basic things. I am not like my mother; she made us sew, and plant roses and plants, and even milk cows. At least I make sure their brother gets his own food. I still serve their dad his food, but it’s because he is tired from work and he hardly sleeps. It’s a sacrifice I make as his wife. And even though I try to make sure they are prepared I want them to live better. I do want them to go to school, and they are not burras [loosely translates to dumb] in school like their mother; and they know what awaits them if they don’t study. I think that fear alone makes them try harder in school, but until they leave the house they are going to have to help me; it’s too much work for me alone.

Home Structure and the Culture of Elders

The homes for both high and low-SES Mexican immigrant families were typically run by an age-based chain of command. In essence, the home setting operated on a pattern of self-regulation on the part of the children that often times tried to avoid punishments when their parents were away
through an expressed/enacted obedience to their “elders,” be they to their older siblings, aunts, uncles, grandparents, or godparents, and so on. At any point in time when no formal family gathering was taking place, children were allowed to talk and ask questions, which allowed the home to function as an open system. In fact, parents and extended family encouraged divergent thought and critical thinking, since they typically engaged the children in discussions over current and controversial issues (ranging from the political to the equally valued family gossip). The entire home dynamic was to some degree dictated by the adult or “elders” in charge at any given point. The elders often changed their plans on the spot according to the behavior and level of engagement of the children. In essence, if the children were loud and/or disobedient, the elder postponed a certain chore assigned, and usually retracted to threats of informing their parents of their misbehaving.

Mrs. Losano’s sister, Eva, best exemplified this childrearing logic when she babysat while her sister went to the doctor:

“When I tell my sister I am going to take care of her kids I always ask her if she allows me to have the kids con todo y nalgas [which is a phrase that refers to permission to spank the kids she is taking care of] in case they don’t listen to me. I hardly ever hit them, but I do tell my sister how they behaved and if she wants to do something about it, good; and if not, well, they are her kids, so she is going to deal with them longer. The good thing is that she doesn’t let them walk over her; and she is very good about making sure her kids respect their elders. She knows I don’t like majaderos [loosely refers to kids who are insolent, particularly to their elders].”

As such, the elders operated as the direct linkage between parents and children, and less as independent socializing agents within the household. Thus, the only instances when the children’s behaviors changed the socializing messages the elders sent was when the resulting assigned chore or activity did not pertain to the originally planned activity/topic by the parents.

**DISCUSSION**

To adequately delineate and extend the established patterns that I observed during my limited period of observation, I have to engage in a constant dialogue with the parental socialization literature and empirical revisionism pertaining to Mexican and Chicana/o home settings/spheres. Within this dialogue, I will point out how my own observations are in support of or in opposition to previous established findings regarding parenting styles, home climates, gender differences, and group identity. Lastly, I will provide a holistic discussion of the childrearing messages pertaining to a family life and an ethnic system in constant flux and/or crisis, which Mexican immigrant parents within the dominant Euro-American culture transmitted repeatedly and with a sense of duty and urgency.

**Beyond Ethnic Revisionism**

Having previously emphasized the rich ethnic and cultural ties of Mexican and Chicano families, it is crucial for the Bourdieuian aspect of my analysis to emphasize that this group still maintains heterogeneity in regards to their class status. This heterogeneity, Segura and Pierce (1993) outline when describing the recent findings of revisionist research on Chicana/o families. Bolstered by this empirical data, revisionist researchers have often examined the features commonly associated with both working-class and middle-class Chicano/a families, including familism (beliefs and behaviors associated with family solidarity), compadrazgo (extended family via godparents), confianza (a system of trust and intimacy), a high Spanish language loyalty, a gender specific division of labor, and high fertility.

These previous empirical findings are in line with this study and, subsequently, establish the bridge to my analysis of the Mexican immigrant families’ hybrid childrearing. First, however, I have to put one aspect of LeVine et al.’s computer metaphor (the “organic hardware” concept) into context as to permit my analysis of socio-cultural tendencies amongst Mexican immigrant families. In essence, LeVine et al. (1994) define organic hardware as “those aspects of human parental care and ontogeny that reflect species-wide anatomy, reproductive physiology, neurophysiology, and growth patterns” (p. 16). This general definition is not able to explain, for instance, the concrete causes of the higher birth rates in the Mexican and Chicana/o communities, as this feature of the communities is not genetically predisposed. Rather LeVine et al. make the point that although the “organic hardware of parenthood and child development provides a basic set of parameters that limit the number of children women can bear at one time, and the levels of performance that children reach at given ages,” that this hardware is subject to “cultural mediation” (p. 20). Given this cultural mediation context, I argue that Ybarra (1983) correctly asserts that
Chicana/o families are culturally inclined to establish large families in order to increase the rate of **compadrazgo** (or, in my case, the fostering of multiple “**elder**” figures) to affirm close connections to extended family members.

Similarly, Keefe and Padilla (1987) note that “extended households and extensive family networks are other important features associated with Chicana/o familism” (p. 14). This desire in the Chicanas and Chicanos to maintain **compadrazgo** along with elder/ethnic familism, in turn, can be explained as a cultural script enveloped in the LeVineian (1994) concept of “cultural software.” To make this latter claim more tangible, however, this notion of cultural software functions as a “directive force” behind the particular high fertility in and family structure (emphasizing both **compadrazgo** and elder/ethnic familism) of Mexican immigrant families by invoking “ideas that influence parents in a particular population, and give them a common sense of what is natural, normal, and necessary in reproductive behavior and child care” (LeVine et al. 1994:20).

This latter LeVineian explanation for cultural software is rather simplistic, however, as it ignores both its socio-cultural context along with its historical fluidity. Thus, Bourdieu’s conceptualization of **habitus** as “society written into the body” and as a durable and transposable set of dispositions could better explain how Mexican immigrant families retained the practices of **compadrazgo** and elder/ethnic familism even after forcibly or voluntarily migrating to the United States. Moreover, the continued creation of family ties (in my observed cases, through a collective elder/ethnic familism, which placed all adults of Mexican descent as direct agents of socialization along with parents themselves) is crucial for the survival or any social group; or, as Bourdieu (1990) puts it: “In short, groups—family groups or other sorts—are things you have to keep going at the cost of a permanent effort of maintenance” (p. 63). With this more inclusive (both socio-cultural and historical) grasp of group behavior and maintenance, one can make the analytic jump from Mexican immigrants’ family structure to their parenting behavior, and their children’s gender personalities along with their overall collectivist group identities.

**Behavioral Familism and Confianza**

To understand parenting behavior in Mexican immigrant families, it is helpful to define and emphasize what Zavella (1987) describes as “behavioral familism;” or in essence, what he terms “the cultural principle of **confianza**” or the belief that “only certain people outside the immediate family are to be trusted with the private information … [which] suggests … [is] the [result of] mistrust of outsiders to Chicana/o kin networks [that] has developed historically in response to the oppressive conditions of internal colonialism” (p. 254). It is this behavioral familism (or **confianza**), that depicts the first element of the Mexican immigrant family’s hybrid childrearing that I observed. In this case, the parental compromise (between the Mexican habitus and the [dominant] Euro-American economic field) is between the Chicana/o inclination to maintain a certain level of distance from non-Chicana/o families/individuals and the Chicana/o need for multiple networking connections (i.e. social capital) that could be helpful for job opportunities and social mobility in the individualistic economy in which their cultural community is enveloped. For LeVine et al. (1994) such a compromise would fail to fit within his optimal parental strategy model, as they posit that all families would rationally and consciously attune their parental behaviors (in this case, following the principle of **confianza**) to provide the best possible set of resources/opportunities for their offspring. Within the more applicable Bourdieuan (1990) paradigm, however, such a compromise is merely one possibility in an infinite number of acts” that agents (Chicana/o families, in this case) will carry out according to their uncalculated feel for a particular (i.e., culture/economic) “game” (p. 63).

**Gender Spheres in Parental Socialization**

This compromise between cultural community and individualistic ecology is also evident in Chicanas and Chicanos socialized gender personality along with their group identity that I observed. The impact of the compromise can be seen as a driving force in the early formation of separate male and female identities in Chicanas and Chicanos, respectively. For instance, Segura and Pierce (1993) emphasize the impact of “non-exclusive mothering … for the development of feminine and masculine personalities in Chicana/o families” (p. 303). In essence, the impact from this compromise in individual Chicanas and Chicanos is a result of their inculcated aversion to cultural death and their acquired need (i.e., class habitus) to compete in an individualistic economy that is neither color nor culturally (nor gender) blind. Thus, it is useful to look at Chicanas and Chicanos as two separate groups in order to understand the gender-specific factors of their parental compromise.

In the case of Chicanas, the practice of non-exclusive mothering is especially important given the strong level of attachment Chicanas develop for their grandmothers and/or godmothers; or as Segura and Pierce emphasize/cite:
Chicanas are sometimes as close, if not closer, to grandmothers or godmothers as they are to their own mothers. Marlene’s Zepeda’s research (1979) indicates that grandmothers are important role models for young Chicanas, particularly with respect to culturally specific skills (speaking Spanish, cooking traditional foods, celebrating Mexican holidays), and that they form particularly strong ties to their children as opposed to the children of their sons (1993:304).

It is important to notice the emphasis that grandmothers and godmothers (and female “elders,” as in my case) place on cultural continuity, which is a source of conflict (and compromise) between Chicana’s gender identity and their desire to be in sync with the (Euro-American) feminist movement. For instance, Segura and Pierce note that “in 1990, Chicanas’ labor force participation rate was 50.6 percent while that of Chicanos was 79.6 percent” while also pointing out that “Chicana/o families tend to be mother-centered with women responsible for the majority of household and child-rearing decisions and tasks” (1993:303-5). However, Segura and Pierce note that despite the fact that Chicanas “mothering occurs in a patriarchal context,” Chicanas see their mothering “not as a direct challenge to male providers but, rather, as an assertion of their cultural gender role” (p. 305). Segura and Pierce argue that “among Chicanas and Chicanos, women’s work in the home is often articulated as ‘part of doing Chicana’” (p. 305). Such a conception of acting out gender does not appear to fit a LeVineian conscious and/or rational choice on the part of Chicana women. Rather, such behavior is better explained by Bourdieu’s (1990) notion of habitus as a “second-nature” feel for the game (and its stakes) that in this case applies in both these Chicanas public and private spheres (p. 163). What is more, such a habitus in Chicana women is clearly operating within a deeply gendered unconscious that has fostered a “system of homologous oppositions” between the male and female social spaces and behavioral dispositions (Bourdieu 2000).

Moreover, Segura and Pierce claim that the implications of the feminist movement for Euro-American women are different for Chicanas:

The sense that a woman’s mothering is part of her Chicana identity is bolstered by interaction across kin networks and the larger ethnic community that can result in Chicanas feeling more strongly motivated to mother than European-American middle-class women whose kinship ties are more dispersed. When Chicanas contest traditional patterns they can become caught between their desire for personal empowerment and their politically charged responsibility for cultural maintenance. Thus, the need or motivation to continue traditional patterns may be more complex for Chicanas inasmuch as it is one potential site for reinforcing Chicana/o culture and ethnicity (1993:305).

Thus, for Chicanas their gender personality is a Bourdieuan habitus/field compromise achieved by refusing to give in to either their communities’ cultural pressures towards patriarchy (as evidenced by their high percentage of job participation and aspirations towards higher education that I observed) or to the ecological/individualistic (and feminist) pressures to give up their gender identity (as evidenced by their attempts at “doing Chicana” by taking a central role in household tasks and the maintenance/transmission of culture through non-exclusive mothering and childrearing).

In the case of Chicanos, Segura and Pierce argue that “although [Chicanos] may be mothered by more than one primary female caretaker, [their] maleness means that [their] female nurturers do not identify with [them] in the way they identify with their daughters” (1993:305). In response to this matriarchal gender identity of Chicanas, Chicanos “are more likely than their sisters to identify with their fathers and with potential male occupational roles” (p. 305). As I observed, these Chicano children do seek the public sphere as an escape from the home sphere in which their gender roles (and privileges) are slightly diminished. Because of this specific matriarchal element in Mexican immigrant and Chicana/o families, previous sociological literature has wrongly presumed that “machismo [might have been] one response to the structural obstacles Chicano men face in achieving masculinity in a social world that has historically denied them equal participation” (p. 306). In defense of the Chicana/o community, Segura and Pierce claim (as do I) that “patriarchy within Chicana/o families does not constitute a culturally unique pathology (or machismo) … as male domination/female subordination transcends any one cultural group” (p. 307).

Nevertheless, for Chicanos, their marginalized position in the Chicana-centered, cultural family and in the Euroamerican economy/ecology (and community) pressures them to “invoke ‘family’ and ‘community’ in ways that suggest a cultural and political overlap in masculine identity” (Segura
and Pierce 1993:307). As a result of these gender/ethnic-specific features of the psychosocial experience of the Chicano gender identity, “high-achieving Chicanos reveal a considerable overlap between their desire to ‘help the community’ and their wish to attain individual excellence” (p. 307). This same observation I corroborated by noticing that a large majority of Chicano children and adolescents were engaging in community service projects through their church or through a school club of their choosing. Thus, Chicanos eco-cultural compromise is more subtle than that of Chicanas; it is Chicanos who are doubly marginalized (both in family and ecology/community/field) and who must, then, defend their ethnic identity through an acquired set of dispositions inclining them towards ethnic/class activism, while also saving their gender (patriarchal) identity through a class habitus that predisposes them towards both individual and economic success (via legal and/or illegal means). This empirical and theoretical finding is in line with the higher level of economic and activist ambitions I recorded from the Mexican immigrant/Chicano male children and adolescents I observed.

CONCLUSION

Having analyzed Chicanas and Chicanos gender identities (and gender-specific eco-cultural compromises in the ways they are raised), I would like to conclude by consolidating the two into a unified group identity (including both gender and ethnicity). It is important to note, however, that this Chicana/o group identity is not some LeVineian vestigial rule or script of a way of life that was only beneficial in northern Mexico (pre-1848) and that should have changed and/or evolved through the 150 years of attempted Anglofication of Chicana/o families by Euroamericans. Rather, I have found that this group identity is a Bourdieuan compromise between Chicana/o families’ determination/disposition to preserve as much of their Mexican (and collectivist) culture as possible, without falling out of line with the dominant Euroamerican ecology/economy and into perennial social, political, and economic stagnation.

It is important to tie all of the Chicana/o family complexity together through an analytical recap, which, in essence, makes even more tangible my analysis of their LeVinean/Bourdieuian childrearing compromise. First, Chicana/o families do in fact make a compromise in the way they raise their children. Second, a considerable level of parental agency existed, but it was not performed under an optimal strategic plan, as LeVine had posited. Third, the overall consciousness of this compromise I found to fall more heavily within Bourdieu’s framework of feel-based strategic maneuvering in a vast and complex childrearing game. Fourth, this compromise between cultural/collectivist community and individualistic ecology/economy is also evident in Chicanas and Chicanos socialized gender personality along with their group identity. Fifth and lastly, the overall process of parental socialization occurred within a semi-structured pattern of “practical pedagogy,” which operated under the delineated childrearing strategy of showing and shaping.

It is crucial to note, however, that given the limited number of families observed it is difficult to generalize to the whole Mexican and Mexican immigrant communities in the entire Bay Area, let alone California. But, it is similarly important to notice (and further study) the existing pattern/process of socialization and the overall childrearing compromise that is made by collectivist families (particularly, those from Asia and the rest of Latin America) in the United States, as these families account for a large portion of recent immigrant populations.

In conclusion, I would like to add that works like those of LeVine et al., Bourdieu, as well as those by Segura and Pierce, are important not so much because they demonstrate that there is a tendency in sociological literature to use a “one-white-size-fits-all-colors” analytical vantage point to make faulty, universal, and world historical claims. Rather, these contributions are significant because they demonstrate that the marginalization of non-European/white countries, groups, and individuals is wrong at both a moral and scientific level. For, arguably, the complexity of Chicana/o families (and that of the Gussi and Kabyle families, as well as of other ethnical/collectivist groups) is helpful in understanding the broader socio-cultural world. And, more importantly, in a globalized world, the usual excuses of sociologists to exclude a majority of the human population (on bases of total dissimilarity) is largely challenged by the current subjective (the English language and worldwide media) and objective (globalized economy and massive world migration patterns) linkages that tie our socio-geographical world together—to the point that only multi-cultural/theoretical accounts of psycho-social phenomena hold any sort of world/human-wide universality.
REFERENCES


NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Sarah Erlich earned a BA in Sociology and a minor in City and Regional Planning in May 2010. In 2009, she received the Outstanding Research Paper Award in the UC Berkeley Washington Program for research about District of Columbia Mayor Adrian Fenty’s decision to close the only operating emergency homeless shelter in downtown D.C. In 2008, she received the Friesen Paper Award for the best research, theory, or policy and planning analysis paper completed in an Urban Studies course at UC Berkeley. This research examined the eviction of an African American car detailing business in an African American enclave in South Berkeley and its proposed replacement with an all-female, predominantly white biodiesel cooperative. During her college career, she interned for the San Francisco Mayor’s Office of Neighborhood Services; the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices; the Children’s Health Initiative, Napa County; UC Berkeley’s Center for Urban Ethnography; and Esperanza Community Housing Corporation. A California Senate Fellow, she currently works in the State Capitol as legislative staff. She aspires to become a public interest attorney.

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Simeon J. Newman is a student of sociology and of history at the University of California, Berkeley. He arrived at UC Berkeley in 2008 after earning an Associate of Arts degree at the College of the Siskiyous. His primary interests concern the politics of exploitation and class domination. Focusing on the Americas, he has endeavored to historicize sociological theory and to apply theory to point to world-historical implications. In 2009, he presented at the First Annual UC Berkeley Sociological Research Symposium. In 2010, his research won the UC Berkeley Library Prize for Undergraduate Research. He has done extended historical-archival research, and is currently conducting a comparative sociological research project on the petite-bourgeoisie. He will receive his Bachelor of Sociology and Bachelor of History degrees in May 2011.

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